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ABSTRACT
Iraq is a poor country with a per capita income of
I.D. 76 (0 212) per annum in 19&5* She has underdeveloped 
resources and large supplies of foreign exchange from her oil 
exports. She is not short of unskilled labour or land and 
excellent opportunities exist for development in agriculture.
Since 1950 the governments have attempted vigorously to 
develop the economy and have stressed (probably incorrectly) 
industry and industry has grown from 7 .6% of national income 
in 1953 to 1 1*2% in 1963 at an annual average rate of 1 1.5%«
In this thesis I have discussed, analysed and appraised 
a number of policies adopted by the government of Iraq designed 
to promote the growth of the industrial sector. These 
policies were of two kihds:
(i) The establishment of enterprises financed, con­
structed and operated by the government.
(ii) The encouragement of the expansion of private indus­
trial enterprises, by protecting them from foreign competition, 
through the provision of finance, by way of tax exemptions of 
all kinds and through controls over the allocation of invest­
ment .
This thesis shows that a key constraint on a more rapid 
rate of industrial growth and the long term development of a 
viable industrial structure has been the administrative bottle­
neck. Thus central planners formulated investment programmes 
without regard to the capacity of government agencies to
3implement their plans. Consequently only a fraction of 
funds available for industrialization plans was actually 
utilized. Moreover because of the low quality and limited 
capacity of the administrative machinery in relation to the 
volume and complexity of tasks imposed on it, tariff rates 
were determined haphazardly, import prohibitions were deter­
mined without proper reference to economic principles; tax 
exemptions were extended arbitrarily; no proper steps were 
taken to provide industry with sufficient working capital; 
and the government attempted to control the allocation of 
private investment by means of very restrictive and cumber­
some procedures. Consequently some of the designed incentives 
acted as impediments to private efforts.
PREFACE
In writing this thesis I have benefited from my employ­
ment with the Iraqi Ministry of Industry from 1959-61 and 
1965-6 6. Many of the ideas in this thesis were formulated 
then, and my job inside various departments of the Ministry 
made me familiar with and gave me access to published and 
unpublished information related to the industrial sector.
This study concentrates on one sector of the economy, 
namely industry. The rest of the economy is brought into the 
picture, only to show the relative importance of the industrial 
sector and to clarify certain aspects of its relations with 
other sectors. I utilized statistics whenever possible, but 
the thesis has an institutional bias because I wish to stress 
the institutional and administrative bottlenecks to industrial 
development in Iraq. I have concentrated on the period 1950-65, 
but where the discussion became concerned with the historical 
development of institutions and policies I covered a longer 
time period.
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first 
chapter is devoted to the government’s efforts to develop the 
economy before 1950 and forms a background to my study from
1950-65. In chapter two the government’s attempts to create 
an organizational system to formulate and implement its 
industrial plans is discussed. This chapter also analyses the 
characteristics of Iraq's public administration and describes
V5
the internal organization of the Ministry of Industry.
Chapter three deals with investment programmes formulated during 
1951-65* In this chapter I discuss the method of plan formu­
lation, the size of the plans, the allocation of investment 
among different sectors of the economy and the choice of projects 
in the industrial sector. In chapter four I outline the imple­
mentation process for investment programmes. Because of the 
re-organization of the planning machinery in 19 5 9* and the 
change in policy after the revolution of July 1958, I sub­
divided the chapter into two sub-periods, 19 50 -58 and 19 59-65  
and make comparisons between them.
Chapter five deals with policy towards institutions con­
cerned with the finance of private industry. In the first part 
of the chapter the discussion concentrates on the role of 
commercial banks and the Central Bank of Iraq in providing working 
capital to industry. In the second part of the chapter I dis­
cuss the activities of the Industrial Bank of Iraq, namely its 
provision of short and long-term loans, its participation in 
the equity capital of private companies and its efforts to give 
industry technical assistance. Chapter six is devoted to the 
consideration of protection, tax exemption and control over the 
allocation of private investment in industry. In chapter seven 
I summarize the thesis and offer my conclusions.
The government did not seek to encourage the growth of 
industry through a multiple exchange rate policy or through 
bilateral trade agreements. Nor did it guarantee minimum profits 
on investments in industry. These policy instruments are there-
fore not relevant to this thesis.
Tables carry two numbers, the numoer of the chapter and 
the number of the table. For example, tables I.3 and IV.5 
refer to tables 3 and 5 in chapters I and IV. All laws and 
regulations mentioned in the thesis are published in the 
Official Gazette of the Government of Iraq, and they also 
appear in annual collections of laws and regulations passed 
over the year. Only the number of a law and its year are 
cited here. A summary of each citation is given in the 
footnotes and tne hibliography contains full citations.
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Chapter I
GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1921-1930
The main purpose of this chapter is to show governmental 
efforts tovdevelop the economy before 1 9 5 0, as a background to 
my study during the period 1950-65* This chapter includes a 
brief description of the economy in 1 9 2 0, which is compared 
with conditions of the country in 19 50, and shows the slow 
progress during those three decades. The role of Government 
in the development of the economy is shown through the analysis 
of its capital expenditure in comparison to total government 
expenditure and gross capital formation. Two of the main 
factors that caused slow progress were shortage of Government 
revenue and political instability. The vast increase in oil 
revenues from 1950 solved the first problem. By comparing oil 
revenue to other sources of government finance, state develop­
ment expenditure, and exports other than oil, I will show that 
at that time, the stage was set for a much higher rate of capital 
formation. It remained for the Government, however, to devise 
an organisation which could provide continuity in development 
work.
1 . Conditions in 1920 
Present day Iraq, mainly but not entirely the ancient 
Mesopotamia, became a political entity in 1920. The first 
Iraqi Government was formed under the British Mandate in 1921 
and achieved independence in 1 9 3 2 .1
1. Khadduri, Independent Iraq 1932-56, pp.l and 14
lb
From 1920 the country started simultaneously to build a 
national administration and develop its resources. Conditions 
in the country at that time were such that its economic develop­
ment required the provision of basic public services, without 
which productive activity of all kinds cannot function properly. 
These include law and order, education and public health, 
transportation and communication, power and water supply, 
irrigation, drainage and flood control. This was necessary 
because during the Ottoman rule in Iraq (153^-1917)» public 
services remained meagre and economic activity was handicapped 
by lack of social overhead capital. ’’For example in 18 78, it 
cost about #1 .5 0 to transport a dollar’s worth of grain from
p
Hilla to Baghdad - aciistance of about 60 miles”, because Iraq’s 
roads were mere tracks suitable only for goods carried by animals. 
Moreover, the administration outside the large towns was
ineffective hence the need to pay dues to tribes through whose
3
territory goods were transported.
Before the First World War, a small section of a railway 
was completed by the Ottoman Government, but during the war 
and immediately after it British occupation forces constructed 
a railway system which connected Baghdad with Basrah in the 
south and Khanaqin and Kirkuk in the north east. This was an 
important improvement but ’’The total length of the railway
2* Geary, Through Asiastic Turkey, Vol.l. p. 190
Quoted by Langley, The Industrialisation of Iraq, p. 105
3* Langley, The Industrialization of Iraq, p. 105*
15
system was 1139 miles in 1920 consisting however of a numoer
of unconnected sections built for the most part of second
hand rails and the rolling stock was a heterogenous
collection of such second hand or worse vehicles as could be
k
spared from the Indian railway11 By 1920, other sorts of 
mechanised transportation were introduced and there were 3*500  
Kilometres of roads, but they were all earth roads impassable 
for a great part of the year by the few dozen motor vehicles 
operating in the country then.
Public utilities were practically non-existent during 
the Ottoman rule. Electric generating equipment was never 
installed and no town had a modern water supply. By 1920 
only "an inefficient installation pumped crude river water 
into Baghdad, but no other town in the country had either 
electricity or^pumped water”^ But the water of the rivers 
of Iraq "are high in colloidal and organic materials, and usually 
high in bacteria. It is necessary, therefore to treat such
supplies of water for human consumption if general health
7
is to be maintained”.
The health organisation of Iraq during the Turkish rule
g
’’existed largely on paper”. Foreigners visiting the holy 
shrines in Iraq or on their way to Mecca through the country
b* Colonial Office, Special Report on the Progress of Iraq,1920-31«P»15
5. Ibid. pp. 137-139
6 . Ibid. pp. ibl
7- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
The Economic Development of Iraq, p. *+58 
8. Colonial Office, Special Report on the Progress of Iraq,
1920-31, p. 6b
16
9
usually exposed it to dangers of imported epidemic diseases, 
yet "quarantine was still largely a bribe - extracting force"^
By 1920, there were 51 dispensaries, 25 Iraqi doctors, and 28 
hospitals, but only one or two of these deserved the name of 
hospital."
Education suffered from neglect during the Ottoman rule
12and the methods of teaching were primitive . In 1920 there
were 84 primary schools with 6742 students and 3&3 teachers,
there were four secondary schools and one college of law
with only 65 students. The meagreness of educational facilities
is reflected in the fact that almost 98% of the population
were illiterate
Public administration during the Ottoman rule was highly
centralized, minute decisions were referred to the next highest
authority and often to Constantinople. The administration
was undermined by intrigue and a responsible bureaucracy did
not develop. Moreover, "tribal life dominated the country
side and tribal leaders, often at loggerheads with each other
14were more or less independent of effective Turkish control."
9* I.B.B.D., Economic Development of Iraq, p. 353
10. Longrigg, Iraq 1900-1950i A Political, Social and Economic
History, p. 53
11. Qubain, The Reconstruction of Iraq 1950-57» P* l8.
12. Longrigg, Iraq, 1900-1950, p. 37
13* Colonial Office, Special Report on the Progress of Iraq, 
1920-31, p. 224.
14. Langley, The Industrialization of Iraq, p. 9
17
yet there is no doubt that an effective control over the whole
country and an efficient bureaucracy is necessary for the
development of the country. In this respect the conntry in
1920 was only slightly better, if at all, than it was earlier.
The Ottoman regime provided no major water storage, drainage
or flood control facilities and widespread flooding continued to
be one of Iraq's major problems. It did, however, authorise
Sir William Willcocks, a British Engineer, to carry out a survey
of Iraq's irrigation system. He submitted his recommendations
in 19H» and one of his proposals, the Hindi\}ah Barrage, was
completed in 1 9 1 3» which provided an adequate flow of water
through the Hilla branch of the Middle Euphrates and thi6
15prevented a large area from going out of cultivation. But in 
1920, the Barrage was "already in a weak condition, a part of 
the floor and a subsidiary weir downstream of the regulating 
gates having been destroyed by the action of the river and the
16original steel gates naving proved unsuitable for their purpose"
Other elements of social overhead <apital were in no better 
condition during the Ottoman rule. For example, before the 
First World War "there were no port facilities at Basrah (Iraq's
only port) except three custom examination sheds... The conditions
17of loading and unloading were exceedingly primitive" By 1920
modern port facilities were installed in B a s r a h w h i c h  were ample
l8for the demand on their services.
15* Langley, Industrialization of Iraq, p. 134
16. Colonial Office, Special Report on the Progress of Iraq, 1920-31 
17« Ibid., p. 169 p.179
18. Ibid., p. 171
18
Table 1.5 summarizes conditions of the country in
1920-1921 and makes clear how primitive it was not so very 
long ago.
2. Government Development Efforts 1921-50
The newly established Government assumed full responsibility
for the development of the country, right from 1921. In its
development activities it used to have, besides the ordinary
budgets, an extra ordinary budget which was a part of the former
budget and under the control of the Ministry of Finance. The
19accounts of this budget were devoted to capital works. These 
capital budgets were in the form of Five-or Four-year programmes 
a number of which are summarized in Table 1.1. The table shows 
a rapid change of programmes and the reason behind this will 
be explained later. Each of these development programmes had a
Table 1.1
Authorized Expenditure under Capital Budgets
1931-1942
I.D. thousands
Period Total Authorized Average Annual
Expenditure Authorized Expenditure
1931-35 2,210 442
19 3 4 -3 8 3,237 647
1936-40 4,120 824
1938-42 8,230 1,049
1939-42 11,135 2,783
Source: Government of Iraq, Laws No. 79 (1931), No. 39(1934>
No. 33 (1936) No. 45 (1938) No.37 (1939) and Ordinance No. 28
Notes One Iraqi Dinar (I.D.) = 1,000 Fils = £1 sterling from
19 31 -65
19* Qubain, Reconstruction of Iraq, 1950-57, P« 19
schedule attached to it specifying on what projects funds
were to be spent. But these programmes did not include
development projects carried out by Government's semi-
autonomous organisations, such as the Port of Basrah Authority
and the Railway Administration, which had budgets separate
from the Government budget, and each carried out its own develop
20ment programme.
Table 1#2 shows total Government expenditure on capital
works compared with total expenditure and gross fixed capital
formation. As a percentage of total Government Expenditure,
capital expenditure rose very rapidly during khe 1930s.
During the war development expenditure dropped considerably,
both in absolute terms and as a percentage of total expenditure.
Although capital expenditure started to rise after the war it
did not recover the pre-war level as a percentage of total 
21
expenditure. In absolute terms capital expenditure was
greater in the post-war years than in the pre-war period, but
did not recover the pre-war level of I.D. 2.4 million per
22annum during 1938-40, in real terms, because the purchasing
power of the Iraqi Dinar during the post-war period was about
23a quarter of its pre-war level. Table 1.2. shows that
20. Qubain, The Reconstruction of Iraq, 1950-57. P* 20
21. Table 1.2, Column 11
22. Table 1.2, Column 4
23• Ministry of Economy,,Statistical Abstract, 1958, pp. 122-128
and Central Bank of Iraq, Bulletin, New Series, No.l, 1965.
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the share of Government in gross investment was 34% during
1921-50. Its share, however, was rising before the war and
government was responsible for 68% of gross investment during
24
193&-40, but its share declined to 25% daring 1946-50.
The investment by the Government went almost entirely 
into social overhead capital. During the period direct 
Government investment in the manufacturing sector was completely 
absent. Projects included in these investment programmes were: 
Government administrative buildings, schools, hospitals, clinics, 
quarantine stations, museums, resort hotels, roads, bridges, 
wireless, telephone and telegraph lines, barrages, canals, etc.
Of special interest to our study is the fact that these programmes 
provided for the establishment of a refinery and the Agricultural- 
Ihdustrial Bank, but in actual fact the direct contribution of
these programmes to the industrial sector was the provision of
25funds for the Bank which started operation in 1936. The 
concentration of government capital expenditure on social overhead 
capital is clear from Table 1.3 which is the summary of the 
schedules attached to the 1934-3& and 1949-53 programmes. Out 
of I.D. 108,000 allocated for other purposes, I.D. 65,000 was 
devoted in the 1934-3$ programme to the establishment of state 
Ahdustrial projects and the encouragement of private industries; 
this sum represents 2% of total allocations. But the Government 
did not invest directly in the manufacturing sector, and this is
24. Table 1.2 Column 12
25. The Bank is studied in Chapter V.
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Table 1.3
Allocation of Funds between Major Sectors in the 
1934-38 and 1999-53
Government Capital Budgets
I.D. Thousands
Major Sector 1934-38 19*+9-53
t • +. J-D * ** I *D - %Irrigation 1,591 58.5 35,300 bl
Building 9** 3 29*5 11,600 20
Communication 293 9*0 9,900 17
Other 108 3-0 1,000 2
Source: Government of Iraq, Law No. 39 (193*0 and Langley,
Industrialization of Iraq, p. 167
one of the reasons why the share of industry in the total 
investment was relatively low, as can be seen from Table 1.4
Table 1.4
Average Gross Investment by Major Sectors
TotalPeriod Agriculture
I.D. Thousands 
Transportation Industry Others
1 9 3 3 -39 ,5 2 0 1,300 ,120 0,420 2,360
19^6 -5 0 2,000 5,500 0,570 2 ,8 6 0 10,930
Percent of Total
1 9 3 9 -39 22% 55% 5% 18% 100#
19^6 -5 0 19% 50% 5% 26# 100#
Source: Abu-El-Haj, Capital Formulation in Iraq, 1921-57,
p. 10.
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To comprehend the magnitude of capital formation it would 
be useful to compare it with national income, but unfortunately 
estimates for the period are not available. The national
2<income of Iraq, in 19^9* was estimated at roughly I.D. 140 million.
Since total gross investment during the same year was I.D. 14
27million, gross investment was roughly 10$ of national income 
in 19^9* On the other hand Dr. Fenelon estimated that gross
28domestic investment was 11$ of gross national product in 1930.
So far as these figures represent the period under study the
ratio of gross investment to national income seems to have been
around 10$. Although the governments share of investment
expenditure was high, the share of investment in gross national
product was relatively low. Moreover, the level of national
income was extremely low. Therefore the investable funds under
the control of the government were small in magnitude. These
funds were not enough to support large development programmes
or even one large flood control complex necessary to control
the exceptionally difficult environment of Iraq and to make
possible a rapid utilization of the country's water resources.
For example total government expenditure on capital formation
during the period 19^1-19^9 was less than the total cost of
huilding the Thartar-Hdbaniya flood control compltx.^ Gi^en
26. United Nations, National and Per Capita Income of Seventy 
Countries, pp. 14, 22 
27* Abu-El-Haj, Capital Formation in Irqq, p.4
28. Fenelon, K.G. Iraq, National Invome and Expenditure 1950-1956* 
29* Total expenditure on Tharthar project, built during 1952-52* was 
more than I.D. 17 million, Ministry of Finance, Department of 
Accounts, Annual Report on Development Board Projects, 1959*
p.12
Zk
Given the desperate need for all sorts of social overhead 
capital, the available funds, over and above the ordinary 
government expenditure, were fully utilized to finance the 
most necessary investment in social overhead capital. Under 
these circumstances the government could not implement a policy 
of industrialization based on direct government investment.
The reason for the absence of direct investment in this sector 
was not the unwillingness of the government to enter the 
industrial sectors but basically the lack of means to Finance 
industrialization.
3• Conditions in 1930 
Unfortunately the financial resources of the government 
were only enough to allow a very moderate expansion of social 
overhead capital, thus although the framework of the required 
facilities was laid down, most of them were still in poor con­
ditions in early 1950s, and in need cf substantial expansion 
despite the fact that in comparison to 1920 important progress 
had been achieved. For example, the length of the road system 
increased from 3*500 Kilometres in 1920 to 8,000 Kilometres in 
1950,^^ and this included 2,500 Kilometres of metalled and 
surfaced and 500 Kilometres metalled roads. But the road system
was nevertheless in a poor condition and impassable in most
31parts for a large part of the year. In 1950 a programme was 
laid down for building and improving 37 major roads with a total 
length of 3*^63 Kilometres which was a sound programme according
30. Table 1.5
31* I.B.R.D., Economic Development of Iraq, p. ^7 
>2. Ibid» p. -T?9
25
to the I.B.R.D. Mission*s Report. The Mission pointed out 
that in addition "agricultural and forestry development areas 
need feeder roads to the nearest railway station or main
road or both  to the length of 8,000 Kilometres". The
Mission found that the railway system, which consisted at 
that time of a single line of metre gauge linking up the north 
east with the south through Baghdad and another standard guage 
single line that connected Baghdad with Mosul and the Syrian 
border, was on the whole ample for the then demand. It, never­
theless, agreed more or less, with the recommendations of the 
consulting engineers, Rendal, Palmer 8c Tritton, of Westminster, 
London, who, in 1951* recommended a detailed rehabilitation 
and modernization programme for the railway system. Moreover, 
the Mission maintained that there was "no doubt that the 
division of the railway system into two guages with a trans­
shipment point in the centre (was) a handicap to full traffic
3 ^ 0 X10 0 t G ddevelopment" . Adding to this the/increase in demands, which
was so that the system was operating at full capacity by 195&,
means that expansion was clearly needed in the railway system
which, together with the Basrah Port facilities, were the most
advanced social overhead capital in Iraq at that time.
Table 1*5 shows that during the three decades the numbers 
of schools, teachers, pupils, colleges etc., increased vastly. 
Nevertheless, in 1950, there were 175*000 children in schools 
out of about 750,000 of school age and probably 87% of the 
32. Ibid., p. 239
33* I.B.R.D. Economic Development of Iraq pp. 319i 52^
3*+. Langley, Industrialization of Iraq, p. 117
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35population were illiterate. Despite considerable progress
in the health services which is clear from Table 1*5, as a 
result of which the incidence of epidemics was cut down, there 
was need for much further progress because Mthe main endemic 
diseases - malaria, schistosomiasis, trachoma and ankylostomiasis - 
(were) still very common"?^
Table
A Comparison between some 
Aspects of Iraq*s Conditions in 1920 and 1950
Item Unit 1920-21 1949-50
Length of the Railway System K1 1339 1648
Length of the Road System ti 3500 8000
Metalled and Surfaced it - 2500
Metalled only 11 - 500
Earth Roads n 3500 5000
Government Primary Schools No. 84 1100
Pupils in Governmeht Primary Schools it 6742 175000
Teachers in Primary Schools tt 363 6588
Government Secondary Schools it 4 108
Pupils in Secondary Schools ti 233 :19433
Teachers of Secondary Schools it n.a. 871
Colleges it 1 9
Pupils in Colleges 11 65 3021
Hospitals 11 28 89
Dispensaries 11 51 448
Iraqi Doctors it 25 797
Towns with piped Water Supply 11 1 4o
Population 11 2,840,000 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
% of Population Illiterate 11 98% 87%
Towns with Sewage Systems n 0 0
Source: Colonial Office, Progress of Iraq, 1920-3 1, PP . 6 5* 13 7,
139* 157* 224; I.B.R.D. Economic Development of Iraq,
pp. 63* 314, 327; Ministry of Education, Report on 
Education, 1949-50 and Ministry of Economy, Statistical 
Abstract, 1951* PP* 87* 98
Note :_____n.a. means not available.__________________ ________________
35• I.B.R.D. Economic Development of Iraq, pp. 62-63 
36. Ibid p. 351
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Infant mortality was estimated to be 250 per thousand live
births and "about 20% of the young men liable for militery
service (were) found to be unfit due to diseases th?t affect
37their ability to work" . A safe water suiply*is one of the 
keys to the health problem, by 1 9 50, 40 municipalities had 
modern safe water supplies, but this was not enough and a plan 
was prepared to provide 114 municipalities having a total 
population of 9 5 0 ,0 0 0 with these facilities. The ^orld Bank 
Mission found that the programme was sound and stated that 
"there are numerous villages in addition to municipalities
38
where the problem of obtaining water is critical" , hence the 
need for a much larger programme. Considerable progress was 
achieved in providing large towns with electricity. Neverthe­
less a large number of municipalities had no electricity at all;
moreover, per capita consumption of power in Iraq was among the
39lowest in the world and power rates among the highest. Sewage
was completely neglected even in Baghdad but Post, Telegraphs,
Radio Communications, Air Transport and City Transport were all
4oestablished but all in need for further drastic expansion.
In the field of flood control and irrigation small works
of immediate value such as canals, regulators, and vital flood
banks were constructed but "in the spring disastrous floods
often inundate large areas; and in the fall water was acutely
short. Agriculture was hampered not only by the inadequate and
irregular supply of water but also by the progressive salination
37* I.B.R.D. Economic Development of Iraq, p. 459
38. Ibid♦ p. 61
39* Ibid. p. 46l
40. Ibid. pp. 332-339, 457
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4lof the soil in the irrigated area" . The extension of flow
irrigation, made possible by building the Kut barrage, which
42was completed in 1 9 3 9, was an important achievement.
In 1920, aside from handicrafts and some cottage industry
there was no other industry worth mentioning. Factories were
43virtually unknown". But in 1950, the I.B.R.D. Mission
reported that "industry is little developed. Although perhaps
as many as 6 0 ,0 0 0 people are engaged in industrial production
(other than oil), virtually all of these are employed in small
undertakings where the work is done largely by hand and
productivity is accordingly quite low. Probably about 2,000
are working in what might be characterized as modern industrial 
44plants"
Perhaps the most important single achievement was the 
extension of the administration to cover the whole country.
Thus "whereas the Turkish Government had exercised rarely more 
than a partial control never at one time operative over the 
whole country, and the Iraqi Government in its early years could 
claim a wider but still not pervasive authority, in 1950 no 
surviving enclaves of non-government remained in desert or marsh
45
or mountain" . Nevertheless, the deep roots of instability 
were still there, mainly because the country was "still engaged 
in the process of welding diverse racial and religious groups into
41. I.B.R.D., Economic Development of Iraq, p.l
42. al-Khalaf, The Economic Physical and Human Geography of Iraq,p.213
43. Qubain, The Reconstruction of Iraq^ pT 1 8 .
44. I.B.R.D. The Economic Development of Iraq, p.2
45. Longrigg, Iraq 1900-1950, p. 394
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46conscious nationhood", and "a formidable range of unsolved
problems, inter Arab and international, political and financial
47
confronted the Government".
4• Main Problems of Development 
From the establishment of Iraqi Government in 1921 until 
1950, the country registered slow but appreciable progress.
There were many reasons for this slow progress two of which 
were lack of state revenue and political instability.
During the period 1921-50, Government revenues were small
48in relation to its ordinary expenditure . It managed, however, 
to spend 12% of these revenues on capital works on average. The 
ratio of capital expenditure to total Government expenditure
49was high (29%) during 1935-40. uil revenues were not large
but they were still important, for they represented 15% of total
50Government revenues during 1931-50, and were equal to 26%
51of exports other than oil.
A spectacular development in the oil industry in the early 
1950s, transformed the prospect of Iraq: oil revenues increased
to an extent that made capital cease to be, for all practical 
purposes, a constraint on the feasible expansion of the economy 
for many years. Production of oil increased vastly and 
according to an agreement between the Government and oil companies, 
which became effective from the 1st January 1951, they undertook
46. Clark, Compulsory Education in Iraq, p. 18 Quoted by the
I.B.R.D. Economic Development of Iraq, p. 66
47. Longrigg, Iraq 1900-1950, P« 3&4
48. Table 1.2 Columns 1 and 3
49« Table 1.2, Column 11
50. Table 1.2, Column 9
51- Table 1.2, Columns and 7
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to pay to the Government 50% of the profits attributed to 
their operation in Iraq. Moreover, the companies guaranteed 
that the Governments share would not be less than I.D. 20 
millions during 1953 and 195*+, a^d not less than I.D. 25 millions 
in 1955 aad annually thereafter. But if prevented by 
circumstances beyond their control from producing certain
52quantities, the guaranteed minimum payment would be reduced. 
Although actual revenues far exceeded these limits, the point 
is that the Government was sure to receive large and increasing 
oil revenues. These funds are almost all in foreign exchange. 
Moreover, they accrue suddenly in large amountslike a windfall
A.
that requires almost no effort; they are like free unconditional 
foreign aid that amounts to almost a quarter of Iraq's national 
income annually. Table 1.6 brings out the importance of oil
revenues. As a source of public revenue they represented
53almost 60% of total Government revenues, they were the main
source of development expenditure and they represented 83%
54of the country*s foreign exchange earnings.
The other major cause of slow progress was lack of 
continuity in development programmes engendered by political 
instability. Implementation of development programmes is, 
by necessity, a long-term task. Continuity requires "a measure 
of public tranquility and national cohesion both of which were 
absent. The period was one of turmoil during which the attention
52. Iverstn, Monetary Policy in Iraq, pp. 95-97 
53* Table 1.6 column 
54. Table 1.6 column 7
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Table 1*6
Oil Revenues compared to Total Government Revenues, 
Capital Expenditure and Value of Other Exports 1931-&3
I.D. Millions
Year Total 
Govmt• 
Revenue
Oil
Revenue
Govnmt. 
Capital 
Expend.
Non
Oil
Experts
2
+
4
2
as % 
of 1
2
as %
of 5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1951 44.9 13*9 3*1 27.0 49*9 39*9 44
1952 74.4 4o.l 7*8 18.7 5 8 .8 53*8 74
1953 8 2 .9 5 8 .3 12.2 19*0 77*3 7 0 .3 83
1954 92.8 64.3 20.8 17*9 82.2 6 9 .2 93
1955 125.9 73.7 31.3 15*9 8 9 *6 5 8 .5 82
1956 113.8 68.8 43.0 13*1 81.9 6o.4 84
1957 97.6 48.8 57*4 12.8 6 1 .6 5 0 .0 79
1958 137.2 79-8 5 2 .2 14.2 94.0 5 8 .2 85
1959 133.2 86.6 49.8 11.4 98.0 6 5 .0 88
i960 1 5 1 .2 95.1 47.5 7*9 103*0 6 2 .8 92
1961 187.7 94.1 66.9 7*8 102.6 5 0 .5 92
1962 184.7 95-1 58.7 19*3 114.4 51*4 83
1963 194.3 110.0 53*5 16.7 126.7 3 6 .7 87
1964 221.0 1 2 6 .0 32.1 1 5 .2 141.2 6 0 .2 89
1965 254.0 134.0 57*1 1 8 .1 152.1 54.6 88
Source: Iraq Petroleum Co., Report on Operation of Oil Companies
pp. 9» 13; Central Bank of Iraq, Quarterly Bulletin 
No.59» P* 32 and Bulletin New Series, No.l. 1965, PP* 30,33 
61 and N o . 1967 pp. 24-27-
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of both the public and the Government was focussed on political
problems.......the Government was almost continually pre-
35occupied with maintaining its own positionsn . Moreover,
there was an unusually rapid change of capital expenditure
of
programmes because^the diversity of the views of different
56Cabinets on how the available funds should be spent. Thus
each Cabinet that came to power tried to change the programme 
of the previous Cabinet and prepared its own programme to be 
changed by the succeeding Cabinet if it had time to do that.
The reason for rapid Cabinet changes is to be found in the
political system. In theory the Government of Iraq was
57"constitutional, representative and democratic11, modelled
after the British System. In practice the country had what
58Longrigg called a "Cabinet Government". The king chose the
Prime Minister, they then together chose members of the Cabinet, 
on a personal basis, from a group of people which constituted 
a ruling class that "did not contain a personality capable of
59single rule, or a group of capable and acceptable oligarchy".
It nevertheless "contained on the one hand more than enough 
figures capable of filling the ministerial posts available, but 
on the other too little variety of view point to compete for power 
by the advocacy of genuinely alternative programmes. The 
result was an uneasy shuffle of offices, short lived Cabinets 
with a brief inning for everybody".^
55- Qubain, The Reconstruction of Iraq, 1930-57* P* 22 
5 6 . Colonial Office, Peport on Progress of* Iraq, 1920-314- P* 133 
and Qubain, op.cit. pp. 22-23*
57* Khadduri, Independent Iraq, 1932-58* PP* 13*18 
5 8 . Longrigg, Iraq 1900-1950. P* 395 
59- Ibid. p. 2^3 o0~. Ibid. p. 22^
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Elections were controlled by the Government and frequent 
dissolutions of Parliament rendered it completely at the mercy 
of the Cabinet; Parliament was incapable of passing a vote of 
no confidence in any of the ky Cabinets during 1921-50. These 
fell because of internal quarrels, dead locks, royal disfavour, 
tribal disorder, public demonstrations and riots, intrigue and
military coups d'etat, but never through parliamentary vote of
6lno confidence. By 1950, according to Longrigg, "internal
politics showed no sign of rising above the habitual strife of
62rival personalities", and it was "difficult not to anticipate 
that Cabinet Government would long continue, and with it the 
rootless precariousness of a regime which seemingly at any 
time a successful intrigue or a military coup d'etat could
63
subvert".
Under these circumatances it was essential to devise a 
planning organisation and administration which could provide 
continuity of development work and protect it, as far as 
possible, from the consequences of »pid Cabinet changes. In 
the next chapter the attempts of the Government to establish 
such an organisation are discussed.
61. Khadduri, Independent Iraq, 1932-58, pp. 2 8 8, 365 and
Longrigg, Iraq, 1900-1950, p. 393
62. Longrigg, op.cit., p. 36^~
6 3. Ibid., p. 397
3^Chapter II
THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF 
GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT PROGRAMMES 1950^5
The aim of this chapter is to show Government attempts 
since 1950 to devise an organizational system that would 
provide continuity in development work and to describe insti­
tutions that evolved from these attempts. Special attention 
will be paid to the administrative machinery for industrializa­
tion. This chapter includes a detailed study of the Development 
Board, which was established in 1950 and a similar study of 
the Planning Board, which was established in 1959* We appraise 
also these organisations to show how far Iraq succeeded in 
establishing an administration compatible with her magnitude 
of investment programmes based on financial resources made 
available from oil exports.
1• The Development Board, 1950-5&
To increase the rate of capital formation, made possible 
by increased oil revenues, it was neacessary to draw up co­
ordinated investment programmes which required an efficient 
administration to carry them out. Developing countries, however, 
Mtend, almost by definition to have underdeveloped administrations",^ 
Iraq was no exception in this respect. Although the country 
had some experience in investment projects and programmes the
1. Hanson, A.H. The Process of Planning, A Study of India’s
Five-Year Plans, p. 26o.
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situation became radically different from the earlier period 
because oil revenues made it possible to raise capital expen­
diture to a rate about 10 times the total public capital 
expenditure per year during the earlier period. Such a rate
of expenditure necessitated "a substantial improvement in the
2
efficiency of public administration". The World Bank Mission 
pointed out many defects in the administration, such as 
excessive centralization, inadequacy of pay scales, low morale, 
lack of any sense of participation in constructive work, which 
badly affected the efficiency of the administration,^ it also 
noticed the lack of co-operation and co-ordination of related 
activities thus "various ministries concerned with the erection 
of schools, hospitals, public buildings and bridges generally 
locate their projects without reference to an overall plan 
and without consultation with each other".
The question of improving the administration has many 
aspects. For example, one may ask whethw to plan in the 
sense of co-ordinating investment projects and if so how much 
to plan? What shall be the form of the agency responsible 
for co-ordination; a Cabinet Committee, a committee of experts 
or a mixed one? Where to locate the central planning agency, 
in the office of the Prime Minister; in same existing ministry, 
in a new ministry, or should it be an autonomous body outside the 
regular Government administration? Should planning be separated
2. I.B.R.D. Economic Development of Iraq, p. 77 
3>• Ibid. pp. 77-7$.
4. Ibid. p. 56
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from implementation etc. Clearly there were many alternative 
approaches to improve and expand the administration; experts 
on development administration, however, differ on these matters 
but they agree, more or less, that each country "has to solve
its administrative problems in its own way since the administra-
5
tion is a part of the national culture".
The Government if Iraq at that time noticed that in the
6
past frequent Cabinet changes made long-term progamming impossible.
To solve these problems the Government conceived the idea of
entrusting the task of development to a separate organization
protected from cabinet changes, run principally by experts and
capable of undertaking a planned programme of development. Thus
according to Law No# 23* 1950, an autonomous agency was established
called the Development Board under the presidency of the Prime
Minister with a membership including tie Minister of Finance and
six full time executive members to be appointed by the Council
of Ministers for a five-year term, which might also prolong
their terms. Among the full time executive members three were
to be experts, one in finance and economics, one in irrigation
and a third in one other field to be prescribed by the Council
of Ministers. One of the executive members was the vice-president
of the Board and one of the expert executive members the secretary
general who signed the Board*s contracts and executed its decisions.
Liaison with the Government was maintained through the Prime
7
Minister and the Minister of Finance.
5* U.N. A Handbook of Public Administration, Current Concepts and
Practice, with Special Reference to Developing CountriesTp•vii 
6. Qubain, The Reconstruction of Iraq,p.32; al-Jalali,Lectures on
Economics of Iraq,p.193 and al-Jamali,Iraq Past and Present p.26 
7# Government of Iraq.Law Nm.2^.1^5a^
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The 1950 Law diverted to the Board all oil revenues plus 
funds which the Parliament might devote to it from time to time, 
and revenues from loans, external or internal, undertaken by 
the Board or by the Government on its behalf. After the 1950 
oil agreement which greatly increased the oil revenues, on the 
argument that other relevant Government departments ought to be 
able to carry out minor capital works without passing their
plans through the Board, the share of the Development Board was
reduced to 70% of oil revenues, the other 30% went to the
ordinary budget.^
The Board was given the following tasks: (a) to prepare a 
general economic and financial plan for the development of the 
resources of Iraq designed to raise the standard of living of 
her people, (b) to undertake a general survey of the resources 
of Iraq, and (c) with the approval of Parliament to carry out 
projects mentioned in the programme in accordance with their 
decided priority.
To perform its duties the Board created an administrative 
machinery under its secretary general to assist it in formulating 
and implementing development programmes. Since the Board was 
not a regular Government agency, its employees did not come under 
the Civil Service Law. Thus it was able to offer fairly high 
salaries and ,fattracted technicians and specialists of high
• \Q
quality to its technical departments’. These departments were;
8. Government of Iraq, Law No. 24, 1952
9. Qubain, op.cit. p. 35 and Adams, Iraqfs People and Resources,
p • 1047
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1. The First Technical Section, dealing with irrigation, 
flood control, artesian wells and drainage.
2. The Second Technical Section, which deal\rwith roads, 
bridges and buildings.
3* The Third Technical Section, for industry, mining and 
electr jdLty.
4. The Fourth Technical Section, for agriculture and 
forestry.
5* The Fifth Technical Section, for housing.
6. The Department of Summer Resorts and Tourism.
7» The Miri Land Development Commission, to deal with re­
clamation and distribution of land and the encouragement 
of small holdings, and
8. A General Administrative Department. ^
The establishment of the Development Board created certain 
problems. The Board was a mixed political and non-political 
organ consisting partly of cabinet ministers and partly of full­
time executive members. It could be argued that it would have 
been mere expedient to make the Board a purely administrative 
institution consisting entirely of technical experts and charged, 
like other Government departments, with the implementation of 
political decisions taken by the Council of Ministers. Cabinet 
changes, however, made an organisation that could provide con­
tinuity in development work highly desirable and the Development
10# The Development Board and the Ministry of Development, 
Second Development p. 10.
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Board was exactly such an organisation. But continuity by 
itself is not enough because ministers are responsible to their 
couhtry for the success or failure of development plans and 
they can argue that they cannot be held responsible for the 
activities of an organisation which is not under their direct 
control.
Considerations of continuity require that the Development
Board should have real authority and the means by which it can
discharge its responsibility. The Act of 1950 provided the
Board with real independence. Considerations of Government
authority, however, required a closer link with the Government
than was provided by that law. The independence of the
Development Board was short lived before it gave way to pressure
from the Cabinet in 1953* At that time the new Government argued
that the system of the Development Board gave too little authority
and too little information to enable the Government to deal with
criticisms in the Parliament. The two ex-officio members of
the Board were a minority in a Board of eight which made decisions
by simple majority vote and they were fully occupied with other
affairs so they could not follow development questions as closely
11
as the executive members. Some Iraqi's regarded the Board as a
12strange organization like a Government inside the Government.
11. Lord Salter, Lc Development of Iraq: A Plan of Action,
p. 97-
12. al-Jalili, Lectures on Economics of Iraq, p. 192
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Accordingly Law No. 27 of 1953 wa® enacted which created 
a Minister of Development, with ex-officio membership of the 
Board, and a Ministry of Development under his control. The 
post of Secretary General was abolished and the Technical 
Sections were transferred to the Ministry of Development and 
the Minister assumed the functions of the old Secretary General. 
The Board, however, remained a mixed committee under the 
chairmanship of the Prime Minister with the membership including 
the Ministers of Finance and Development and seven full-time 
executive members one of whom was to be the permanent Vice- 
Chairman. The Board remained to have its own budget which was 
completely separate from the ordinary budget.
A ministry staffed by career personnel and under the 
direction of a Minister was the normal Government department in 
Iraq. This form of organisation ensures full control by the 
Government. The danger is that the administration may be 
subjected to excessive fiscal and personnel restrictions and 
may not have adequate freedom of action. In fact one of the 
immediate repercussions of the creation of the Ministry of 
Development was the down grading of the salaries of Iraqi 
employees when they were incorporated in to the Civil Service. 
Several members of the staff consequently resigned which resulted 
in lower efficiency . ^
The reorganisation of 1953» according to Lord Salter "funda­
mentally altered the character and authority of the Board". The
4
authority of the Government was strengtheded and for all practical
13• Adams, Iraq's People and Resources, p. 10k
*fl
purposes the Board lost its independence because its action
became dependent upon agreement with the Minister of Development,
who alone had the technical staff to advise on policy and to
implement it. Thus although it was the Board which decided the
allocation of funds, the Minister of Development could effectively
prevent implementation because the machinery for implementation
was under his control. Even if there were agreement between
the Board and the Minister of Development, frequent changes of
Ministers would nevertheless delay action because new Ministers
Ikneed time to become familiar with the scope of their work.
The Government thus failed to devise a system which would
render the independence of the Board compatible with the authority
of the Government. The reorganisation of 1953 brought back the
danger of instability in the development work. But despite
151^ cabinet changes during the period 1951-1958 "the Board
maintained an autonomous and independent status rarely enjoyed
by any other Government agency, and was on the whole immune from
political influences"^ because throughout the period Nuri Said
was either in power or very ihfluential and this provided a
17measure of continuity.
To illustrate the Development Board*s system of work we 
will outline below the procedure for the implementation of 
industrial projects: The Board decided from the beginning not
to set up a complete staff of experts but to use consulting firms
14. Salter, "tfln-iS&mic Development of Iraq, pp. 97-98 
15* Khadduri, independent Iraq, p. 372
16. 1 *t. „-i..\ , Ibid . p~! 358
17* Langley, Industrialization of Iraq, p. 205
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to undertake the investigations of the industrial projects
l8covered by its industrial programmes. The consulting firms
also prepared designs and specifications, supervised construction 
and the initial operation of new projects. The Third Technical 
Section, however, was established for industry, mining and 
electricity, with a minimum number of experts to assist the Board 
in selecting a consultant for each project it approved, co-ordi­
nate activities if several consultants were necessary, provide 
liaison between the Board and consulting firms and between con­
sultants, contractors and government agencies concerned with a 
project. According to this system the implementation of a 
specific project required a preliminary analysis so that the 
Board could decide whether the project should be studied in 
detail. In case where the preliminary study was encouraging 
the Board invited a consultant firm to prepare a feasibility 
study which covers markets, availability of raw materials, 
labour, transportation, water and power supplies, production costs 
and the economic justification of the project. The Technical 
Section then submitted its recommendations to the Board on the 
feasibility study. If the project was economically sound the 
consulting firm, after the approval of the Board, started to pre­
pare specifications under which tenders for the construction of 
the project were invited. The Section reviewed these specifi­
cations and if approved by the Board, they were issued inter-
18. Langley, Industrialisation of Iraq, p. 205
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nationally. After tenders from contractors were received the 
consultant analysed them and submitted a report to the Board 
through the Technical Section.
The next stage was the actual construction of a project by 
a contractor or contractors, chosen by the Board, under the 
supervision of the consultant. During this stage the Technical 
Section assisted the contractors to overcome such difficulties as 
slow custom clearances, transportation delays and disputes with 
local citizens or officials. While construction was going on 
the Technical Section also selected Iraqi*s for training in 
order to run the factory when it was established, the training 
could have been in local schools or abroad but under the super­
vision of the consultant or contractor, the training included also 
a period of working in similar industrial plants. The-next 
stage was the initial operation of the plant by the contractors 
under the supervision of the consultant. Finally, the Developmeit
Board handed over the plant to the Ministry of Economy for 
19Management.
Thus the planning and implementation of government industrial 
projects were entrusted to the Development Board and the Ministry 
of Development. The related administrative staff consisted of 
a minimum number of experts; foreign consultants and contractors 
were used heavily. The Board, however, was not only engaged in 
general policy but also in the detailed planning and implementation 
of projects including their detailed technical specifications. In 
fact nothing was done without the approval of the Board, even
19- Langley, Indistrialization of Iraq, p p . 206-207
the selection of students to be sent abroad for training with 
respect to the Board’s projects. The result was, according 
to Lord Salter, excessive centralization in the sense of lack 
of delegation of administrative and detailed planning duties 
to subordinates and other Government agencies. He noticed that 
the Board was spending on capital works large sums of money 
which was nearly as large as the whole ordinary state budget.
Most capital works took several years to construct and the 
administrative work involved was clearly enormous. Lord Salter, 
therefore, strongly urged that the Development Board ’’should 
as soon and as far as possible be divested both of continuing 
administrative duties and of the responsibility for detailed 
as distinct from general planning”. ^
2. The Planning Board, 1959-19&3
The Revolution of July 195& brought, among other things, 
changes in the Government's development administration. The 
Development Board was disbanded but the Ministry of Development 
continued, for a short while to supervise the Board's last 
programme, assisted by an advisory council, until Law No. 7 
of 1959 abolished the Ministry of Development and created an 
Economic Planning Board, a Ministry of Industry and a Minister 
of Planning.
The new Planning Board was a committee of ministers under 
the chairmanship of the Prime Minister with membership of 
Ministers of Finance, Planning and those ministers whose ministries
20- Salter, Development of Iraq, p. 103
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dealt with development such as Minister of Industry, Agriculture,
and Communication.
A planning committee composed of ministers who are most
concerned with development and headed by the Prime Minister is
in a strong position to make decisions which the cabinet will
accept and to facilitate co-ordination of the most important
sectors programmes in a development plan. But such a Planning
Board has two serious weaknesses. First it cannot provide
continuity in the development work where there is political
instability and frequent cabinet changes* When the Planning
Board was created some people thought that the era of political
instability was over. An observer, for example, argued that
the main cause of political instability was the isolation of
the previous regime from the people, since the Revolutionary
Regime, he though, has ended this situation, organisations based
21on it must be changed. The Revolutionary Regime, however,
did not provide political stability; in fact instability 
increased, thus during the period 1958-1965 'there were three 
successful "Revolutions” and a larger, but unknown,number of
22
unsuccessful attempts, civil disorder and lo cabinet changes.
The second main shortcoming of a Board composed of all operational 
Ministers is that "it places undue stress on compromise . . . and 
is likely to have difficulties dealing with issues which are
23
not questions with simple answers but complicated alternatives” .
21. Hassan, Studies in Economics of Iraq, p. 229
22. Information collected by Dr. A. Kfileldar from several issues 
of The Middle East Journal, (The Middle East Institutes, 
Washington, D.C.) and Chronology of the Arab Politics, 
(American University of Beirut)
23* Waterson, iteY.elop,meat ..Planning, p. 490
46
This presumably, is why Law No. 44 of 1964 made the Planning
Board again a mixed committee of Ministers and executive members
under the presidency of the Prime Minister with membership of
Ministers of Finance, Planning, Economy and the GovernC<if!t of
the Central Bank and other Ministers who would be called when
projects concerning their Ministries were discussed by the Board.
The number of executive members was four only which means that
they were a minority in the Board while they were a majority
in the old Development Board.
According to the 1964 Law the tasks of the Planning Board
were: "preparation of a general detailed economic plan and
annual plan; determination of economic, fiscal, monetary and
commercial policies with the approval of the Council of Ministers;
determination of methods and agencies which implement projects
of the plan; supervision of the preparation of annual ordinary
budget; supervision and direction of economic activities of
the private sectors within the general framework of the plan;
and approval of all matters in connection with the implementation
24of any project whose total cost is more than I.D. 25QiOOO»tl
The Ministry of Planning was the technical secretary of the 
Board and entrusted with the formulation of plans as well as 
preparation of various related economic, statistical and 
engineering analyses. The Ministry was organized into depart­
ments dealing with the main sectors of the economy, namely, agri-
24. Government of Itaq, Law No. 44, 1964.
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culture, industry, building and communication. In addition 
there were economic, legal, administrative and statistical 
departments each headed by Director Generals.
Thus the Government set up a central planning organisation 
that constituted the policy-making organ responsible for the 
determination of target and priorities as well as the formula­
tion of detailed plans. Plan implementation*, however, is the 
responsibility of Ministries. This is one of the main 
differences between the old Development Board organization and 
the new Planning Board. An important potential strength of 
the new organization is that it makes it easier for the Planning 
Board to concentrate on general planning imple­
mentation of projects, with their enormous amount of administra­
tive and technical work, to the operational ministries, provided 
that the Planning Board and the Ministry of Planning are ready 
to delegate these responsibilities to ministries and that the 
ministries are prepared to accept them. A serious weakness 
of the new organization is that, uhlike the Development Board, 
plan implementation agencies come directly under the control 
of the Ministry of Finance, this means that these ministries 
cannot increase their capacity to implement plans without the 
approval of the Ministry of Finance. The objectives of Finance 
agencies and of planning agencies are different ones ’’finance 
thinks in terms of economy, planning in terms of development". A
25. Hanson, The Process of Planning, p. 79
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lesson of experience is that "Ministers of Finance in less 
developed countries often pay little attention to central 
planner's plans"?° But if the Ministry of Finance chooses to 
ignore the expansion in the capacity of implementing ministries 
it could create serious obstacles to development. The need for 
coordination between the capital budget and the ordinary budget 
was important under the Development Board Organization, it 
becomes vital under the new organization.
3 . The Ministry of Industry
Law No. ?k of 1959 created a Ministry of Industry to under­
take all activities concerned with the industrialization of Iraq 
and to supervise both public and private industrial affairs. The 
following departments, which previously dealt with industrial 
affairs, were transferred to the Ministry:
1. The General Administration Boards of the Ministry 
of Development.
2. The Department of Legal Affairs and contracts from 
the Ministry of Development.
3 . The Third Technical Section of the Ministry of 
Development which dealt with industry, mining and 
electricity.
k. The Industrial Bank from the Ministry of Development.
5 . The Department of Industry from the Ministry of Economy
which was dealing with industrial research, and 
promotion of private industry.
26. Waterson^Development Planning, p. 391
6. All state industrial plants including Baghdad Electricity, 
The Nuclear Energy Authority, the Mining section of the
Department of Oil Affairs of the Ministry of Economy and
27
Federation of Industry.
The Ministrys organization and tasks were defined in September 
1959 and the Ministry included the Following departments:
1. Department of Diwan For General Administration.
2. Department of Industrial Planning.
3. Department of Industrial Design and construction.
4. Department of Industrial Buildings.
5* Department of Promotion of Private Industries.
6* The Industrial Bank.
7* Centre For Promotion of Industrial Management•
8. Department of Standardization * and specification.
9. National Electricity Authority.
10* The Organization for Management of State Manufacturing
plants and
2811. Federation of Industry.
This study deals only with those aspects of industrialization 
which are covered by those activities under 2, 3» 5 and 6 we
shall discuss later, in detail, the activities of 5 and6 and 
shall deal below with the activities of the other three departments
27 Government of Iraq, Law No. 7^ 1959*
28 Ministry of Industry, Compilation of Law and Regulations 
concerning Industry, PF*59, 6, 11.
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The Department of Industrial Planning was created to collect 
data concerning industrialization, classify and analyse it to 
prepare an industrial plan within the framework of the general 
economic plan. This department was also entrusted with the task 
of following up the industrial plan. It was organized into the 
following sections: economic studies, planning, statistics,
laboratory research and administration.
Thus the planning machinery for the industrial section con­
sisted of the Department of Industry in the Ministry of Planning, 
which represented the central planning organ for industry, and tne 
Department of Industrial Planning of the Ministry of Industry as 
the counter part at the sectional level. According to the 
Ministry of Industry*s laws and regulations, the latter department 
was responsible for drafting the sectoral plan to be submitted to
the Ministry of Planning for finalization and co-ordination with
29other sectoral plans of the economy.
With the exception of Oil refineries, implemenation of the 
state's industrial projects was entrusted to the Ministry of 
Industry - Departments of Industrial Design and construction and 
the Department of Industrial Buildings. The task of the former 
department was the preparation of specifications and the construction 
of Governments industrial projects. It was organized into the 
following sections* electricity and electric industries, mining 
and metallic industries, spining and weaving industry, chemical 
industries and construction material industry. Each one of these 
represented various industrial sub-sections. The department included
29. Ministry of Industry-^ Compilation of Laws, p. 7
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also a civil engineering and an administration section containing 
a special unit to deal with problems of transport delays, insuring 
and storing of industrial machinery.^ The Department of Industrial 
Buildings was entrusted with the construction of buildings connected 
with the industrial projects of the Ministry, andcontained three
51
sections for design, implementation and administration.
, After the reorganization of the governments development
^administration in 1959$ the industrial planning and implementation 
agencies became so numerous that one can hardly think of any
-aspect of industrial development which lacks a specific depart-
32ment to deal with it. Thus the sections connected with
economic and technical research of the Department of Industrial 
Planning in the Ministry of Industry, were supposed to study 
the economy and put forward ideas for the establishment of hew 
projects, the section for industrial planning and statistics of 
the same department were supposed to carry out feasibility 
studies of these ideas covering markets, raw materials, labour, 
power etc. and then present them to the Ministry of Planning, 
which in turn was supposed to call on its Industrial Department
30. Ministry of Industry, Compilation of Laws, p.8 
31• Ibid., p. 11
32. An important missing section from the new organisation is 
a unit to deal with improvements in the administration 
itself, this is not to be confused with administration 
sections in each department which deals with the ‘'household" 
business of the same department. In fact improvement in 
the organisation seems to be no bodies major duty or 
regular responsibility.
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to study the project from economic and technical points of 
view. After initial approval by the Planning Board, the 
Department of Design and Construction in the Ministry of 
Industry was supposed to prepare the specifications and 
designs of the project and then, after the project received 
final approval from the Boards, to proceed with actual con­
struction of the project, assisted by the Department of 
Industrial Buildings. Meanwhile, the section for manpower 
and experts of the Department of Industrial Planning was 
supposed to provide the necessary skilled labour and experts 
to ruh the project when completed.
This is how the system should nave worked according to 
rules and regulations of these departments. In practice, 
however, the actual source of projects, feasibility studies, 
designs and specifications, training of labour and actual con­
struction of industrial projects were not dealt with in the
33system for even the simplest project. Thus although the
Department of Industrial Buildings was supposed to design 
and construct industrial buildings, its activities were, never­
theless, confined only to supervision and follow-up Iraq’s
share in the Civil Engineering and construction of Industrial
34 '
projects covered by the Iraqi-Soviet agreement of 1959* Even 
here, however, Iraq’s commitments were contracted to the private
33- U.N. Industrial Planning, Programming and Policies in 
Selected Countries of the Middle East, pp. 57-58.
3^. For some details of this agreement see pp*77-?8
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"55sector. On the other hand the Department of Industrial
Design and Construction was not directly involved in the actual
v
preparation of designs, specifications or construction of any 
project. The Department was evolved from the old Third 
Technical Section of the Ministry of Development and just like 
that section the department was confined to supervision of work 
undertaken by consultants and contractors, together with other 
tasks which were previously performed by the Third Technical 
Section, such as provision of liaison between consultants, 
contractors and the government etc.
As for the Department of Industrial Planning in the 
Ministry of Industry, it was supposed to study the economy, 
propose new projects, prepare feasibility studies and formulate 
a sectoral plan. In practice it did little, if anything, of 
this sort. This department was evolved from the old Department 
of Industry of the Ministry of Economy which concentrated 
primarily on technical research and laboratory work and was 
"not equipped to analyse and record commercial and economic opera- 
tions of industry11; in other words the staff of this depart­
ment was not familiar with the techniques of project appraisal 
and sector programming. The Department of Industrial Planning 
also continued to concentrate on laboratory research and during
the period 1959-1965 at no time had it had more than 4 graduates
37in economics in its planning and economic research sections.
35• U.N. Industrial Planning in Selected Countries of the 
Middle East, p. 57 
36. I.B.R.D. Economic Development of Iraq, p. 298 
37* Information provided by Mr. N'T Dawooa, an economist 
in that department.
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Between the time when the Department was established (or more 
precisely since it assumed its new name) in 1959* and 1965* 
three ’’general plans” were prepared by the Planning Board, 
but the Department proved to be so inadequate in its planning 
activities that the government, on the recommendation of the 
Planning Board and Ministry of Planning, enacted Law No. 2? of 
1965 in order to establish programming units in all ministries.
This means the establishment of an agency inside the Ministry 
of Industry to assume the responsibilities of Industrial Planning. 
Moreover, almost all the projects included in the industrial
7fi
plans were proposed and studied by outsiders and the department 
did not prepare feasibility studies of any project, these studies 
were undertaken by foreign consultants. Furthermore, when by 
1965 most projects proposed by consultants were either estab­
lished or under implementation, the Planning Board found it 
necessary to authorize the Ministry of Industry to contract a
consulting firm to prepare an industrial survey similar to that
39undertaken by the A.D. Little for the Development Board. Such 
studies basically look for new projects and prepare a pre­
feasibility study for them. Thus it seems safe to argue that 
the enlarged organization for planning and implementation of 
Industrial projects after 1959* represented no real improvement 
on the much smaller and simpler Third Technical Section of the 
old system.
3 8 . This point is discussed in Chapter III.
39* Government of Iraq, Law No. 7 8 ,1 9 6 5 of Five-Year Plan 1965-69» 
p.23 and Arthur D. Little, A Plan for Industrial Development 
in Iraq.
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Nor did the reorganization of 1959 change fundamentally 
the procedure followed by the Development Board in planning
4oand implementing industrial projects. In fact one can sub­
stitute the Planning Board for the Development Board and the 
Ministry of Industry - Department of Design and Construction, 
for the Third Technical Section and repeat exactly what was 
said on pages Hv-V-5 above to get a clear picture of the pro­
cedural method of planning and implementation after 1959* An 
important difference is that the implementation procedure in 
the new organisation involves more departments inside the 
Ministry of Industry, on the one hand, and involves two ministries 
Planning and Industry - instead of one in the old organization, 
on the other hand. Implementation requires of course time- 
consuming cross-references between the different departments 
involved. But the amount of time needed for communication tends 
to be greater the larger is the number of departments involved 
inside each ministry, and communication tends to be slower 
between two ministries than communication inside one ministry. 
Assuming no other changes, the whole process of planning and 
implementation tends to be slower in the new organization.
40. Jalal, F., The Implementation Time Path of the Rayon 
Project in Iraq; A case study, p.l.
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When organizations grow and become more complex, it is
essential to reduce the need for time consuming communication
and maintain only essential cross-references. This can be
done by delegation of responsibility from the Planning board,
for example, down to the departments of the Ministry of Industry.
This requires a fundamental change in the outlook of top
policy makers towards planning.
The or-organization of 1959* however, was not accompanied
by a change in the approach of the Planning Board towards
planning. The "Government announced in April 1959i that it
intended to decenttralize to a substantial degree all matters
kl
connected with economic development" and in fact, one of
the main principles on which the re-organization of 1959 was 
based was the idea of decentralization in the sense of separation 
between planning and implementation of investment programmes.
The Planning Board was created to become a major planning body 
with the Ministry of Planning as its technical secretariat to 
help it in drawing development programmes. Ministries were 
established and made responsible for detailed planning and 
implementation of projects. The behaviour of the Planning 
Board and the Ministry of Planning viz-a-viz other ministries 
remained similar to the behaviour of the Development Board and 
the Ministry of Development towards their Technical Sections.
4l. Langley, Industrilization of Iraq, pp. 307-308
57
A report by the World Bank pointed out in late 19^3 that "the 
Economic Planning Board, though officially at Ministerial 
level, is preoccupied with details of project approval, award 
of contracts, even selection of personnel. The result is 
that little attention is given to basic issues of development 
policy and strategy on the one hand, nor on the other hand to 
the task of improving the administration machinery and procedures
1*2
throughout the Government to make inplementation mere expeditions".
To comprehend what preoccupation with details of implementa­
tions mean I need only to quote the Five-Year Plan 1961-65 
which made the Planning Board responsible for "assignment of 
consulting engineers, approval of economic and technical 
reports and the preliminary specification of projects, approval 
of general conditions of tenders and contracts, approval of 
technical specifications, and final designs of projects, the 
method according to which a project must be implemented, announce­
ment of tenders and extension of terms, awarding of tenders, and 
changes in specifications, approval of necessary appropriations 
for projects, dealing with compensations delays arbitrations etc., 
disposal with movable and immovable proparty of the project, 
approval of completion of the project, approval of budgets state­
ments and programmes prepared for spending on projects, appointment 
of foreign engineers and employees for the purpose of implementation
42. I.B.R.D. International Development Association, Current
Economic Position and Prospects of Iraq, September 19&3, 
p.7.
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of the plan, changing of sites of projects, suspension of work
on a project or part of it, transfer uf necessary funds for the
continuation of a project from the annual appropriation of
subsequent years to the preceeding year whose allocation are
exhausted, and the insertion of the names of contractors dealing
with the Board in the blacklist should it be required by public 
43interest".
Now the bulk of these functions are purely administrative. 
Thus beside preparation of the detailed plans the Board monitored 
in minute details the implementation of projects, in this sense 
planning was highly centralised. Such a system may be tolerable 
when the size of the plan is small, in the sense of including 
few projects, and the administrative machinery efficient so 
that members of the Board could devote a fairly large amount of 
their time to the plan. But neither of these conditions was 
satisfied in Iraq. The plans included a large number of 
projects, for example, the 1961-65 plan included nearly 300 
projects of which 50 were industrial, it involved expenditure 
of more than I1D. 560 million (which was almost equal to the 
total government ordinary budget during the same period). Most 
of the projects were large involving several consultants and 
contractors* for each project while the implementation process 
took several years. It is clear that concentration of decision
43* Government if Iraq, Law No. 70, 1961 of Five-Year Detailed 
Plan 196I-6 5, paragraph 7 of article 7
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making for the administrative and technical details of such
large number of projects "poses insuperable problems for
communication. Few individuals at the apex of the pyramid
find themselvs challenged to make quickly a range of decisions
44which would require supernatural capabilities". Moreover
these few individuals were not in a position to devote their 
whole time to planning; the Board until 1964 was a committee 
of ministers and throughout 1959-65 it included the Prime 
Minister and the Minister of Finance, who clearly had other 
important responsibilities. Under these circumstances, no 
matter how efficient is the implementing machinery, the whole 
process will be sbwed down by the bottlenecks of top-level 
review. On the other hand the time consuming tasks of 
reviewing project selection, evaluation, preparation and imple­
mentation prevented the Board, according to an I.B.R.D. study, 
from undertaking its more vital tasks of general planning such
as the assessment of total resources, selection of alternative
45patterns of investment and formulation of policy.
44. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries, The
Theory of Prismatic Society, p. 283*
45. I.B.R.D. Current Economic position and Prospects of
Iraq, p. 7
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4. Administrative Defects 
An efficient bureaucracy may reduce delays caused by 
concentration of decision-making in the centre, but one can 
hardly expect to find an effective and efficient bureaucracy
46
in almost all developing countries. The efficiency of the
bureaucracy depends on the ability of the peopfe employed by
the Government. Personnel recuirements can be divided into
three categories, namely, administrative, technical and clerical
In Iraq the first two were understandably short in both number
47
and qualifications and the third in qualifications.
The World Bank Mission noticed that the number of students
48in technical schools were inadequate for the needs of Iraq.
As to quality, the same mission reported that, for example,
the College of Commerce and Econ mics "apparently produces
neither competent and practical bookkeepers and accountants,
nor people well grounded in economics and finance capable of
acting as company secretaries or as economic and financial
49experts in business or Government". In fact, the shortage in
the number of qualified people was so acute that, according
to a member of the Development Board, it would have been a
miracle to expand the bureaucracy to cope with the increased
50amount of work implicit in Irqq*s development programmes.
46. Waterson, Development Planning, pp. 249,278; Swerdlow, 
Economics as Part of Development Administration, p. 108;
Hanson, The Process of Planning, pp. 268,288 and Riggs,
Administration in Developing Countries, pp. 244-245.
47. al-Jalili, Lectures on Economics of Iraq, p. 257
48. I.B.R.D. Economic Development of Iraq, p. 257
49. Ibid. p. 297
50. Ionides, Divide and Lose, p. 125
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Certain personnel practices, also imposed serious strains
on efficiency in Iraq’s public administration. The inadequacy
of pay scales lowers morale, discourages efficiency, and forces
employees to look fbr other sources of income including dis- 
51
honesty. t!Many civil servants were compelled to supplement 
their salaries by engaging in business, or accepting other
52employment with resulting neglect of their official duties11.
Rank and pay in Iraq depend largely upon scholastic attainment
which according to Lord Salter, ’’bears little relation to merit
or aptitude* At one end of the scale young persons who may
not be fit for any other employment are able to enter the
civil service at a fixed salary because they have spent the
requisite number of years in a primary, intermediate or
secondary school. On the other hand, students who have spent
many years studying abroad and have gained high educational
qualities are discouraged from entering the Service because they
will receive the same low salary as a person who, for example,
53
has passed four years in the Lew college".
The World Bank Mission noticed that promotion was based
"almost entirely on seniority and other considerations rather 
54
than on merit" No doubt that seniority in the sense of 
maturity and cumulative experience is a relevent consideration
in promotion but in Iraq seniority was used in the sense of
51* Adams, Iraq’s People and Resources, p. 132 
32. I.B.R.D. Economic Development of Iraq, p. 78 
53« Salter, "y^Wv^giic Development of Iraq, p. 238 
I.B.R.D. op.cit. p. 78
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55elapsed time in the service. Moreover, frequent cabinet
changes encouraged bureaucrats to become involved in partisan
politics and thus "took sides with prospective ministers.
When these ministers achieved power, their friends were amply-
rewarded. Such a spoils system, needless to say, had very
damaging effect on the efficiency and morale of Government
56administration1*. This discouraged Civil Servants from
concentrating on their work and improving their efficiency
because under such a system they feel that their advancement
depends on chances of political or personal favouratism rather
than on their ability.
Another wasteful practice was the practice of misplacing
people. Thus, as Adams put it, **it takes luck, influence or
both for a person to be assigned where he can make the best
57use of specialized training**. Moreover, “officials were
frequently shifted from one position to another without regard
58to their qualities and experience**, this was partly caused by
political ihstability, thus after each cabinet change a number
of senior civil servants were removed. For example, in 19&3
a World Bank mission reported that it has “heard unofficial
estimates that one-half to three quarters of the people in
Government posts involving any real degree of responsibility were
new in their jobs since the February coup’*.^ This, admittedly,
55- Adams, Iraq’s People and Resources, p. 132 
3 6 . Khqdduri, Independent Iraq~ p^ 60 
57* Adams, op.cit. p. 131
5 8 . I.B.R.D. Economic Development of Iraq, p. 78
59* I-B.R.D. Current Economic Position and Prospeccs of Iraq,p.7
is an extreme example but all observers have stressed the 
unfavourable consequences of frequent shifts of senior Civil 
Servants on efficiency. Under such a system it is difficult 
for the Civil Service to provide continuity of administrative 
experience for the benefit of successive Governments. ivioreover, 
it means that officers do not stay in one department long 
enough to become really useful.
Serious defects are also to be found in paper work, 
registry and archives. Details of this kind may seem to be 
unimportant, but f,proper filing and storage of paper can be 
a practical contribution to souhd administration, and in more 
than one country it has been suggested a very appropriate
60starting point for reform” . Although I have not come across
any document on this aspect of Iraq's Civil administration, 
three years of work inside the Ministry of Industry has convinced 
me that reform might as well start from here. The filing 
system of the Minstry, for example, was such that incoming papers, 
reports, memoranda, and minutes were stored in a manner that 
made subsequent retrieval^ sometimes impossible. The time 
required to recover a document (if possible at all) was sometimes 
more than a week.
All these and other defects serjpusly affected the ogfficiency 
of public administration. Although tne weakness of Government
60. U.N. A Hand Book of Public Administration, p.28
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6lmachinery was officially recognised it seems tiat not enough
and continuous attention was paid to the improvement of the
administration before 195$ and by that time, according to
62an authority "the administration was cracking seriously"
After the revolution of 1958 little systematic attention was 
paid to this vital question and the quality of the administra­
tion remained "the most crucial element in Iraq's development 
effort".^
61. Qubain, The Reconstruction of Iraq, p. 23
62. Ionides, Divide and Lose, pp. 201-2
6 3. I.B.R.D. Current Economic Position and Prospects of Iraq, p.6.
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Chapter III
FORMULATION OF GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT PROGRAMMES
1951 - 1965
The a&im of this chapter is to analyse investment programmes 
formulated by both the Planning Board and the Development Board 
to invest oil revenues in different sectors of the economy.
The method of plan formulation is discussed with regard to the 
size of the investment programmes, allocation of investment 
resources among different sectors and projects in order to 
discover whether there was any improvement in planning techniques. 
Special emphasis is put on the industrial investment programmes 
which were adopted as part of the general investment plans. The 
word "plans" is used instead of the more accurate phrase "Govern­
ment investment programmes" for sake of brevity.
1. Plans of the Development Board, 1951-58
In early 1950s the Government entrusted the Development 
Board with the task of investing 70% of oil revenues in order 
to raise the standard of living of the people of Iraq. The 
Board began to operate towards the end of 1950, and until it 
was abolished in 1956, it formulated three investment programmes 
which are summarized in Table Ill.l. We will call them the 
first, the second and the third plans.
The First Plan, 1951-56: This plan called for the expen­
diture of I.D. 155*^ million or I.D. 25*7 million per annum, 
compared to I.D. 11.5 million under the last capital budget 
19^9-53» formulated by the Government, following the traditional
66
extraordinary budget procedure.^ Compared with the previous
Table III.I 
Plans of the Development Board
I.D. Million
Item The First
1951-
I.D.
Plan
56
%
The Second Plan 
1955-59 
I.D. %
The Third Plan 
1955-60 
I.D. %
Agriculture 66.1 42.6 114.4 37.6 1 6 8 .1 33.5
Industry 31.1 20.0 43.6 14.3 67.1 13.4
Transport 29.0 19.8 74.2 24.4 124.4 24.9
Buildings 20.6 12.1 6 0 .7 20.0 123.1 24.8
Miscellaneous 8.6 5-5 11.4 3.7 17.3 3.4
Total 155-4 100.0 304.3 100.0 500.0 1 0 0 .0
Source: The Development Board, Compilation of Laws concerning
the Development Board, pp.8-9 ; The Development Board
and the Ministry of Development, Law No. 43 of 1955 for 
the General Programme of the Development Board and the 
Ministry of Development, pp. 16-23; Development Board 
and the Ministry of Development, Law No. 54 of 1956 
for the Amendment of Law No. 43, 1955»P*H
capital budgets this was a very ambitious plan indeed and was 
bound to have farereaching economic effects. It was also much 
more diversified than any previous extraordinary budget in the 
sense of including a larger number of projects and conering the 
industrial sector which was not included in the previous capital 
budget. Thus the plan included a vote for industry, mining and 
electricity of I.D. 31 million which represented 20% of total 
investment of the plan.
1. See Table 1.3 p. 2.2-
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No allocation was made, however, for specific industrial
projects due to lack of preliminary studies on the basis of
which costs could be estimated. The World Bank Mission*s
report included a preliminary survey of Iraq's industrial resources
and suggested several industries with development potential.
In addition the Industrial Bank of Iraq had already employed
2
consultants to examine several industrial projects. On the
basis of these studies the Board decided to build a number of
industrial projects, undertake mineral and industrial surveys
and to increase the country's capacity for the supply of
electricity.^ By the end of the First plan the Bitumen Refinery
of .Quiaiara was under construction to produce 6 0 ,0 0 0 tons of
bitumen annually, the Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mill of Mosul
was under the construction to produce one million square yards
of cotton textiles, two cement plants at Sulaimaniya and Mosul
were under construction each to produce 350 tons of cement per
day and, with the financial aid from the Board, the Government
Oil Refinery Administration completed a refinery at Doura with
4
a total capacity of one million tons per year.
The World Bank Mission suggested, and the Board agreed, 
that a chemical plant, should be constructed at the oil fields 
at Kirkuk to utilize the natural gas. Moreover, the Mission 
considered that natural gas produced as a by-product of oil 
and almost totally wasted was a most promising industrial asset
2. The,Industrial Bank, May 1965, Report p. 10.
3* Langley, The Industrialization of Iraq, p. 207
4. Qubain, The Reconstruction of Iraq, pp. 169-172
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for Iraq. It proposed a plant of a capacity capable of 
producing annually 500,000 tons of ammuniam sulphate,
5
100,000 tons of elemental sulphur, and 300,000 tons of cement.
In 1953 the Board hired consultants to prepare a feasibility 
study. They found that a plant on the scale envisaged could 
be erected at a total cost of I.D. 32.7 million which on the 
basis of the prices ruling at that time could make 15% profit 
on capital after allowing for amortization of the plant over 
a period of 20 years. The Board felt that this sum was very 
large and the project would produce much more than the local 
market could absorb and it hesitated to commit funds on such 
a large scale and asked the consultants to prepare a feasibility 
study for a smaller project. The consultants then prepared 
the study for a project to produce annually 250,000 tons of 
ammonium sulphate, 50,000 tons of elemental sulphur and 100,000 
tons of cement at a total cost of I.D. 20.7 million which could 
earn 9-3% profit on capital. The same consultants also submitted 
supplementary reports about a large number of chemical products
which could be produced from gas. But the Board decided to
£
wait for another consultant’s report.
A survey of the country’s mineral resources was important
to reveal the industrial potentialities of Iraq, and the Board
decided to finance a geological survey of the country. It hired
a firm to carry out this survey in two stagesL (i) location of
areas containing minerals and estimation of their potential value
5* I aB.R.D. Economic Development of Iraq, p. 37
6. Lord Salter, Development of Iraq, pp. 218-19
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and (ii) experimental boring to ascertain whether exploitation
would be worthwhile. Actual work on the First Stage began
early in 195*+» and preliminary reports indicated the existence
of large quantities of glass sand, limestone, suitable for
7
cement, bitumen and sulphur deposits.
In 195^ the consultant firm which was hired by the Board 
to prepare an electric power survey, presented a Bport which 
established the foundation for Iraq's power programme. The 
report covers power resources of the country which in addition 
to oil and natural gas included the possibility of hydroelectric 
generation from dams and barrages. The report estimated the 
potential load for the next 20 years, it proposed alternative 
methods of generation and suggested a programme for the develop­
ment of power plants and transmission lines. It found that 
the immediate development of hydroelectric facilities was not 
economically sound. It suggested the immediate implementation 
of the First Stage of the programme which was the establishment 
of large power plants in the North, Middle and South of the 
country. By the end of the plan the northern project was in
the stage of preparation of final specifications while the other
8two were still under review.
During the first plan period the Board found itself con­
sidering many industrial proposals as a result of that it decided 
to undertake a general industrial survey to analyse potential
industries that might be built and provide information on their 
9priority.
7* al-Khalef, The Economic Physical and Human Geography of Iraq,p.28o 
8. Lord Salter, Development of Iraq, p.7
9« Langley, The Industrialization of Iraq, p. 206
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The Second Plan, 1955-59s In April 1955 the Minister of 
Development presented to the Parliament a five year plan to super- 
ceed the First, plan. The reasons that made the new plan 
necessary were a sharp increase in oil revenues that far exceeded 
original estimates, changing conditions that made cost estimates 
of the first plan no longer realistic, and changes which were 
introduced in the 1953 Law of the Development Board and the 
Ministry of Development with respect to the financing of projects 
of other departments by the Board.^
The plan proposed a total expenditure of I.D. 304.3 million, 
which wss almost double that of the previous plan. The main 
difference, however, between this plan and the first one, aside 
from the size was that the new plan included the so-called minor 
projects which were to be financed by the Board but implemented! 
by other Government departments. Total allocation of funds for 
minor projects was I.D. 38.2 million or 10% of the total, out 
of which I1D. 32.3 million went to minor public buildings.
This plan allocated for industry, mining and power I.D*43*5 
million which represents 14.3% of total allocation. The plan 
was drawn after four years of experience during which an organi­
zation to deal with industry was set up (the Third Technical 
Section), and several important studies were carried out. The 
result was an industrial programme which was not only bigger 
that! the previous one but different in form, while specific projects 
were not included in the first plan, the second plan subdivided 
the industrial sector as in Table III.2
10. Qubain, The Reconstruction of Iraq, p. 4-3
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Table III.2 
The Industrial Sector of the
Second Plan, 1955-59
ITEM I.D.000
Bitumen Refinery Plant 855
Cotton Textile Plant 5,1X5
Mosul Cement Plant 2 ,2 0 8
Suliaminiya Cement Plant 2,150
Mosul Sugar Plan 1,782
Electricity Projects 10,000
Mineral Survey 5**3
Industrial Survey 017
Laboratory Tools 900
Other Industries 22,000
Total **3,572
Source: Development Board and Ministry of Development, Law No.**3
1955» P.21
In an explanatory note to the plan it was mentioned that 
the I.D. 22 million devoted to the item Mother industries” 
would be invested in profitable industrial projects recommended 
by the consultants then studying this sector, and that if they 
recommended the implementation of projects that require more 
funds, the Board would raise its allocation for this sector.
This plan was operative for one year only (1955/56) but 
during this period the consultants, Arthur D. Little, Inc., who 
were commissioned by the Board to undertake an industrial survey, 
presented their report. This report suggested a programme to 
be implemented in six years and contemplated creation of a
11. Development Board and Ministry of Development Law
1955 of the Second Plan p.o.
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chemical industry, establishment of a steel rolling mill, a 
steel furnace, date industries, as well as expansion and improve­
ment of the existing industries at a total cost od I.D. ^3 million. 
It suggested also a group of other industries for further investi­
gation, such as pharmaceutical products and glass ware. It 
also referred to a number of industries and argued that they 
were not suitable for Iraq for some time to come due to mrious
reasons, including agricultural machinery and canning fruit and 
12
vegetables.
The establishment of a chemical industry was the central
focus of the Little report. But the report made it clear that
the chemical industry was complex and costs of production were
closely related to the plant size. Moreover, one plant often
produces a number of joint products or by-products and unless
markets can be found for the extra products, it may not be
profitable to produce the main product. It stated that
’’investigation has disclosed that the establishment in Iraq
of plants to produce rayon and paper and to recover sulphur
from natural gas is economically justified. A rayon plant and
a paper mill of the recommended size would between them require
5,600 tons annually of caustic soda. This, coupled with the
demand of existing industries, would by i9 6 0, result in a
£)robable total demand of 8,000 tons of caustic soda, which would
justify its production in Iraq. The only method of producing this 
chemical that would be economical on this scale, the electric
12. Arthur D. Little, A Plan for Industrial Development in Iraq, 
PP. 377-389 “
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method, would result in the production of about 0#9 ton of 
chlorine for »»oh each tone of caustic soda produced. Unless 
markets can be found for this, it would be cheaper to import 
the caustic soda. The proposed plastic material industry offers 
a potential market for chlorine, as it is required, as a raw 
material for polyvinyl chloride. Natural gas can be used to 
produce ethylene, a raw material for both polyvinyH chloride 
and polyethylene, which are widely used plastics with growing 
world market.
The sulphur in the Kirkuk natural gas could supply, in
addition to export markets, the rayon plant with the sulphur
and sulphuric acid it would need. At the same time, it would
make it possible to produce feritlizers in Iraq, as sulphur
would be required in substantial quantities to produce ammonium
sulphate. Ammonium sulphate or other nitrogenous fertilizers,
ammonium nitrate and urea, would require ammonia, which could
13
also be manufactured from natural gas^
The Little Report, therefore, made clear the complemeriarity
(
between a complex of plants in the chemical industry hence the 
need for an integrated properly phased and well balanced industrial 
programme•
The Third Plan, 1955-60* The main reasons put forward for 
presenting this plan in May 195& to replace the previous five 
year plan 1955“59i were increased oil revenues, the completion
of several studies especially in the fields of drainage, commu-
o
1 niVation and housing, and recommendations of Lord Salter in favour
13* Little, A Flan for Industrial Development in Iraq, pp.l8-19
14
of a more flexible and more diversified programme.u
This plan called for the expenditure of I.D. 500 million
including I.D. 49 million which was the 1955 allocation under
the previous plan; this left an annual expenditure of I.D.
90.8 million in the following five years. The plan increased
greatly the allocation of funds for projects geared to meet
immediate human needs such as hospitals, clinics, drinking
#water etc. It was also made more flexible, contemplating new 
projects which might or might not be implemented depending on 
whether they were found economically sound after careful study.
The Minister of Development could also propose, on behalf of 
the Board, supplementary programmes in the light of new studies 
or if oil revenues changed sharply.
The plan devoted I.D. 6 7.1 million to industry which was 
13% more than the allocation for industry in the second plan, 
but the share of industry in total funds of the plan decreased 
to 13*4% compared to 14*3% in the previous plan. Most of the
absolute increase devoted to industry went to the item ffother
industries". Table III.3 shows that other items were similar to 
the previous plan and changes reflected actual expenditure 
during the previous year (1955)? and some refinements in cost 
estimates. Total expenditure for the five manufacturing 
industrial projects were given and subdivided into different 
elements, i.e. machinery building, power etc. each industrial
project included a housing project which accounts for more
Oj 15than 20% of the total cost in some cases.
14. The Development Board and Ministry of Development, Law No.54,
1956 of the Third Plan, 1955-&0 p.3*
15- : • Law No.5^ 1956 of the Third Plan pp.26-29.
■ . - —
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Table H I *3
The Industrial Sector of the
Third Plan, 1955-19&0
ITEM I.D. 000
Bitumen Refinery Plant 67
Cotton Textile Plant 3 ,6 2 3
Mosul Cement Plant 3 ,2 4 3
Sulaimaniya Cement Plant 2,455
Mosul Sugar Plant ■ 2 ,9 1 7
Mineral Survey 126
Electricity Projects 1 2 ,6 6 9
Other Industries 3 7 ,9 0 0
955 Allocation For all Items 4,119
Total 6 7 ,1 1 9
Source: The Development Board and the Ministry of Development,
Law No. 5*+i 1956» P* 25
The projects under the item ’’other industries” were basically 
embodiments of several industries proposed by the Little report.
That report, however, did not include more than a preliminary 
study of these projects. In all cases a much more detailed study 
of each project was necessary. Therefore some projects included 
in this item could be deferred while others could be implemented 
even new projects aould be introduced. The plan did not reveal 
the stage of implementation of the projects included in this 
item which can be appreciated from tabletll*^, which is the only 
piece of information given in the plan with respect to £hese orojects.
1*+. The Development Board and Ministry of Development, Law No.5^1 
1956 of the Third Plan, pp. 26-29.
76
Tablelll.k
Projects suggested by the Little Report and 
included in the Third Plan
ITEM
Extension and Improvement of 
Existing Industries
I.D.000
11,500
New Industrial Projects:
Sulphur,Extraction, Paper, Date Syrup,
Animal Fodder, Steel Rolling Mill,
Steel Furnace, Rayon and Rayon Textile 12,300
Industries whose studies must be
completed:
Fertilizer, Plastic Materials,
Caustic Soda, Natural Gas Pipeline 10,700
Other Industries ^+,670
Total 39,170
Source: The Development Board and Ministry of Development,
Law No. 5^» 1956 p.31
2. Programmes of the Planning Board, 1959-65
The Planning Board was established in 1959, and up to 1965
it had formulated three industrial programmes which are summarized
in Tablelll.5* These programmes will be called the Fourth, the
Fifth and the Sixth Plans.
The Fourth Plan, 1959-62: The aim of this plan was to
"change radically the direction of the plan of the previous regime..
in a manner which can serve the interests of Iraqi people11,
because the new Government believed that f,oil revenues have been
l6wasted on matters of no interest to Iraq11. Thus the Revolutionary 
Government reduced the share of oil revenues going to capital 
formation from 70% to 50% and formulated a plan which gave first
16. Ministry of Guidance, Law No. l8l of 1959 for the provisional 
Economic Plan, pp. 8l-82
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Table HI.3
I
Investment Programmes of 
the Planning Board 1959-65,I*D"Million
ITEM
The Fourth Plan 
1959-62 
I.D. %
The Fifth Plan 
1961-63 
I.D. %
The
I.D
Sixth Plan 
1965-69
%
Agriculture V7.9 12.2 112.9 20.3 173 25*9
Industry 38.7 9*8 1 6 6 .8 29*9 187 2 8 .0
Transport 100.8 25*7 136.4 24.5 110 16.4
Buildihgs 291*5 48.3 140.1 25*2 134 20.1
Miscellaneous 14.0 3.6 0.0 0.0 62 9.6
Total 392 100.0 556.3 10 0 .0 668 .2 100.0
Source: Ministry of Guidance Law No. l8l , 1959, p. 11 ; The Five
Years Detailed Economic Plan, 1961-65, issues by the
Ministry of Guidance, Baghdad, 1962, pp * 11, '79 and
Ministry of Guidance Law No. 87 (1965) of the Five Years
Economic Plan 1965-6 9, p * 71
priority to public buildings and housing, to which it devoted I.D. 
291*5 million representing *+8.3% of total allocation.
This plan devoted I.D. 38.7 million to the industrial sector, 
which represented 9*8% of total allocations. This, however, did not 
include the amount of funds required for the projects of the Iraqi- 
Soviet agreement of 1959, which included a steel mill, fertilizer, 
a sulphur extractioh plant, a woollen textile plant, a cotton textile 
mill, a clothing workshop, a plant to produce agricultural machinery, 
a stocking and underwear factory, an electric bulb factory, a canning 
factory, a glassware factory, a pharmaceutical factory and a plant 
for the production of electrical equipment. The agreement also
78
provides for technical assistance in the establishment of plants 
to produce fcaustic soda, polyvinyl chloride and polyethylene.
Studies and designs of these projects were to be carried out during 
1959-60 while most machinery and equipment was to be delivered 
during 1961-62. The capacity of each factory was mentioned in the 
agreement and Iraq was made responsible for civil engineering and 
provision of all mailable Iraqi materials and labour. In case
17where this could not be done, the Soviets were to provide them.
But the amount of funds required for these projects were not 
mentioned in the plan, because at that time even rough estimates of 
their costs were not available. The plans, however, devoted I.D.
10 million to cover Iraq’s share in the costs of all projects 
covered by the agreement, which numbered 6l, but this sum was not 
divided between different sectors. Almost all the industrial 
projects of the agreement were derived from previous preliminary 
studies and plans. In fact, with the exception of the electrical 
bulb factory and the electrical equipment plant, all these projects
l8were mentioned in the Development Board Plans and the Little report.
Beside the projects of the agreement Table II.6 shows that the 
plan included all other projects of the Development Board, it also 
included a shoe factory, and a cigarette manufacturing project 
which was previously carried out by the Government operated Tobacco 
Monopoly.^
17* Law No. 52 of 1959 for the Economic and Technical Agreement
between the Republic of Iraq and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, Reprinted in Hassan, Studies in Economics of Iraq, 
pp. 417-440.
18. Langley, The Industrialization of Iraq, pp. 268-269
19« The Tobacco Monopoly was established in 1939 to improve the
quality of tobacco, to assure farmers stable and reasonable prices 
and to raise revenue See I.B.R.D. Economic Develop.of Iraq.n.26
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Tablelll.6
The Industrial Sector of
the Fourth Plan 1959-&2
ITEM • I,D. 000
Mosul Sugar Plant 260
Sulaimaniya Sugar Plant 4,000
Date Syrup Plant 300
Natural Gas Pipeline 1,100
Mosul Cement Plant 192
Sulaimaniya Cigarette Factory 1,000
Rayon and Rayon Textile Plants 100
Paper Plant 10,000
Popular Shoes Plant 350
Electricity 21,384
Projects of the Agreement -
Total 3 8 ,7 2 9
Source: Ministry of Guidance, Law No. l8l, 1959* PP* 33-35*
The Fifth Plan, 1961-6 5: This plan gave the highest priority
to the industrial sector to which it devoted I.D. 166*7 representing 
almost 30% of total allocation. This sum was divided into I.D. 6l 
million for major industrial projects and I.D. 3*7 million for the 
so-called complementary projects of which I.D. 4.3 million was 
devoted to minor electricity projects of the Ministry of 
Municipalities. The major industrial projects are summarized in 
table III.7* This plan provided funds for each project for different
years and in case of the projects of the Iraqi-Soviet agreement 
total allocation was divided between the two parties.
The chemical industry of the plan included caustic soda, 
ethylene, polyethylene, polyvinyl chloride, carbon blocks, rayon
8o
TableIII.7
The Industrial Sector of
the Fifth Plan 1961 - 65
ITEM
Chemical Industries
Medical Projects
Cigarette Factory
Foodstuff Projects
Glass and Ceramic Plants
Electrical Product Plants
Metal Industries
Textile and Clothing Projects
Basrah ail Refinery
Mineral Survey and Pipelines
Electricity
Atomic Energy Projects 
Vocational Training Projects
Total
Source: Ministry of Guidance,
No.of Projects I.D.000
10 36,450
1. 3 ,8 0 0
1 1,630
3 4,810
2 6,000
2 4 ,8 5 0
3 17,564
6 23,733
1 10,000
4 8 ,85 0
12 38,070
3 2,700
1 1,850
161,023
Law No. 70, 1961, p. 96
yarn, paper, sulphure extraction i, fertilizer, rubber tyres and 
tube factories. The metal industries included steel, agricul­
tural machinery and geological equipment repair plants. The 
weaving and clothing industry included the clothing workshops, 
the stocking and underwear plant the shoe factory, and cotton, 
rayon and woollen textile plants. Tnese were all the projects of 
the previous plan.
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The Sixth Plan, 1965-69* This plan, like the previous 
one gave first priority to industry but it raised the share of 
agriculture in total funds to the second place after it was in 
the fourth place in the previous plan. The new plan did not 
distinguish between the major projects and the minor or comple­
mentary projects. The latter projects were not complementary 
to the major projects as one might expect, but minor projects 
which were previously financed by the ordinary budget.^ But 
the plan included almost all the minor projects of the previous 
plan.
Tablelll.8 below summarizes the industrial sector of the 
sixth plan. The first item included all the projects of the
Table ill.8
The Industrial Sector of 
the Sixth Plan 1965 - 69
ITEM No. of Projects I.D.000
1.Chemical Industries 10 47,^50
2 .Medical Projects 1 3,300
3*Foodstuff Projects k 5,500
*+ .Glass and Ceramic Plants 2 ^,500
5 ‘Electrical Product Plants 2 1,500
6.Metal Industries 3 13,070
7 -Textile and Clothing Projects 5 21,100
8 .Oil Pefining and Gas Pipeline 3 26,150
9‘Mineral Survey 1 800
10 .Electricity 10 39,550
11-Atomic Energy Projects 3 1,550
12 .Vocational Training 3 2,530
13‘Miscellaneous Projects 10 ,0 5 0
Total 18 7 ,2 0 0
Source: Ministry of Guidance, Law No. 87, 1963, PP. 15-23
20. Hassan, Studies in Economics of Iraq, p. 267
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previous plan except the carbon black project whose place was 
taken by a project for the production of rayon pulp. The 
second, fourth, fifth, sixth, ninth, and eleventh items included 
exactly the same projects as the previous plan. Items three, 
seven, and eight included all the projects of the previous plan 
plus the extension of Mosul textile and sugar plants and an oil 
refinery at Mosul. All these are negligible differences. The 
novelty in the new plan is the provision of I.D. ^.6 for "new 
industrial projects” including tractor and motor car assembly, 
a project for production of salt, a chipboard project, laboratories 
for specifications and standardization department, a woollen 
textile project in the North and an industrial survey of the 
Arthur D. Little type. The plan also devoted I.D. 5 million to 
cover working capital requirements of projects expected to be 
completed during the plan period. All these are summarized in 
item 13 of Tablelll.8 Nevertheless, it is hard to say that 
there was any significant difference between this plan and the 
previous one as far as the projects included is concerned.
It is clear now that the process of implementation of 
the industrial programmes was extremely slow. Thus the largest 
number of projects included in the last plan of the Development 
Board were included in the 19&5-69 Plan> among these projects 
were the sulphur extraction, paper, steel, rayon yarn, rayon 
textile, fertilizer, plastic materials, caustic soda, gas pipeline 
etc. A large number of these were still under consideration 
in 1965 after they have been included in all these plans for more
*3
than 10 years. I will deal with this problem in detail in 
the next chapter.
3• Size of the Plans, 1951-&5
Before 1950 Iraq was a poor country with a low investmeht 
ratio and a slow rate of economic progress. Any attempt to 
increase the saving ratio could have resulted in lowering the 
already low level of consumption, After 1950 a large increase 
in the investment ratio became possible without any need to 
restrain consumption. This was due to a substantial increase 
in oil revenues which could be used for immediate consumption, 
for investment purposes or for both in varying combinations.
Because the standard of living of the masses of population 
was very low, one might argue that a large share of available 
oil revenues should have been devoted to current consumption.'
One may go further and support this view by arguing that an 
immediate betterment in the standard of living by improvements 
to nealth, education, food and housing conditions would increase 
productivity. In addition so far as post savings habits of the 
population reflected the society's time preference the case for 
devoting a large part of oil revenues to consumption purposes 
is strengthened.
On the other hand one can argue that Iraq had developed 
a level of consumption compatible with its productivity, it was, 
therefore, socially acceptable and politically feasible to 
maintain this level for the time being or increase it slowly 
and push the rate of investment to a much higher level. Further-
8k
more as oil is an exhaustable asset and the revenues from it 
are subject to short run instability from political distur­
bances, or from a sharp decline in oil prices due to a pos­
sible surplus of oil supply, it seemed proper to exploit the 
opportunity and push the investment of oil revenues to the 
highest possible level.
In 1950 the Government decided to use all oil revenues 
for investment purposes, and the whole of the revenue was
devoted to the Development Board to be used for capital forma- 
21tion. Two years later the share of the Board was reduced
to 70% and the remainder went to the government's ordinary 
budget to enable other public departments to carry out minor 
capital works independently of the Board. Changes came with 
Law No. 27, 1953 which made a distinction between major develop­
ment projects and minor capital works. The Board became 
responsible for the finance and implementation of the first 
category of projects, while other Government departments 
assumed responsibility for the execution of the second category 
of projects, but they obtained fihance from the Board's budget.
This implied that the 30% of oil revenues falling to the Government 
could be used for current expenditure. This step made possible
21. The Board receives its share of oil revenue in foreign 
exchange. It uses some of this to purchase foreign 
materials. The remainder is sold to the Central Bank 
for Iraqi Dinars and the Board uses them to purchase 
local labour and material. Those whose income is 
increased directly or indirectly in the process of develop­
ment spend part of their extra income on imported goods.
From the point of view of the economy the importance of the 
foreign exchange is that it enables the country to finance 
these imports and this prevents or at least modifies the 
inflationary effects of the development process.
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a substantial increase in Government services such as health 
and education, as well as the abolition of some indirect taxes 
levied upon basic food necessities in order to increase current 
consumption. In other words the Government decided to use 
the revenues partly to increase the standard of living immediately 
but mainly for capital formation designed to raise the standard 
of living in the future.
Since the increase in oil revenues was very large and due 
to the limited absorptive capacity of the economy at the beginning 
this arrangement for using oil revenues appears to be wise and 
the economy moved in the right direction as will be demonstrated 
in chapter IV.
22An optimum investment ratio may, however, be lower ar 
higher than the level which available oil revenues can support. 
Thus it seems that to establish a direct relationship between 
oil revenues and the investment programme is not a wise thing 
to do. In this respect the planning Board's approach of 
deciding a target rate of growth of output, which under certain 
assumptions determined the rate of investment, seems superior 
to the Development Board's approach of investing a certain 
percentage of oil revenues. The first approach implied a 
commitment to a certain volume of investment and high lighted 
the requirments for growth. Thus a political authority who 
wants the economy to grow at a specific rate must find the 
necessary funds to finance it, while the second approach does
22. Sen, On Optimizing the Rate of Saving; and Horvat, The 
Optimum Rate of Investment.
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not commit the Government to a difficult problem; if there 
are oil revenues, the investment ratio may be high, but if 
there are not enough oil revenues, failure to invest the 
amounts required by the plans can conveniently be acplained by 
the external factor, oil.
For Iraq, however, what matters most is not the approach 
to planning but the political commitment to feasible projects 
and determined action toward their implementation. The rates 
of growth selected by the Planning Board to double national
income in 10 years representing an 8% growth rate in national
23income per year, are not exceptionally ambitious rate targets, 
but this required a rate of public investment which could not 
be financed by 50% of available oil revenues only. Such a
2k
rate of growth needed definitely above 70% of that revenue.
When the Government reduced oil revenues allocated to develop­
ment to 50% in 1959, it became clear that it was not prepared to 
support such a high rate of growth. The planners list of
finances other than oil revenues cannot be taken as serious acts
25of economic calculation. The proper way to increase, or even
23* Ministry of Guidance Laws, Nos. 70, 1961, p.6 8; 87,1965,
p. 50.
2k . Assuming a low capital-output ratio of 3*5, as compared 
with k to 5 in the past, this target might have been met 
by investing I.D. 5&0 million during 1961-65 by the govern­
ment^ during the same period total oil revenues were I.D.
556 million. See Ministry of Guidance, Law No.70,1961 pp.67 -8  
and table 1 .6  p .31 
25» Almost 70% of funds to finance the 1961 -65 plan was expected 
to come from oil revenues and foreign loans. Out of the 
remaining 30%, 25% was a deficit to be obtained somehow and 
almost 80% of the remaining 5% to come from Port administration 
which requires higher duty per tone on exported oil together 
with a rise in exports. See Ministry of Guidance Law No.70, 
1961, pp. 71, 73 and Law No. 8 7, 1965, p. ^9-
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maintain, the pre 1)958 investment ratio was to increase the 
share of oil revenues devoted to the capital budgets, not to 
reduce it in favour of public consumption and then to try to 
find other sources to finance the plans. The question is 
who tried to find other sources of finance. If the share of 
oil revenues devoted to ordinary budget is reduced, the 
Ministry of Finance is in a position to find other sources by 
increasing taxes and reducing current expenditure or at least 
checking these from expansion. The situation will be reversed 
if the share of oil revenues allocated to ordinary budget is 
increased. In this case the Ministry of Planning is in a weak 
position to find other sources of finance to raise the invest­
ment ratio to the level which may make possible the desired
26rate of growth of income. In fact when the development plan's
share was reduced to 50% of oil revenues in 1 9 5 9, the investment
ratio and the amount of public capital expenditure immediately
27
started to fall.
4 • The Sectoral Allocation
After defining the available financial resources the
Development Board formulated investment plans on the basis of
different reports prepared by specialists about sectors of the
26. The Ministry of Planning tried to increase the share of oil 
revenues devoted to capital formation from 50% to 60% but it 
failed. See Ministry of Guidance Law No. 70, 1961, P» 70 
and Law No. 87 1965, P*
27- See Chapter IV and Hashinr , Capital Formation in Iraq, 1957-
6 2, p. 2 1 6.
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economy. Thus flood control, irrigation and drainage projects 
formed the subject of detailed reports by a number of consultant 
firms, an industrial survey was undertaken, the country's 
requirement for power, communication, etc., were studied by
specialists. Beside these sectoral investigations a few
28general studies were carried out by experts. . From these 
studies and reports a good picture of the requirements of tne 
country could be drawn. Nevertheless a plan cannot be formulated 
by adding together every recommendation in the sectoral reports 
because total resources were limited.
The scale and timing of investment in each main sector was 
decided upon by the Development Board on the basis of its judge­
ment after studying these reports, and its plans were no more 
than budgets for the allocation of oil revenues between different 
sectors. Inside a given sector there were a number of projects 
for which financial allocations were made for each project in 
each single year - such as the industrial projects mentioned in 
Table III.2, and another group of projects for which financial 
allocations were made for the group of projects together - such as 
the projects mentioned in table HI.4. These plans consisted 
basically of a collection of projects. They did not predict 
possible increments to national income from these projects, but
28. The General Reports were the I.B.R.D. Report, op.cit.,
Lord Salter's Report, op.cit.and Professor Iverson,
A Report on Monetary Policy in Iraq. For a list of 
sectoral reports see Salter, op.cit., pp. 244-47*
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national income statistics only became available in 1958* The
Development Board used simple common sense rather than formal
methods of analysis, such as mathematical models, in trying to
avoid inconsistencies in its plans.
On the other hand the planning Board tried to prepare
investment programmes which were more sophisticated than those
of the Development Board and we will show this by analyzing the
current 19 65 -69 P^an# This plan started by stating its aims
which included improvement in the standard of living, economic
unity between Arab States and redistribution of income in favour
29of poor classes. To achieve these aims the planners fixed
the compound fcate of growth of income at 8% per annum (compared
to 6.4% during 1953-63)*^ In order to achieve an overall growth
rate of 8% planners decided to maintain the previous rate of
growth of the industrial sectors, which was 12% per annum, raise
the rate of growth of agriculture from zero to 7*5%, raise the
rate of growth of other sectors slightly or maintain previous
rates. The planners predicted the rate of growth of the so-
31called "foreign oil sector" to be 6%.
Given these desired rates of growth the increment to value 
added in each sector was calculated. Then these figures were 
multiplied by sectoral incremental-capital-output ratios derived 
from Iraq's past experience or based on the experience of other 
countries similar to Iraq.
29. Ministry of Guidance, Law No. 8 7, 1965, PP« 50-5i
30. Ministry of Guidance, Law No. 8 7, 1965, P« 54.
31. Ibid. p. 59
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Table III.9, summarizes the process. Column one shows 
the required value added in each sector, column two shows the 
sectoral capital-output ratios and column three the amount of 
investment required to tring about this increment in output.
Tablelll.9
Investment Requirements of the 
Five-Year Plan 1965-69
I.D. Million
Sector Value Added Capital-Output Ratio Investment
Agriculture 48 3*4 157
Industry 59 3*6 215
Transport 20 5*9 119
Other Sectors 101 3*3 330
Total 228 3-6 821
Source: Ministry of Guidance, Law No. 87 of 1965 for the
Five-Years Economic Plan, 1965-69* P* ^
The planners stated that in the past the share of the
private sector in total investment was 50%, but due to nationali
zation in 1964, they expected this share to fall in the future
and decided to raise the share of Government to 78% of the
required amount of investment. Then the planners decided the
shares of Government and the private investment in different
sectors. For example, they argued that the additional I.D.59
million of output in the industrial sector required I.D. 215
million of investment and expected the Government to invest
I.D. 210 million, of which I.D. 168 comes from the plan budget 
and I.D. 42 from other Government departments, and this leaves
91
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I.D. 5 million to be invested by the private sector.
Now, if the Development Board*s approach to the allocation 
of available oil revenues among different sectors could be 
regarded as arbitrary in the sense that it was decided upon by 
common sense without the use of "scientific” methods of analysis, 
the degree of arbitrariness was hardly reduced by the Planning 
Board's approach. Thus the Planning Board's decision to aim 
at an &% rate of growth; which in itself is an arbitrary rate 
in a sense, could be achieved by almost an indefinite combina­
tion of rates of growth of different sectors in the economy.
Tne Planning Board, however, arbitrarily decided upon one set 
of growth rates for each of the different sectors, but this 
choice determined at once the share of each sector in the 
Planning Board's total available funds, which can hardly be 
anything more than 50% of oil revenues. No one can seriously 
claim that one approach is more "scientific" than the other, 
and no one can say which of the two methods can bring the 
system nearer to optimality.
In fact, all the six plans discussed consisted of no 
more than collections of projects chosen in a remarkably similar 
way despite the apparent difference in their shapes. Just as 
the Development Board's Technical Sections prepared sectoral 
plans that reflected the recommendations of expert's reports, 
the Planning Board and the Ministry of Planning asked different 
Ministries to prepare their projects. Then each Ministry prepared
32. Ministry of Guidance, Law No. 87, 1965, p. 68
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its "plan” i.e. its collection of projects, on the basis of 
previous plans and specialized reports. Added together these 
projects required larger amounts of funds than the planners 
expected to become available, therefore, some projects had 
to be cut by the Ministry of Planning and the Planning Board 
instead of the old Ministry of Development and the Development 
Board, The questions of what projects to cut and what
sectors to emphasize were determined on the basis of the general 
outlook of the Planning Board and the Development Board to 
economic development.
The pattern of allocation of funds between different 
sectors of the economy in the plans of the Development Board 
leaves no doubt that the chief aim was to develop agriculture 
by increasing land under utilization, increasing productivity 
of land and the introduction of mechanization. In contrast 
the plans of the Planning Board showed a marked shift in 
emphasis from agriculture to industry as can be seen from 
TableIII.10 below.
33* Development Board and Ministry of Development, Law No. 43, 
1955, p.l. and Ministry of Guidance Law No. 70, 19&1, p.63
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TableIII.10
Planned Distribution of Funds 
Among Different Sectors
%
Sector Development Board Planning Board
First Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth
Plan Plan Plan Plan Plan Plan
Agriculture 42.6 37.6 33-5 12.2 20.3 23.9
Industry 20.0 14.3 13-4 9.8 29.9 2 8 .0
Transport 19.8 2k. 4 24.9 25-7 24.3 16.4
Building 12.1 20.0 24.8 ^8 .3 23-2 20.1
Other 3-5 3-7 3.4 3.6 0.0 9.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Tables HI.1 and HI.5
Note: The Fourth plan does include the projects of the Iraqi-
Soviet agreement.
The Development Board*s emphasis oh agriculture reflected
the outlook of many reports submitted by specialists to the
Government. These have pointed out that one of the major
problems of Iraq was centred around the control of its water
resources. The two rivers of Iraq, the Tigris and the Euphrates,
often rise without warning and cause floods that damage irrigation
works, plants, and property. They carry with them heavy sediments
which silt up canals and barrages, Their water is slightly
saline and when poured into the central and the southern plains
the hot sun and high water table lead to salinization of the soil.
They are at maximum flow too late for winter crop and too early
34
■ftyr §.ummec crops. ____________________________________________________
34. Development Board, Development of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley t 
pp. 1, 6 and 13*
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It is clear, therefore, that flood control to prevent
damage and drainage to prevent salinization, were absolute
necessities even if one did not want to extend the area under
cultivation. By early 195& two of the major flood control
projects were completed and thereafter large amounts of the
Euphrates flood water could be diverted into lake Habaniya
and stored there and the waters of the Tigris could be diverted
into the Wadi Tharthar depression. These two projects cost
approximately I.D. 20 million, as compared with an estimated
damage of I.D. 10 million ihflicted by the 1954 flood alone.
This might have been inflicted again in the spring of 195& had
35thesetttwo projects not been completed.
The majority of the population, however, depend for their 
livelihood on agriculture, but productivity per unit of land 
and per unit of labour is extremely low. Since a large proportion 
of population is on the land even if one allows for a moderate 
decline in the share of agriculture in the total labour force, 
a direct attack on the causes of low productivity in the agricu­
ltural sector was socially most desirable; if by economic 
development one intends to improve the conditions of living of 
the majority of the population and guarantee cumulative growth.
This requires either a shift to summer crops, on the existing 
farm lands - which requires additional water supply, or the 
expansion in the cultivated area which also needs additional water.
35• Langley, The Industrialization of Iraq, p. 120
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The nature of flood control projects, waich were desirable 
for the sake of flood control alone, was such that they could 
provide additional water for irrigation. On the other hand 
large areas of potentially cultivatable land were available and 
a vast expansion of the agricultural sector, was therefore possible. 
Hence the Development Board was advised to emphasize agriculture 
in preference to industry. Thus the World Bank Mission stated
that ”in a country like Iraq principal emphasis will inevitably
36need to be placed on the development of agriculture”.' Professor 
Iversen emphasized that fertile land was the most valuable asset 
of Iraq and the country ’’has a large comparative advantage in 
agriculture, whereas the possibilities of creating new industries
able to compete on equal terms with producers abroad are limited
37and more remote”. Lord Salter shared these views and put
forward a number of reasons why Iraq had no reason to emphasize 
industry: Population pressure on land was small, there was no
shortage of foreign exchange and in the long run the world*s 
rapidly increasing population would press more and more upon
food supplies; hence it is likely that the terms of trade would
38move in favour of agricultural countries. He emphasised
however, that there would, and should, be industrialisation ’’beyond 
the present very modest limit”. He concluded that ”(a) the
3 6. I.B.R.D. Economic Development of Iraq, p. 97 
37* Iversdn, Monetary Policy of Iraq, p. 177 
3 8 . Slater, "tcVnd&ic Development of Iraq, p. 17
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amount of money to be devoted to industry should be on an 
althgether smaller scale than what is allotted to the support 
and expansion of agriculture, (b) the expansion so far as 
possible.... should not outrun the available supplies of skilled
labour., and (c) the industries should be carefully selected as
39being assured of a domestic market". The Little report in
recommending specific industrial projects applied the following 
criterion: "The proposed industry must be able to produce at 
a cost below the landed price of comparable imported goods 
before import duty is levied... In the future it may be desirable 
to apply a less stringent test,but at the moment a number of 
industrial opportunities promise a profitability that does not 
need additional assistance. It is clearly desirable that
40tney should be established first".
Table III.10, shows that all the plans of the development
Board followed the general development strategy suggested by
experts and gave the highest priority to agriculture. Many
observers have criticized this strategy for various reasons.
Kanaan, for example, critized the Development Board's strategy
as a direct application of the Hecksner-Ohlin's version of the
comparative cost theory which essentially is a static concept
4lthat ignores a variety of important dynamic elements. Viner 
has demonstrated, however, that the comparative cost theory can
39- Salter, Itc'kvegic Development of Iraq, p. 18.
40. Little, A Plan for Industrial Development in Iraq, p. 9«
41. Kanaan, T.H. Input Output and Social Accounts of Iraq,
Chapter II, p. 14.
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be extended to incorporate dynamic elements such as changes in 
quantity and quality of factors of production overtime, economies
42
of scale, complementarity in producer and consumer markets etc., 
This dynamic interpretation of the theory of comparative 
advantage means that scarce factors of today may become abundant 
in the future. It is not possible therefore to determine 
where the comparative advantage lies before making a comprehe­
nsive analysis of the possible changes in the supply of different 
factors of production in the future.
This clearly does not mean that the outcome of the analysis 
will emphasize industry. Nevertheless this type of analysis 
shows that the mechanical application of the comparative cost 
doctrine to a country like Iraq is likely to overemphasize 
agriculture and put severe restrictions on industrial expansion,
I
such as that put forward by Lord Salter who recommended only 
industries based on local raw materials, assured of domestic 
market and for which skills were available. If we wait for 
skills to come first, somehow, and then build factories to 
utilize the skilled labour, we may wait for a very long time 
indeed and this might not be a wise thing to do because there is 
a physical limit to the expansion of agricultural sector.
In this respect it is interesting to notice that in 1952 
a consultant firm made a technical and detailed survey of the 
utilization of agricultural resources in Iraq. This study
42. Viner, J., Stability and Progress: The Poorer Countries*
Problem, pp. 61-62.
pointed out that there is in the valley of the two rivers 
22 million donums (one donum = 0 .6 2  acre or 0.25 hedtare) 
of arable And irrigable land, of which 13 million donums were 
then cultivated under the fallow system. Thus only another
i
9 million donums of land could ever be brought under cultivation. 
A high income per worker in agriculture seems to require, 
among other things, a 9aV/ ourable land - agricultural labour 
ratio, but this cannot be maintained, in the long run, in the 
face of ever increasing population unless a part of growing 
population can be diverted into activities other than agricul­
ture. Therefore other branches of economic activity, mainly 
industry, are needed to absorb at least a part of additional 
labour and capital.
Although the Development Board gave first priority to 
agriculture, it did not neglect industry and its plans during 
the period 1951-^0 allocated I.D. 93 million to the industrial
sector compared with I.D.4millions total investment in modern
44industrial plants up to 1951*
This however, did not satisfy the policy makers after the 
Revolution of July 1958. Thus the Fifth and Sixth Plans were 
formulated by the Planning Board and gave first priority to 
industry. Beside the alleged neglect of industry by the Devdop- 
ment Board, it looks as if the Planning Bo rd regarded industry
43* The Development Board, Development of the Tigris-Euphrates 
Valley, p. 4.
44. I.B.R.D. Economic Development of Iraq, p. 33
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as in some sense more productive than agriculture. Thus in
an explanatory note to the fifth plan it was stated that
’’industry increases national income by a higher percentage
than agriculture with regard to capital and labour... while
capital-output ratio was 8 for extensive cultivation in the
Diala River Basin,... it was estimated that capital output
ratios were 3 or less in some industrial projects such as the
4bglassware and the sulphur extraction projects”.
Although it is reasonable to think that productivity per
unit of capital and/or labour in a few industrial projects is
higher than that of certain agricultural projects, it does not
follow that productivity of additional capital will be higher
in the industrial sector than in the agricultural sector. It
is interesting to notice that the capital output ratios of some
state farms in the same plan were lower than those of the
46industrial projects mentioned above. Moreover in the current
Five-Year Plan 1985-8 9, capital-output ratio of irrigation
projects is estimated to be 5» but these are social overhead 
capital projects, that make possible higher productivity else­
where in the economy, thus the capital-output ratios for tne 
whole agricultural sectors in the plan was 3»4 compared to
473*6 for the industrial sector including electricity. It should 
be remembered also that the definition of projects and sectors 
is, in the last qnalysis, arbitrary. Industrial projects for
45. Ministry of Guidance, Law No. 70, 1981, p. 78
46. Ibid., pp. 208-216
47. Ministry of Guidance, Law No. 8 7, 1985, P* 89
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example are associated with urbanisation which means more 
houses, schools, hospitals, power stations etc., should some 
of the capital required by these projects be regarded as the 
capital cost of industrial projects or not? If one allows for 
th&se indirect capital requirements of industrialization, the 
capital output ratio of this sector will become much higher. 
Therefore it is hard to conclude that the drastic shift in 
development strategy that took place after 195$ can be justified 
on the basis of the capital output ratio analysis, even if we 
confine ourselves to information given in the plans.
Another justification for the shift of emphasis from
agriculture to industry after 1958 seems to have been the
Planning Board’s belief that Mit is on the basis of industrial
development that the economy progresses technically and the
*+8people acquire higher skills” .
Although changes in productivity over time are important 
and the relative advantages of different sectors should therefore 
be measured over time, it does not follow that allowances for 
this factor will always favour industry. There is often as 
much scope for technical improvement in agriculture as in 
industry. The fact that most developed countries with high 
income per head nave a large industrial sector in which produc­
tivity has been increasing will give us wrong conclusions if 
we compare productivity here with that of primitive agriculture
48. Ministry of Planning, Repd.rt on the Draft Broad Lines for
the Detailed Sconomic Plan, quoted by Kanaan, Input-Output 
and Social Accounts of Iraq, Chapter II. p.l4.
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in poor countries. If we look at the differences in productivity 
between developed and poor countries, we can see that there is 
often as much difference in productivity between developed and 
underdeveloped countries in agricultural sectors as in the
49industrial sectors. The relevant comparison is between the
two sectors in the same, or at least, similar environments. This 
will narrow sharply, if not wipe out, the differences in 
productivity between the two sectors. The relevant thing is 
to compare the advantages of expansion and modernization of 
agriculture with industrial expansion, and not benefits of 
industrial development with horizontal expansion of primitive 
agriculture.
Our discussion of the arguments put forward by Iraqi 
policy makers and their advisers for over-emphasizing agriculture 
or industry before and after 1958 was clearly inconclusive.
This, however, is due to the very nature of the problem. Since 
no satisfactory strategy can be derived from these theoretical 
discussions, it does not follow that the problem of resource 
allocation between different sectors need not be dealt with 
systematically, because this at least, brings to our attention 
several aspects of development plannihg that one needs to be 
aware of to avoid certain mistakes.
In fact, proper assessment of costs and benefits derived 
at project, sub-sectoral and sectoral levels would go a long way
49. Clark, Conditions of Economic Progress, pp. 276,236.
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in offering a fairly satisfactory solution to the problem.
The ifcrouble is the scarcity of well prepared projects or 
groups of interrelated projects ready for implementation, which 
is partly due to the lack of qualified specialists who can 
produce well planned desirable investment projects. Thus 
during the period of preparation of all the plans, discussed, 
estimated available funds were much greater than the amount 
required for all the projects which were prepared and ready for 
implementation. Therefore one could not allocate all estimated 
available funds among different sectors on the basis of well- 
studied projects. When dealing with projects which are not yet 
well analysed and ready for implementation, the problem of 
resource allocation becomes basically a matter of judgment, 
and there is no reason why even the most objective people should 
not have different opinions, especially if we remember that even 
the highly sophisticated arguments and theoretical reasoning 
designed to a far less difficult problem of choice of projects 
inside each sector is inconclusive. Thus even if there is a 
set of well prepared projects ready for implementation, one can 
rank them according to a variety of investment criteria such as:
(a) the Factor intensity criterion proposed by Polaj^ and Buchahan,^^
(b) marginal social productivity criterion proposed by Kahn and
51elaborated by Chewery, (c) marginal reinvestment criterion proposed
50.Polak, J. Balance of Payments Problems of Countries Reconstructing 
with help of Foreign Loans, pp. 208-32 and Bubhanan, N .,Inter­
national Investment and Domestic Welfare, pp. 24,72,106-(j
51.Kahn, A.E., Investment Criteria in Development Programmes, 
pp. 38 -6 1 and Che*ery, H.B., The Applic tion of Investment 
Criteria, pp. 76-9 6 .
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32by Galenson and Lfitbenstein etc. But each of these has its 
own well known limitations and they lead to contradictory fisults. 
For example, the first criterion leads to projects with low 
capital-out-put ratio, while according to the third criterion 
planners are advised to contentrate on those projects or 
techniques of production with the highest capital intensity.
Under these circumstances the question of resource alloca­
tion between different sectors can best be dealt with by a group 
of people who are aware of different aspects of the process
of development and have a good knowledge of the country and are
53objective and large minded. In the case of Iraq, members of 
such a group can hardly satisfy the requirements of the function 
if they are ministers because cabinet changes are rapid and 
politicians are unlikely to have the required qualifications. 
Such a group of experts cannot also perform their basic function 
properly if they keep themselves occupied with technical details 
of sinale projects in the sense discussed in chapter two.
A plan formulated under the supervision of a group of 
people who satisfy the above-mentioned requirements is likely to 
recognise the importance of all sectors, estimate its revenues 
fairly accurately, include a number of welt-prepared projects,
52. Galenson, W., and Lfifebenstein, H., Investment Criteria, 
Productivity and Economic Development, pp.3^3-7^•
53* Tinbergen, The Relevance of Theoretical Criteria in 
Selection of Investment Plans, p. 10.
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recognise complementarity between different projects and 
sectors, recognize the causes of sliggishness in implementa­
tion and propose remedies. From a point of view of rapid 
industrial growth a plan that satisfied these simple common-
sense requirements and devotes only 15% of total funds to the
industrial sector is far superior to another one which allocates 
30% of total funds for this sector but exaggerates total available 
resources and leaves the organization dealing with planning 
and implementation of industrial projects so inadequate, that 
it can impLement only a few projects among a long list included 
in the plan during the time span of the programme.
4 . The Choice of Projects
Given the fact that a certain percentage of available 
funds are allocated to the industrial sector, the question is, 
on what branches of industry or specific industrial projects 
should one spend money?
The World Bank Mission in 1951 recommended that priority
should be given to industries that would complement agriculture
such as Fertilizer, agricultural implements and processing of
local agricultural commodities, and to industries which would
meet the growing local demand for consumer goods and construction 
54
material. The Little report agreed with these views to a large 
extent, thus with the exception of the proposed steel rolling 
mill, all the recommended industries depended on local raw
. w " *  - •
54. I.B.R.D. Economic Development of Iraq, pp. 35-38,53-
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55materials particularly chemical resources. Almost all the
industries recommended by the report were designed to supply 
the domestic market, but the report stressed that this market 
was too small to justify a large industrial expansion based 
on chemical resources because even medium-sized plants would 
be fai&y large in comparison with domestic consumption. Instead 
of arguing for the exploitation of chemical resources on the 
basis of the world market, the report recommended a number of 
small and medium sized, but interrelated, industrial projects 
that had to be taken together if this programme was to be 
commercially successful on the basis of the local market.
The Development Board followed these general lines of 
advice and concentrated on the development of industries based 
on domestic resources and assured of a domestic market. Almost 
all the industrial projects of the Planning Board are based on 
local raw materials and a domestic market. There are, however, 
a few exceptions, thus the rayon project will produce exclusively 
for the domestic market, but beside domestic raw materials it 
will use certain imported raw materials to be produced locally 
in the future. The other important exceptional case is the
agricultural machinery plant which will use imported raw material
56and have a capacity far larger than the local market needs.
55- Langley, Industrialization of Iraq, p. 219
56. Ministry of Guidance, Law No. 70, 196l, for the 1961-65
plan, p. 295 and in formation provided by Mr. H.K. al-Duri, 
Engineer at the metalic industries sectioh of the Department 
of Industrial Design and Construction, Ministry of Industry.
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The current five-year economic plan 19&5-66, introduced
two new techniques, namely, the use of the criteria laid down
57in the United Nations MA Study of Industrial Growth"^ for
allocating the total share of the industrial sector among sub­
sectors, and the use of some priority ratios in choosing specific 
projects.
Pattern of Industrial Growth
The United Nations study used the general analytical
58method of Che«ery’s "Pattern of Industrial Growth", and basic 
data for 53 countries in 1953 and 42 countries in 195$. The 
manufacturing sector was divided into thirteen sub-sectors. Then 
by using the multiple regression method, the quantitative 
relations between the level of total manufacturing output and 
output in each of the thirteen sub-sectors, on the one hand, and 
per capita income and population on the other hand, were 
expressed in terms of a set of"standard equations". Now given 
the size of the population and per capita income, the "total 
manufacturing equation" will show the expected size of the 
industrial sector for each country. Given the size of 
population, per capita income and the ratio of the actual to 
the calculated value of the industrial sector in each country,
the set of 13 equations will give the expected size of each
59sub-sector of the industrial sector in any country.
57- United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
A Study of Industrial Growth.
5 8 . Chenery, Patterns of Industrial Growth,pp. 624-51
59« United Nations, A Study of Industrial Growth, pp. 6, 32.
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The aim of the Sixth Plan was to increase national income 
by 8% per year and the continuation of the 12% rate of growth 
of the industrial sector. Then the planners estimated the 
level of national income, per capita income, and value added 
in the industrial sector for 19&9 constant 195& prices.
Applying the United Nations method on these macro-economic 
quantities table H i . 11, was constructed. Column one shows 
value added in the manufacturing industrial sectors after it 
was rearranged from 1? to 13 sub-sectors. Column two shows 
how value added in this sector would have been distributed 
between different branches, had the pattern of industrial 
growth been similar to the "normal case". Column tnree is 
the difference between che two columns and measures the amount 
of deviation from tne "normal" pattern. Column four shows 
the distribution of value added in 19&9 by the application of
the United Nations criterion.
.is
Since it /too much to hope to obtain a pattern of industrial 
mix in complete conformity with the normal "pattern" the planners 
divided value added in 19&9 between different branches of 
industry as shown in column 5* The items of this column were 
obtainedcby subtracting items of column three from those in 
column four. This method implies a reduction in the amount of 
deviation between the country's industrial mix and the normal 
pattern. This is one alternative among a large number of 
possible processes of change. One can plan for increasing the 
deviation*or decreasing it at various rates or simply perpetuating
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it. The planners, however, chose to decrease the deviation 
d.s prsumably because they regard this deviation as a sign of the 
immaturity of the economy.
By comparing columns five and one the rates of growth of 
all subsectors were calculated as shown in column six. Tnese 
rates were used, the planners claimed, to determine the amount 
of investment in each sub-sector and^he number of projects in
. . 60dach one.
Since the industrial projects included in the current 
plan are almost the same industrial projects as were in the 
previous plan,^ it is safe to say that there was, in fact, 
no connection between the exercise based on the United Nations 
and the actual selection of branches of industries and 
industrial projects. But we do not regret the absence of any 
relationships between the selection of the projects of the 
'S plan and the requirements of Chettery's pattern of industrial 
growth because hardly any one could say that the pattern is 
optimal since Chenery1s model failed really to take account 
of trade or resource endowment.
It is interesting to notice that the application of the 
system of regression equations will result in giving a high 
priority to sectors in which the country has no special advantage 
and a low priority to those branches in which the country has
6 0 . Ministry of Planning, The Five Year Economic Plan, 19&5-69i
p.15^.
61. Compare tableslll.7 andlll.8 and see p.82.
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an obvious advantage. Thus if the requirements of table HI.11 
are taken seriously, the lowest priority should go to chemicals 
and non-metallic minerals, while it is obvious that the country’s 
supply of chemical raw materials and lack of metals and timber 
(instead of which bricks, tiles and cement are used widely) 
necessarily point the other direction. According to the table, 
highest priority should be given to rubber, plastics, paper and 
wood products, but in most of these products Iraq has hardly any 
special advantage. The requirements of the table were not 
taken seriously and the plan gave highest priority to chemicals 
as tableIII.8 shows.
Having failed to make any positive contribution by pushing 
the system toward optimality, this type of analysis may have 
had the negative effect of assuring the government that the 
projects were selected scientifically. For example, on the 
basis of this analysis one might argue that a country like 
Iraq, in terms of population and per capita income, should nave 
a larger industrial sector, it is wise, therefore, to push ahead 
the industrial sector, especially the lagging branches, such as 
basic metallic products; therefore the agricultural machinery 
project is a wise choice. At the same time it is a fact that
this project has a capacity which is several times larger than 
the needs of Iraq and the country has no special advantage in 
producing these goods or the required raw materials.
Ill
Priority Ratios:
The first five plans discussed did not specify the 
criteria used for the selection of projects. For the sixth 
plan, however, planners calculated the expected effects on 
the economy of the implementation of 17 industrial projects, 
out of ^5 industrial projects included in the plan. On the 
basis of information supplied in the reports of consultant firms, 
planners calculated capital-output ratios, capital to foreign- 
exchange-saving ratios and capital-labour ratios. These 
ratios are given in tablelll.12. The planners pointed out 
that projects which produce more output per unit of capital 
expenditure are preferred to projects with higher capital-output 
ratio, and projects that save more foreign exchange per unit 
of investment are better than those with a higher capital to 
foreign exchange ratio, while projects which employ more un­
skilled labour per unit of investment are preferred to those 
that employ less.^
Although it is possible to rank projects according to 
any of these criteria, and obtain specific results, it is 
extremely difficult to use more than one criteria unless one 
specifies accurately his objectives in the sense of deciding 
that x units of output has the same desirability as y units of 
saving foreign exchange and z units of unskilled labour employed.
62. Ministry of Planning, The Five-Years Economic Plan, 1965-6 9, 
PP 239-2^0
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Tablelll.12
Priority Ratios in the Sixth Plan 1965-6 9 :
Project Gross Capital
Output
Ratio
Net Capital 
Output 
Ratio
Capital to 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Saving 
Ratio
Capiilal
Labour
Ratio
1 2 3 4
Kut Cotton Textile 4.0 5-2 3.8 5.0
Hilla Rayon Textile 4.1 5-1 3-6 3.8
Expansion of Mosul 
Cotton Textile 3-0 3-7 2 .8 4.0
Kut Stocking and 
Underwear Project 2 . 0 2.3 1.5 2 . 0
Basra Paper Plant 6.3 9.1 11.3 1 8 .8
Samara Antibiotic 
Project 4.5 5-6 3.6 7.3
Hindiya Rayon Project 11.5 47.6 1 0 .8 1 5 .0
Kirkuk Sulphur 
Extraction Plant 4.0 )
\
)
1 0 .0 1Basra Fertilizer Plant 5-0 )) 15
Four different Pero- 
chemical plants 6 .0
)
)
)
)
Natural Gas Pipeline 4.0 4.6 negative 155.0
Basra Refinery 3-7 4.3 negative 15.0
Ramadi Glass Plant 5-2 7-7 5-3 3.7
Ramadi Ceramic Project 1.9 2 .1 2.9 2.4
Iron and Steel Project 6 .0 1 0 .0 15.0
Electrical Equipment 
Project - Baghdad 3-2 4.0 3-5 2.7
Agricultural Machinery 
Plant 5.8 7.9 8.9 4.1
Total 4.9 8.7
Source: Ministry of Planning, Five -Years Economic Plan, 1965- 69,
pp. 237, 243 and 245-
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The planners, however, did not specify their objectives in these 
terms, they only stated vaguely that they had used these ratios 
to decide the priority of projects. But since all these 17 indu­
strial projects were included in the previous plan, it is hard to 
say that there was any relationship between these priority ratios 
and the inclusion of these projects in the sixth plan.
In summary the policy of choice of projects was to concentrate 
on those projects that use local raw materials and find an outlet 
for their product in the domestic market. In the current plan, 
the planners, stated that in a later stage, emphasis will be put 
on the exploitation of local petrochemical raw materials on tne 
basis of the world m a r k e t . I t  seems that within these general 
lines of policy any single industrial project has been tested by
its commercial profitability. But this does not mean that a
consistent method was used to arrive at proper costs and benefits. 
In fact, the prices of outputs and inputs used were sometimes 
market unadjusted for things like custom duty rates. In some 
cases the local market prices of imported goods were compared 
with the cost of local production in order to arrive at the 
rates of profit from capital investment in industrial projects.
Thus, the feasibility study of the Nassiriah Woollen 
Textile project,^ compared the cost of production in the proposed 
mill with the Baghdad market price of imported woollen textile, 
and the project shows a 15?o profit on capital. Nowhere in the
6 3 . Ministry of Planning, 19&5-69, Plan» P* ^ 7
Gk. Ministry of Industry, the Feasibility Study of tne Nassiriah
Woollen Textile Project.
Ilk
report was anything mentioned about import duties. The local 
market price of imported woollen textiles includes 33% import 
duties and the profit margin of the importer and the wholesaler, 
and these profits are likely to be inflated because imports were 
subject to a quota system.^ The point is that one cannot rank 
projects according to their profitability if the set of prices 
used in estimating profits are not consistent. If costs of 
domestic production are not compared with landed price of 
imported goods before duties are levied, the duty rates will 
become the decisive factor in ranking projects according to their 
profitability. Since tariff rates are arbitrarily imposed and 
changed by the government, it is clear that they do hot bear 
any relationship to real costs and benefits. Therefore they must 
be sexcluded in this type of studies.
Professor Arthur Lewis once pointed out that ’’the quality
and the forms of plans should be limited strictly within the
66capacity of the machine”. In Iraq the planning machinery did 
not apply the simple commercial profitability test in a consistent 
manner, nevertheless, it tried to use more delicate methods 
such as national income, balance of payment and employment tests 
in the formulation of the current plan. As a result this plan 
was an impressive document in comparison with the previous plans 
but we have shown in this chapter that the difference between this
63- The quota system is discussed in chapter six. 
bo. Leldls, A., Principles of Economic Planning, p. 122
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plan and the previous plans is essentially fanciful. Moreover, 
some of the techniques used in the formulation of this plan 
may have regretable consequences for the economy if taken 
seriously.
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Chapter IV
i
IMPLEMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT 
INVESTMENT PROGRAMMES 1951-&5
The aim of this chapter is to discuss implementation of
investment programmes to show how far plan targets were achieved
*
and whether the reorganisation of the planning macninery in 1959 
improved the process of implementation. For this purpose the 
period is subdivided into two periods first 1951-58, during which 
the Development Board Formulated and implemented investment 
plans - we call it the first period - and second 1959-&5* during 
which the Planning Board formulated investment programmes while 
operating ministries were responsible for plan implementation - 
we call it the second period. An attempt is made in this 
chapter to show the main features of the failure in implementation 
and I will discuss the main reasons for the slowing down of 
implementation. Special emphasis is put on the industrial 
sector •..
1. The Experience of Implementation 
While the formulation of a consistent plan is indisputably 
necessary what matters more is its implementation. Failure to 
carry out plans may manifest itself in different ways such as 
inability to invest in economically sound projects, delays in 
the execution of projects, inferior construction, selection of 
low yield projects and inability to use facilities provided by 
investment
1. Waterson, Development Planning p. 299
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Unfortunately data reflecting the implementation of 
development plans in Iraq are fragmentary. Except for invest­
ment figures no adequate information is available. Moreover, 
up to the sixth plan 19&5-69* the 1951-&5 Plans did n°t give, 
adequate overall or sectoral targets for national intfome, 
employment, balance of payment etc.
The overemphasis on financial investment targets can be 
regarded as a sign of bad planning which may have detrimental 
repercussions because it tends to focus attention on the ful­
filment of investment targets rather than on the real targets 
of investment which are physical. This, as Reddaway has pointed
out, is Mto mistake the means for the objective, the fundamental
2
objective of the plan is to obtain the higher level of output11.
On the other hand the value of capital formation that results 
from investment depends on how and where money is invested. It 
is not inconceivable for large sums of money to be invested in 
projects that serve no useful purpose. Moreover, some items 
of current expenditure on health and education may be more 
productive in the long run than much of the investment in magni­
ficent public buildings, boulevards, uneconomic industrial projects, 
expensive housing for bureaucracy, etc. Nevertheless, we 
proceed to examine the implementation of Iraq’s plans on the 
basis of actual expenduture, simply because of lack of information, 
and because financial expenditures were the main targets of the 
plans. Under these circumstances a proper measure of plan 
implementation is the extent to which investment targets of the 
plans have been achieved._______________________
2. Reddaway, Importance of Time Lag for Economic Planning, p. 227
118
Table IV.1
Planned Investment, Actual Capital Expenditure and 
Total Revenues of the Development Programmes 1931-65
I.D.Millions
Year Planned
Investment
Actual
Invest­
ment
Revenue 
devoted 
to Plans
2 as % 
of 1
2 as % 
of 3
3 as % 
of 1
1 2 3 4 . 3 6
1951 9 . 3 3 .1 7.4 33.3 41.8 79.5
1952 2 0 .5 7 . 8 23.9 2 8 .0 3 2 .6 116.5
1953 2 8 .<+ 1 2 .3 35.2 42.8 34.9 123.9
1954 3 1 .5 2 0 .9 4o.7 6 6 .3 51.3 12 9 .2
1955 46.6 3 2 .0 60 .7 68.6 52.7 130.2
1956 8 1 .9 4 3 .0 51.1 52.3 84.1 6 2 .3
1957 100.8 5 7 .4 35.8 36.9 1 6 0 .3 33.3
1958 99-5 5 2 .2 61 .7 52.4 84.6 6 2 .0
1959 8 0 .O 4 9 .9 43-3 6 2 .3 114.7 3^.3
i960 143.0 4 7 .5 47.6 3312 99.7 33.2
1961 97-1 6 0 .8 66.6 6 2 .6 91.2 6 8 .5
1962 1 0 8 .0 5 8 .7 70.0 34.3 8 3 .8 64.8
1963 117.6 5 3 .5 6 7 .6 4 3 .4 79.1 37.4
1964 119.6 7 4 .0 76.4 6 1 .8 9 6 .8 6 6 .3
1965 1 2 3 .2 5 7 .1 70.8 46.3 8 0 .6 37.4
• 1951-58 418.8 2 2 8 .7 316.9 54.6' 72.1 73.6
1959-65 788.5 401.5 442.5 30.9 90.7 5 6 .1
1951-65 1207.3 63 0 .2 759.4 52.1 8 2 .9 6 2 .9
Source: Law No. l8l of 1939» P* 11; Law No. 70 of 1961 P-ll?
Law No. 54 of 1956, p 11; Law No. 87 of 1965» P« 72; 
Central Bank of Iraq, Quarterly Bulletin, No. 59i P* 46; 
Central Bank of Iraq, Bulletin, tfew Series, No.3* 1967
pp. 28-2 9 ; No. 4 1 9 6 7, pp. 29-25"!
Note: Column two excludes administrative expenditures of the Development
Board and all loans. Revenues for 1965 Is provisional.
119
Expenditure - Allocation Ratio: This ratio shows the relation­
ship between planned investment and actual investment i.e. 
between goals and achievements. The higher the ratio the more 
successful has been the plan in carrying out its investment 
target. The first column of Table IV.1 shows that allocation 
of funds for investment was rising; it increased from less than 
I.D. 10 million in 1951 to I.D. 123*2 million in 19&5* Actual 
expenditure was moderate at the beginning, but it started to rise 
rapidly during the first period 1951-58; it increased from 
I.D. 3*1 million in 1951 to I.D. 57*^ + million in 1957i the 
momentom was then lost and the 19&5 level of I.D. 57*1 is almost 
equal to the 1957 level.
A comparison between columns one and two of table IV.1, shows 
that expenditure was always less than planned investment. The 
ratio of expenditure to allocation, given in column k of the 
same table, was 52.1% for the whole period, but the ratio was 
higher in the first period. Moreover, during 1951-58 the ratio 
rose from the low level of 33% to 52% in 1958, but during the 
second period the ratio fell to kG% in 1 9 6 5. Thus while the 
gap between promise and achievement was narrowing during the 
Development Board Period it appears to have been widening during 
the Planning Board’s period.
Expenditure - Revenue Ratio: Planners may exaggerate reiienues
hence actual investment will be less than planned expenditure.
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Column three of table IV.1 shows that revenues were rising rapidly
during the first period with the exception of 1956-57i when
revenues dropped sharply due to blowing up oil pipelines in
Syria during the Suez crisis of 1956.^ At the beginning of the
second period revenues dropped again due to the Revolutionary
Government’s decision to decrease the percentage of oil revenues
h
devoted to the development plans from 70% to 50%. Column *5 
of table IV.1 shows that the ratio of expenditure to revenues 
was 4l% in 1951 but it rose to 89-% by 195& but at the end of 
the same year accumulated funds, despite the Suez crisis, was
I.D. 84.6 million. During the second period the ratio increased 
to 90%, compared with 72% during the first period. This 
improvement, was mainly the result of fall and stagnation in 
revenues rather than increased expenditure. Throughout the 
whole period, however, there was a marked inability to spend 
available funds.
Sectoral Underspending: Table IV.2 shows the ratio of actual
expenditure to planned investment in the four major sectors. It 
shows that throughout the period 1951-65 achievements of invest­
ment targets was the lowest in the industrial sector. Com­
pared with an overall ratio of actual investment to planned 
investment of 52%, the ratio was only 40% for the industrial sector, 
It is interesting that the situation of the industrial sector
3* See Table 1.6 p.^\ and Central Bank of Iraq, Annual Report, 
1965, p. 1 8 .
4. Ministry of Finance, Department of Accounts, Annual Report,
1959, p. 10.
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did not improve during the second period. In fact the ratio 
fell from 46% during 1951-58 to 38% during 1959-85* Thus the 
gap between goals, and achievements cf the industrial sector 
increased during the Planning Board’s period. Morever, whereas 
the ratio improved from 3*3% in 1952 to 108 % in 1958, it 
decreased to 47% in 1985*
Table IV.3 shows that the Development Board gave first 
priority to agriculture and devoted 14.8% of planned investment
to industry. Although the Planning Board gave first priority
5
to industry, this is not reflected in table IV.3i because 
planned investment in this sector did not include the cost of 
machinery and equipment that was expected to be provided by the 
Soviet Union according to the Iraqi Soviet Technical and Economic 
Co-operation Agreement, for the years 1959-80, and the Fourth 
and Fifth Plans were terminated before their whole period was 
over, and these plans concentrated industrial investment in the 
final years.
Table IV.4 shows the distribution of actual investment 
between different sectors. It shows that the ratio cf investment 
in agriculture to total investment decreased from 32% during 
1951-58 to only 14% during 1959-83* The sharp decline in the 
share of agriculture in total investment did not result 1 however, 
in any significant improvement in the share of industry, because 
the ratio of investment in industry to total investment increased
5* See Table III. 10. p. <V$
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Table IV.3
Sectoral Distribution of 
Planned Investment 1931-1963
I.D. million
Year______ Agriculture Industry Comrnunica tion Buildings______ Total
1 2 3 ** 5
I.D. % I.D.» % I.D. % I.D. % I.D
1951 4.7 50.5 0.0 0.0 2.1 2a . 5 3.5 37.6 9.3
1952 10.6 51.7 3.0 14.6 3.8 1 8 .5 3.1 15.1 20.5
1953 1 5 .0 5 2 .2 5.0 17.4 4.7 1 6 .6 3.7 12.8 28.7
1954 1 6 .3 51.7 6.0 19.0 5.3 1 6 .8 3.9 12.3 31.5
1955 14.1 30.2 4.1 8.7 14.1 3 0 .2 14.3 30.6 46.6
1956 2 7 .O 32.9 17.0 20.7 17.7 2 1 .6 20.2 24.6 8 1 .9
1957 2 6 .6 2 6 .3 1 6 .0 1 5 .8 29.3 2 9 .0 28.9 2 8 .6 100.8
1958 29.5 29.6 11.0 11.0 32.1 3 2 .2 2 6 .9 27.0 99.5
1959 15.0 18.7 10.0 12.5 2 3 .O 2 8 * 7 3&-P 40.0 8 0 .0
i960 20.0 13.9 14.0 9.7 37.0 2 5 .8 71.0 49.6 143.0
1961 19.7 20.2 14.4 14.8 24.8 2 5 .5 38.0 39.1 97.1
1962 20.2 18.7 24.7 22.8 32.4 3 0 .0 30.7 28.4 1 0 8 .0
1963 22.8 19.3 39.6 33.6 29.8 2 5 .3 25.4 21.5 117.6
1964 24.7 20.6 43.0 35.9 27.9 2 3 .3 24.0 20.0 119.6
1965 25.1 20.3 32.1 2 6 .0 2 6 .5 2 1 .5 39.5 32.6 12 3 .2
1951--58 143.8 34.3 6 2 .1 14.8 ]09.1 2 6 .0 104.5 24.9 4l8,8
1959-65 147-5 18.7
00•i>- 
1—1 22.52)1.4 2 5 .5 2 6 0 .6 33.0 788,5
1951- 64 291.3 24.1 239.9 19.83L0.5 2 5 .7 365.1 30.2 1207,3
Source: Central Bank of Iraq, Annual Report, 1963, P* 217, and
1965, p. 351; Law No. 87 of 1965, p. 72; Law No. l8l of
1959, P* 11, Law No. 70 of 1961, p. 11; Central Bank
of Iraq, Bulletin, Eew Series, No. 3» 1967, P* 29 and 
No. 4, 1967 P* 29.
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Table IV.4
Sectoral Actual Investment 
as % of Total Investment 1951-1965
I.D. Million
Year Agriculture Industry Communication Building Total
1 2» 3 4 5
I.D. . % I.D. 0/c I.D. % I.D. % I.D. %
1951 1.6 51.6 0.0 0.0 0.6 19.3 0.9 29.0 3.1
1932 3.5 44.8 0.1 1.2 1.7 21.7 2.3 32.2 7.8
1953 7.1 57.7 0.5 4.0 1.9 15.4 2.8 22.7 12.3
1954 11.6 55.5 2.0 9.5 4.3 20.5 3.0 14.3 20.9
1955 11.6 3 6 .2 0.9 2.8 8.4 2 6 .2 11.1 34.6 32.0
1956 12.3 2 8 .6 3-0 11.6 9.2 2 1 .3 1 6 .5 38.3 43.0
1957 13.2 22.9 8.6 1 5 .0 12.4 21.6 23.2 4o.4 5 7 .4
1958 12.6 24.1 11.9 22.7 7.9 13.1 19.9 3 8 .1 5 2 .2
1959 10.3 20.6 4.8 9.6 12.6 2 3 .2 22.2 44.4 4 9 . 9
i960 10.8 22.7 3.7 12.0 7.9 1 6 .6 23.1 48.6 4 7 .5
1961 9 . 6 15.7 7.0 11.5 14.1 23.1 30.1 49.5 6 0 .8
1962 6 .3 16.7 1 0 .3 17.5 15*8 26.9 2 6 .3 44.8 5 8 .7
1963 4.5 8.4 9.3 17.7 1 8 .3 34.2 21.2 39.6 5 5 .5
196^ 6.7 9.0 1 6 .3 22.2 1 8 .8 25.4 32.0 43.2 7 4 .0
1965 5.9 10.3 15.1 26.4 12.4 21.7 2317 41.5 5 7 .1
2K)t 1
~x931-58 7 3 .5 32.1 2 9 .O 12.6 46.4 20.0 79.9 34.9 2 2 8 .7
1959-65 54.1 14.1 6 8 .9 17.1 99.9 24.9 178.6 44.4 401.5
1951-65 327.6 21.0 97.9 15.5 346.3 2 3 .2 254.3 41.0 6 3 0 .2
Source: Central Bank of Iraq: Annual Report 19&3* P« 2l8;
Quarterly Bulletin, No• 591 P* 47, Bulletin, New Series, 
No.3> 19°7 P* 29 and No# 4 19&7 p. 29-
Note: Expenditure excludes administrative expenditure of the
Development Board, all loans and transfer of funds to the 
ordinary budget.
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only from 13% during the first period to 17% during the second 
period. The largest share of the investment went to the public 
buildings seetor and the ratio of investment in building to total 
investment increased from 3*+% during the Development Board’s 
period to during the Planning Board's period. The combined
share of agriculture and industry fell from 45% to 31% between 
the two periods. Thus although the Planning Board justified its 
relative neglect of agriculture by the necessity of shifting 
emphasis to industry^, it in fact turned out to emphasize public 
buildings not industry.
Table IV.5 shows that during the period 1951-65 there was 
a marked deviation of actual pattern of investment from the 
planned composition of capital expenditure. Thus although 
19*8% of funds were devoted to industry only 15*5% of actual 
investment went to this sector. While 4l% of funds were invested 
in public buildings 30% was devoted to this sector in the plans. 
The table also shows that during the Planning Board's period 
the pattern of actual investment deviated more from the planned 
pattern of investment than it did during the Development Board's 
period. This means that the plans of the Development Board 
governed actual expenditure to a larger degree than the plans 
of the Planning Board. In other words the implementation 
process upset the priorities of the Development Board to a smaller 
degree than those of the Planning Board. This indicates a 
set batek in the quality of planning process.
6. See pp. S I ol
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Table IV.3
Deviation of Actual Pattern of Expenditure from 
Planned Composition of Investment 1951-&5
%
Sector 1951 - 58 1959 •- 65 1951 - 65
Planned Actual Planned Actual Planned Actual
Agriculture 3^.3 3 2 .2 18.7 13.5 24.2 2 0 .2
Industry 1 ^ .8 1 2 .6 22.5 17*1 1 9 .8 15-5
Communication 2 6 .0 20.3 25.5 24.9 25.7 2 3 .2
Buildings 2k .9 34.9 33.3 44.5 30.3 41.1
Total 1 0 0 .0 1 0 0 .0 1 0 0 .0 1 0 0 .0 1 0 0 .0 1 0 0 .0
Source: Derived from Tables IV--3 andIV -4
Thus during the period 1951-65i implementation failure 
manifests itself in a marked inability to use available funds 
in economically sound proiects, a large and increasing gap 
between promise and achievement, while priorities outlined in 
the plans were distorted by the implemenation process.
2. The Main Causes of Failure.
Poor plan implementation may to attributed to a combination 
of administrative inefficiency, over ambitious plans, technical 
and political factors.
Ambitious Plans: Out of the six plans, covering the period 1951*
6 5, five were unduly ambitious even in the strict sense of 
financial requirements. Column six of table IV.1 shows that 
during 1951-65 actual revenues came to only 63% of planned
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investment. During the early part of 1951-58 period planners 
underestimated revenues while during the latter part of the 
same period there was an obvious overestimation of revenues 
aggravated by the Suez crisis of 1956. Over estimation of 
revenues increased by far during the 1959-65 period, thus while 
the ratio of revenue to planned investment was 63% for the 
khole period, it was only 56% for the 1959 -65 period compared 
to 75% during 1951-58. Thus even if all available revenues were 
utilized actual investment would have been equal to 75% of 
planned investment in the first period and only 56% during the 
second period. This means that planners, especially during the 
second period, overestimated the political will of the government 
to develop and hence overestimated the amount of funds that the 
government was prepared to devote to capital formation.
Over estimation of revenues has many unfavourable consequences. 
Thus the plans will tend to include beside a number of much 
needed projects many less essential and dubious schemes, con­
sequently the investment programme may move in all directions 
at the same time. But because of physical and administrative 
as well as financial limitations, the speed of the implementation 
process will be slow; this means that large amounts of funds 
may be immobilized in many projects from which little fruit can 
be derived over the short run. Moroever, overesdmation of 
revenues tend to upset the pattern of planned investment.
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To show the effect of over estimated revenues on the relation 
ship between pattern of planned investment and the composition 
of actual expenditure I have distributed actual revenues of the 
plans during 1959-&5 among different sectors according to the 
priorities of the plan* Thus in row - a of table IV*6 actual 
revenues during the period, which was I.D. 442 million, is 
distributed between different sectors according to actual plan 
priorities given in row 1-b of the same table.
Table IV.6
Distribution of Actual Revenues between 
Sectors According to Priorities of 
the 1939-^9 Plan
I.D. millions
Agric• Industry- Commu. Building Total
1 . Planned Investment on a .1.D.147.4 177. 8 201.4 2 6 0 .6 288.5
the basis of estimated
revenues b. % 1 8 .7 22.5 25.5 33.4 1 0 0 .0
2 . Planned Investment on a .1.D. 84.0 100 .0 112 .0 146.0 442 .0
the basis of actual
revenue b . % 1 8 .7 22.5 25.5 33.5 1 0 0 .0
3- Actual Investment a .1,D. 54.1 68.9 99.9 1 7 8 .6 401.5
b. % 14.1 1 7 .0 24.9 44 .0 1 0 0 .0
4. Actual Investment a .I.D. 54.1 68.9 99.9 146.0 3 8 6 .9
with no shift of
funds between Sectors b. % 1 5 .0 19.0 27.0 39.0 1 0 0 .0
Source: Derived from Tables IV.1, IV.3 and IV.4.
In row 4a we show what the amount of investment would have been 
in each sector, had planned investment, given in row 2a, set a 
ceiling on actual investment in each sector. The only sector 
which is affected in this way is the public buildings sectcr, 
in which investment is reduced from I.D. 17&.6 to I.D. 146.0 Had 
the planning process worked in this manner an extra amount of 
I.D. 22.5 would have been added to unutilized funds. The 
point is not whether it is or is not desirable to invest money 
in public buildings rather than keeping it to be invested in other 
sectors in the future; what I want to emphasize here is that 
exaggerated revenues tend to upset the pattern of planned expen­
diture and this has occurred in Iraq. The results of table
IV.6 are given in table IV.?• This table shows that the degree of
Table IV .7
Overestimated Revenues and the Deviation of the
Actual Pattern of Investment from the Planned Pattern 1959-65
%
Sector
Planned and Actual 
Investment on the Basis 
of Estimated Revenues
Planned and Actual 
Investment on the Basis 
of Actual Revenues
%
Planned Actual
%
Planned Actual
Agriculture 1 8 .6 14.1 1 8 .6 15.0
Industry 22.5 17-0 22 *5 19.0
Communication 25.5 24.9 25.5 27.0
Buildings $3.4 44.0 33.4 39.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Derivedifrom table IV.6.
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deviation between the actual pattern of expenditure and the 
planned composition of investment would have been less had 
planners not exaggerated revenues. But unrealistic targets 
are only one reason among many more serious reasons which cause
I
underspending and tend to upset the planned pattern of investment. 
Administrative Inefficiency: Successful plan implementation
depends "on the technical competence and integrity of the admini-
7
stration11 , because implementation is largely a matter of proper 
organisation and administration. We have demonstrated in 
chapter two that the administrative machinery of the Iraqi govern- 
ment was not geared to^exceptionally large spending made possible 
by oil revenues. The administration was characterized by 
excessive centralisation, low moral, lack of co-ordination and 
lack of a sufficient sense of urgency. We have also mentioned 
that promotion was based on seniority and other considerations 
rather than merit. Officials were frequently shifted from one 
position to another without regard to their experience and tney 
did not stay in one department long enough to become really useful, 
there were also serious defects in the paper work, registry, and 
archives. All these defects seriously affected the efficiency of 
the administration yet little systematic attention was paid to 
administrative improvements.
After the revolution of July 1958 government recurrent 
expenditure increased vastly as can be seen from column two of 
table IV.8. Such a development is bound to have favourable
7- Tinbergen, Central Planning, p. 72
131
effects on a country*s capacity to absorb capital expenditure 
provided that emphasis is put on the expansion of those depart­
ments which are directly concerned with plan formulation and 
implementation such as Ministries of Industry and Planning and/ 
or the departments of health and education which can indirectly 
increase the absorbing capacity of the economy in the long run.
Table IV.9 shows the main elements of the governmen's 
ordinary budget expenditure during 1951-65• Column 4 shows that 
during the first period current expenditure of the departments 
concerned with plan implementation increased very slowly from 
I.D. 0.9 million in 1951 to I.D. 2.9 million in 1958 representing 
2*9% and 3*6% of total ordinary expenditure. During the second 
period 1959-65, expansion was also slow and the current expendi­
ture of the planning administration (i.e. departments concerned 
with plan formulation and implementation) increased to I.D. 3*6 
million in 1963* Moreover, the ratio of current expenditure 
of the planning machinery to total ordinary expenditure decreased
from 3*6% on average during the first period to 2*5% during 
o
1959-63- Column three of table IV.9, nowever, shows that there 
was a significant expansion in expenditure on health and 
education but this was overshadowed by the great expansion in 
expenditure on security and defence. For example, expenditure 
on health and education increased from I.D. 25-9 million to
8l Figures for the other two years 19^4-1965 are not yet 
published by the Department of Accounts of the Ministry 
of Finance.
Table IV.8
A Comparison between Capital Expenditure, 
Current Expenditure and National Income
I.D.millions
132.
Year Capital 
Expend•
Current
Expend.
National
Income
1 + 2 1 as % 
of 4
1 as %
of 3
1 2 3 4 5 6
1951 3.1 30.8 1 8 6 .0 33.9 9.2 1 . 6
1952 7.8 44.4 217.0 52.3 1 5 .0 3.6
1953 12.3 50.1 244.0 62.4 19.6 5 .0
195^ 20.9 53.7 248.0 47.1 44.2 7.3
1955 3 2 .0 55.2 289.3 8 6 .5 3 6 .2 1 0 .8
1956 43.0 70.2 334.8 113.3 3719 1 2 .8
1957 57.4 73.8 352.7 131.2 43.7 1 6 .2
1958 52.4 79.2 374.0 131.4 39.7 14 . 0
1959 49.9 100.1 391.6 150.0 33.2 1 5 .6
i960 47.5 114.2 437.1 161 .8 29.3 1 0 .8
1961 6 0 .8 119.1 484.2 179.9 33.7 1 3 .8
1962 58.7 128.4 5 2 8 .0 1 8 7 .1 31.4 1 1 .1
1963 53.5 149.0 525.0 202.6 26.4 1 0 .1
1964 74.0 176.9 595.0 250.9 29.4 12.4
1965 57.1 172.2 6 3 2 .0 229.3 24.9 9.0
.951-5 8 2 28 .7 457.8 2 2 81 .8 686 .3 33.3 10.2
959-65^0 1 .5 995.9 3529.9 1397.4 2 8 .7 11.1
.951-65630 .2 1417.7 5874.7 2047.9 30.7 10.7
Source: Table IV.1; Central Bank of Iraq, Quarterly Bulletin, No*59i 
p.42; Bulletin, New Series, No.3» 19&7i p. 26 and No.4 1967, 
P*24; Annual Report, 1963* P* 150; Fenelon, Iraq, National 
Income and Expenditure and International Financial Statistics. 
Vol. XXI, No. 6, June 1968, pT 176
Note: National Income Figures are for Calendar years while other
figures are for financial years.
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I.D. 48.7 millions between I960 and 19^5 but expenditure on 
defence and security increased from I.D. 44.0 million to I.D.
74.6 million during the same period.
The movements of current and capital expenditure during 
the two periods is shown in table IV.8. During the first 
period 1951-58 capital expenditure increased more rapidly than 
ordinary expenditure and the ratio of capital expenditure to 
total capital and current expenditure rose from 9 *2% in 1951 
to 40# in 1958. During the second period the ratio declined 
sharply to 25% in 1965- Column six of table IV.8 shows that 
on average capital expenditure by the Development Board and the 
Planning Board came almost to 11% of national income, at current 
prices, during 1951-65. The ratio was higher during the 
second period but this is due to the inclusion of the first year 
(1951)t which was a preliminary year. What is more important 
than the overall ratio is the trend, thus the ratio started to 
rise from the low level of 1.6# in 1951 and reached the high 
level of 16% in 1957* But it was declining during 1959-65 
and by 1965 it reached a low level of 9%*
The rapid expansion of current expenditure, most of which 
went to security and defence, the decline in the share of oil 
revenues devoted to capital formation and the decline in capital 
expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure and national 
income were all movements in the wrong direction. Nevertheless, 
the amount of current expenditure on the planning administration 
increased moderately during 1959-6 5. But capital expenditure 
remained stagnant or even declined slightly. Thus implementation
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does not depend on the size of the administration alone. This
decline in the implementation capacity may be partly explained by
the fact that the planning organisation and administration was
made more complicated after the reorganisation of 1959 and since
there was no clear distribution of functions or delegation of
responsibilities to ministries and departments, the whole process
of planning and implementation tended to be slower after the
9
abolition of the Development Board organisation.
The result of faulty organisation and weak administration was, 
not surprisingly, under-spending. But underspending was higher in 
the industrial sector as can be seen from table. IV.2. This reflects
the relative weakness of the administration which dealt with the in­
dustrial sector^. Thus although the country has been developing admini­
strative and technical machinery for plan formulation and implemen­
tation this machinery remained weak and inadequately staffed in 
view of the task assigned to it.^ As a result of weak administra­
tion most of the industrial projects that have been included in
the plans were not fully studied from both technical and economic
points of view. For example, at the beginning of 1965 ou^ 39
' /  —  > .M -r  i
major industrial manufacturing projects included in the 1961-65 plan -
all of which were included in the 1959-65 plan and nine were
included in the 195: -6 0 plan, - mnly four projects were completed, six
were under construetion,while ten were still under feasibility study and
/ the
1  — — ■ 1 --------- ■— ■       ■ - '■ ■        ■
9. See 6 5
10. United Nations, Industrial Planning Programming and Policies 
in Selected Countries of the Middle East, p. 45*
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Table IV.9
Main Elements of Government 
Ordinary Budget Expenditure 1951-&5
I.D. millions
Year Total Security 
or 
Def ence
Health
and
Educatn.
Planning 
Administ.
4 as % 
of 1
2 as % 
of 1
3 as % 
of 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1951 30.9 10.9 6 . 6 0.9 2.9 35.2 21.3
1952 44.7 1 7 .0 8 .2 1 .2 2.7 3 8 .0 18.3
1953 50.5 1 8 .6 9.2 1.7 3.3 3 6 .8 1 8 .2
1954 5^.1 20.1 11.1 2.0 3.7 37.1 20.5
1955 55.7 22.2 12.0 2.1 3.7 39.8 21.5
1956 70.9 2 8 .6 14.6 4.0 5.6 40.3 20.5
1957 7 4 .5 30.6 1 5 .5 2.2 3.1 40.2 20.8
1958 7 9 .9 31.2 1 7 .2 2.9 3.6 39.0 2 1 .5
1959 1 0 0 .5 37.3 2 1 .5 1.7 1.7 37.1 2 1 .3
i960 114.3 44.1 2 5 .9 3.2 2.8 38.5 22.6
1961 119.2 *+5.1 3 0 .2 3.5 2.9 37.8 25.3
196? 128.4 49-3 3 4 .2 3.6 2.8 38.4 2 6 .6
1963 149.0 6 1 .3 3 4 .4 3.6 2.4 41.1 2 3 .0
19$4 141.7 5 6 .8 3 4 .5 n.a n.a 4o.l 24.3
1965 172.2 7*+. 6 48.7 n.a n.a 43-3 2 8 .2
1951-•58461.2 17.0 3.6
1959-63611.4 15.7 2.5
Source: Ministry of Finance, Department of Accounts, Annual Reports
f&r the years 1959 through 19&3* Central Bank of Iraq, 
Quarterly Bulletin, No. 59i P* 44 and, Bulletin, New Series,
Nos. 3 and 4, 19&7> PP* 26 and 24.
Notes: (1) n.a. = not available
(2) Column four is total administrative expenditure of the
Development Board and Ministries and Departments of 
Industry, Agriculture, Planning, Communication and 
Buildings.
(3) The Figures for 1951-58 of Column 3 has been adjusted to 
include expenditure on primary education to make it 
comparable with 1959-65 figures.
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feasibility study of nine projects were completed. For tne 
latter projects technical engineering specifications were 
still to be prepared after that bids for construction were to be 
invited and then a contractor or contractors were to be chosen 
so that actual construction may start. In all these stages 
the problem should go through the cumbersome procedure outlined
in chapter two.
The relative weakness of the organization dealing with 
industry was partly due to tne reorganization of the planning 
machinery in 1959* Before that time the Development Board 
gave a low priority to industry and invested little in this 
sector and the Board created only a small administration to 
deal with industry. Outside the Board's organization other 
government departments dealing with agriculture, communication 
and public buildings had been engaged in the implementation of 
projects almost since the establishment of Iraqi government in 
1921. ^o similar department dealt with industrialization.
When the Development Board was reorganised into different 
ministries in the manner discussed in chapter two a relatively 
small ministry of industry emerged with only a small staff.
Although the Planning Board gave first priority in the fifth 
and sixth plans to industry^. the administrative machinery 
dealing with this sector was not enlarged sufficiently, mainly 
because administration came under the control of the Ministry 
of Finance and not the Planning Board. This lack, of co-ordination
11. U.N. Industrial Planning Programming and Policies in 
selected countries of the Middle East, p.43
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between the plans and the budget (i,e. development policy and 
fiscal policy)was a real problem and was not reduced by making 
the Ministry of Finance a member of the Planning Board. To 
show the lack of co-ordination between plans and budgets a 
comparison is made in table IV.10 between the public buildings 
and the industrial sectors. Columns one and two of this table 
show that in 1959 the administrative expenditures of the 
departments dealing with implementation of building projects 
was five times larger than administrative expenditure of depart­
ments dealing with implementation of industrial projects.
Columns three and four of the same table show that during the 
same year actual capital expenditure on buildings was almost 
five times as large as capital expenditure on industrial projects. 
During that year planned investment in building was three time 
larger than that of industry. By 19&3 while planned expenditure 
in industry was raised to 120% of planned investment in buildings, 
administrative expenditure on industry was only 27% of that 
on buildings. Consequently, underspending in the industrial 
sector was much higher than in the public buildings sector and 
capital expenditure in industry came to only of that in
the buildings sectors .
There is a relationship between administrative expenditure 
and capital expenditure in each sector. Column ££*& of table IV.10 
shows that during the period 1959“63» administrative expenditure 
represented on average 1.9% of capital expenditure in the industrial 
sector. Other things being equal, in order to spend I.D.39-6
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million in the industrial sectors in 19&3 (which was 
the planned investment in that sector at that time), 
one expects that administrative expenditure on industry 
should be I.D.752,000. But during that year actual 
administrative expenditure on this sector was only I.D. 
187,000 i.e. one quorter of the required amount. In 
fact during that year actual capital expenditure was only 
slightly more than one quarter of the planned investment 
in the industrial sector.
No doubt that other factors beside administrative 
expenditure also contribute to determine the implementation 
capacity of different operating ministries, such as: 
the internal organisation of each ministry, quality of 
its staff, the relative complexity of the field o f  w o t k , 
etc., but our analysis indicates that administrative 
expenditure is very important. But so far as adminis­
trative expenditures determined the capacity of ministries 
to implement projects, table IV10 shows that the 
priorities of the ilanning Board were reduced to a state 
of mockery; other policy makers, mainly the Ministry of 
Finance, decided the desirable expansion of the capacity
i4o
of operating ministries, or implementing machinery.
Such a problem is more unlikely to occur under the 
Development Board*s type of organisation, in which pVah 
formulation was not isolated from plan implementation 
because the implementation machinery was also under 
the control of the Board hence it could change the 
implementation capacity of departments dealing with 
different sectors without any need for the approval 
of the Ministry of Finance.
This problem is presumably .ne of the reasons 
that led the Minister of Planning to demand, in his 
introductory statement to Law No. 70 of 1961 for the 
Five Year Flan I90I-6 5, that the Planning Board - 
and hence its technical secretariat i.e. the 
Ministry of Planning, must "parcicipate" in the pre­
paration of the government's annual ordinary budget.
But the Ministry of Finance, apparently did not agree 
12
with this view. But Law No. 44 of 1964 for the 
Planning Boafd made the "supervision" of the prepara­
tion of the ordinary budget one of tne tasks of the
12. Ministry of Guidance, The Five Years Plan I96I-6 5, p*63
Planning Board. But this law seems to have had no 
administrative effect and Law No. 8? of 1965 for the 
19 65 -69 plan again stressed the importance of 
"participation" of the Board in the preparation of 
ordinary budget. A later Law No. l8 of 1966 
reduced the role of the Planning Board to 'bn expression 
of opinion" which is, however, not only less effective 
than "participation" but even less effective than the 
supervisory role mentioned in the previous law.
The failure of the Planning Board to obtain 
adequate staff for the Ministry of Industry, or in 
other words, the insistence of tne Board on formula­
ting plans that bear no relationship with the implemen­
ting capacity of the Ministry of Industry, goes a long 
way to explain the instability of the Ministry to 
implement industrial projects in sufficiently large 
numbers to fulfill the targets of industrial investment 
set down by the Board.
One may say that the institutional set up was 
such that planners could not have done much about the 
capacity of operating ministries to implement projects.
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But the Board could have rendered a great service by pre­
paring its plans on the basis of the capacity of the adminis­
tration to implement, instead of ignoring this capacity, and 
on the basis of the government's political will to develop 
as measured by the 50>o of oil revenues, instead of over 
estimating this will and expecting plan revenues to be twice 
as much as 50% of expected oil revenues. In this case plan 
targets would have been much smaller than those of the plans - 
which after all were never realized,- but by doing this planners 
could have demonstrated how little could be achieved due to 
lack of a sufficient political will to develop and administrative 
bottlenecks. This might have persuaded the government to 
do something about them.
Political Instability: A United Nations study in i960 pointed
out that political instability was an important factor in 
explaining poor implementation of plans in Iraq,because "political 
instability has weakened decision making by the various government 
authorities".^ Although no one wno is familiar with recent develop 
ments in Iraq finds this surprising,it is nevertheless not easy to 
analyse this factor. However, I have shown in chapter three 
that most of the industrial projects included in the later plans
13* United Nations, Industrial Planning Programme and Policies 
in Selected Countries of the Middle East, p"! 45.
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originated in-the Little report. Most of these projects
were included in the 1955-60 plan of the Development Board 
and were studied or were under study before the 195$ revolu­
tion when a number of western consulcing engineering and 
contracting firms were dismissed and their places taken by 
Soviet experts. Further studies and preparation of feasibility 
studies, technical specifications etc... by Soviet experts was 
of course time consuming. For example one industrial project 
(sulphur extraction from Natural Gas), went through the whole 
process of pre-construction before 195$ and in June of that 
year the Development Board decided to contract the erection of 
the plant to an American firm at a total cost of I.D. 6,680,320 
and the firm was asked to approach the Ministry of Development 
to sign the required agreement. Then the Revolution of July 
1956 intervened and the firm was informed that the new govern­
ment has decided to abrogate the Board's decision. The project
was included in the Iraqi Soviet Technical and Economic Co­
operation Agreement of May 1959, to be studied and designed
during 1959-62 and erected during 1962-64. After the Revolution 
of February 1 9 6 3, the project was withdrawn from the agreement 
and the process of reviewing and restudying started again. By 
January 1965 the contract for the erection of the project was
signed with the original American firm at a cost of IiD. 7,485,900
15for exactly the old project. Thus not only seven years was
14. See p.7&
15* Information compiled by Miss M. al-Hashirai of the Economic 
Department of the Ministry of Industry from File No. 42/10 
of the Project at the Ministry.
Ikb
wasted during which income from the project was lost but the 
cost of the projects also increased substantially. This 
example shows the harmful effect of political instability. 
i#1ore generally table IV.1 shows that capital expenditure 
started to rise slowly in early 1950s, but the process was 
accelerating and capital expenditure increased from I.D. 3»1 
million in 1951 to I.D. 57*4 million in 1957* The momentum 
was then lost for many years after the 1958 Revolution, then 
expenditure started to rise again but was interrupted by 
another revolution in 19&3 an<l capital expenditures decreased 
again.
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Chapter V
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND INDUSTRIALIZATION
1950-1965
The purpose of this chapter is to examine Government policy 
towards institutions concerned with the finance of private 
industry. By far the most important of these institutions was 
the Industrial Bank; created in 1946 and fully owned by the 
Government. A detailed analysis of the role of this bank 
forms the main subject of this chapter, but I will also consider 
the past and potential roles of the Central Bank and commercial 
banks. The Central Bank was established in 194? by the 
Government to control monetary policy.. The Government also 
created in 1942 one of the largest commercial banks of Iraq 
namely the Rafidain Bank and it nationalized all commercial 
banks in 1964. All these institutions were attached to 
regular ministries. The central government was legally in 
charge of monetary policy and could control it.
1. Commercial Banks and the Finance of
Industry
In discussion of underdeveloped countries an important 
place is usually given to the shortage of capital both in the 
sense of real physical assets and of funds for their finance.
The latter consists of two aspects: obtaining the necessary
saving and the purely financial aspect namely the channelling 
of savings towards specific objectives.^" My analysis will be 
confined to the financial mechanizra only.
1. Cameron, Banking in the early stages of Industrialization,p.292
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Industrial expansion requires investment funds which come 
either from within the enterprises themselves (internal finance) 
or from external sources namely banks and the capital market.
The most important sources of external finance are loans and 
capital investment provided in exchange for^shares. Loans can 
be classified according to their terms of maturity into short, 
intermediate and long terms, that is for periods of less than 
one year, one to ten years and more than ten years. Short term 
loans are granted by commercial banks and are usually intended 
for the finance/working capital while longer term loans are 
intended to finance fixed capital formation.
In underdeveloped countries planners and private entrepreneurs
tend to concentrate on the finance required for fixed capital
formation and devote limited attention to the equally important
working capital requirements. For example the current 19 65 -69
Iraqi plan allocated only I.D. 5 million for working capital and
provided I.D. l4l million for fixed investment in the manufacturing 
2
industry. Furthermore, most writing on problems of industriali­
zation does not treat adequately the need for working capital.
Yet many industrial enterprises may fail because firms are unable 
to obtain the necessary working capital from banks. It is evident 
that an adequate assessment of the volume of working capital 
required and ways and means of financing it are necessary if 
financial bottlenecks are to be avoided.
The main components of working capital include: inventories,
receivables and cash at hand or in banks. Working capital require-
2. Ministry of Guidance, Law No. 87, 19&5 for the 1965-66 plan,p.l6
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ments differ from enterprize to enterprize, and depend on 
capital intensity, seasonality, location, business practices etc. 
Differences tend to be small between enterprizes in the same 
branch of industry but widen between industrial sectors. Table 
V.l shows relative working capital requirements for thirty major 
industrial enterprizes in Iraq and it is interesting to notice 
that in two companies producing vegetable oil the ratio of the 
value of current assets to the value of fixed assets had the 
same magnitude 124, the two spinning and weaving companies have 
also the same ratio 82 the ratio for the four cement enterprizes 
was between 29 and 44. This shows that the ratio was far lower
in the capital intensive industry - cement - than in the textile
industry - which one expects to be less capital intensive. The 
ratio was also relatively low for a number of industries such 
as matches, jute and nylon stocking which imported their raw 
materials throughout the year, while it was higher for cigarette 
manufacturing companies which usually in Iraq buy most of the 
tobacco they need for the whole year at the end of the tobacco 
season. But "the less time that it takes for raw materials to 
be converted profitably into cash and receivables through sales, 
the less funds have to be held on balance in working capital".^
The ttable also reveals that in most enterprizes working capital
was larger than fixed capital and this demonstrates the importance 
of working capital, a large part of which could have been financed 
by short term loans from commercial banks.
3* Brandt, Business Finance: A Management Approach, p. 35$
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Table V.l
The Ratio of Working Capital to Fixed Capital in 
Thirty Major Industrial Companies in Iraq in 1962
Name Product
National Leather Industries Leather 210
Iraq Carpet Company Carpets 133
Cotton Seed Products Company Vegetable Oil 124
Vegetable Oil Extraction Company Vegetable Oil 124
Al-Ahliya Tobacco Company Cigarettes 102
Rafiaain Tobacco Company Cigarettes 93
Iraq Detergent Company Detergent 87
Asbestos Industries Co. Asbestos 86
Iraq Spinning and Weaving Co* Textiles 82
Fattah Pasha Spinning and Weaving Co. Textiles 82
Northern Industries Co. Beverages 76
Eastern Industries Co. Beverages 64
Euphrates Industries Co. Beverages 62
Arab Carbonated Water Co. Beverages 37
Eastern Beer Co. Beverages 35
Shat El-Arab Industries Beverages 50
National Cardboard Co. Cardboard 68
Iraq Jute Industries Co. Jute Products 59
United Match Factory Matches 58
Agrarian Industries Co. Food Products 57
Nylon Stocking Co. Stockings 57
Kerballa Cotton Textile Co. Cotton Textile 56
Northern Grain Milling Co. Flour 55
Dates Industries Co. Dates 45
Rafidain Cement Co. Cement 44
Iraq Cement Co. Cement 4l
Euphrates Cement Co. Cement 37
United Cement Co. Cement 29
Iraqi Building Material Co. Building Mat. 35
Eastern Chemical Industries Gas 26
Total (30 Companies) 64
Source: U.N.Financing of Manufacturing Industry, p. A. 15
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A breakdown of commercial loans by sectors is, unfortunately,
not available. The Law for the control of banking authorized
the central bank to require banks to supply it with annual and
4
monthly balance sheets in a prescribed form. Commercial banks
were not, however, required to submit breakdowns of their loans
by sectors, nor did they keep such statistic for their own informa- 
5
tion but partial evidence is available which indicates the
smallness of commercial bankfs loans to the industrial sector.
Table V.2 shows the consolidated balance sheet of 30 major
industrial companies in 1962. It shows that the combined indebted
ness of these companies to the commercial banks amounted to only
I.D. 1 million or k% of their total liabilities.
In terms of paid up capital these companies accounted for
£
about one third of private industry at that time. If we assume
that the indebtedness of these enterprizes to the commercial
banks could be regarded as representative of the private industrial
sector as a whole, then the total indebtedness of the private
industrial sector to the commercial banks would be I.D. 3 millions.
In 1962, however, total claims of the commercial banks on
n
the private sector were I.D. 62 million. This means that the 
proportion of outstanding private industrial short term credit 
to total claims of commercial banks on the private sector would
4. Law No. 34, 1950
5* U.N. Financing of Manufacturing Industry, p. l8 
6 . Ibid., p. 22
7 ‘ See Table V.3 .
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Table V.2
Consolidated Balance Sheet of 
Thirty Major Industrial Companies
1962-1963
I.D. Thousands
Liabilities Amount %
Net worth: 22,055 81
Paid-up Capital 17,212 64
Undistributed Profits 2,V?7 9
Capital Reserves 2 ,3 6 6 9
Medium and Long-term loans: 855 3
Industrial Bank 551 2
Other 30k 1
Current debt: *+,238 16
Short term bank credits 1,029 4
Creditors 2,023 8
Income tax reserves m 3
Other 297 1
Owner's equity and total liabilities 2 7 ,1^8 100
Assets Amount %
Gross fixed assets 20,894 77
Minus: reserves for depreciation 10,107 37
Net fixed assets 10,787 40
Intangible assets 3,048 11
Current assest 13,314 49
Cash in hand and at banks 1,404 5
Inventories 8,879 33
Debtors 2,803 10
Other 194 1
Total assets 27,148 100
Source: United Nations, Financing of Manufacturing Industry, p.A.l4
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have been 5 per cent. But because these thirty companies were 
well established it can be argued that the indebtedness of the 
rest of the private industrial sector to banks was probably less.
Such a meagre extension of bank credit to the industrial 
sector can hardly be explained by lack of demand. Thus table V.2 
shows that the same thirty industrial enterprizes were obliged to 
resort to another,source of short term credit, namely suppliers 
credit and the volume of this type of credit was twice as large 
as the volume of bank credit. Both types of funds accomplishe 
the same purpose in meeting operating expenses, thus an enterprize 
may finance part of its working capital directly by means of trade 
credit or indirectly by cash borrowing, which is later used for 
making inventory purchaes. But trade credit is usually more
g
expensive than bank credit. For example even in the United Kingdom
q
the rate of interest on such credit is 2# per cent for one month.
If we assume that the rate was even as low as one per cent a month 
in Iraq, the effective rate of interest charged will be 12 per 
cent per annum compared with a rate of interest of only 7% 
charged by Iraqfs commercial banks. ^
It is evident that industrialists will not resort to such 
an expensive form of credit if they can borrow from banks. But 
such an extensive dependence by industrialists on suppliers credit 
is a familiar sign of "credit hunger".^ Moreover in 1961 the 
Industrial Bnak decided to resume activities in the field of short
8. Paish, Business Finance, p. 33
Bates, The Finance of Small Business, p. 114
10. Information provided by the Director of The London Branch 
of Iraq*s Raffidain Bank.
11. Bates, The Finance of Small Business, p. 108
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terra lending, in order, among other things, to ease shortage in
12in the supply of short-term credit. Earlier the situation was
appafently no better and in 1956 the consultants to the Development
Board, Arthur D. Little, noticed that private industrial enter-
prizes "including those established by the Industrial Bank, find
serious difficulties in obtaining adequate supplies of working
capital"^ The question is why did the commercial banks fail to
meet the demands of industry for credit? Was it because of an
absence of liquidity? Were deposits in banks highly volatile
and hence banks needed high reserve ratios? Did the Central
Bank try to encourage commercial banks to lend more to industry?
Table V.3, shows that during the period 1950-38 commercial
banks maintained a cash reserve ratio against their private
deposit liabilities (item lo) considerably higher than the 13%
1/+
imposed by the Central Bank. This ratio varied between a low 
level of 26% in 195& and a high level of 48% in 1930. Although 
this ratio fell sharply during 1939-63 it remained well above the 
legal ratio imposed by the Central Bank. During 1930-63 the cash 
reserve ratio against total deposit,liabilities (item 11) was also 
high. Throughout the same period commercial banks maintained 
substantial amounts of excess reserve-defined^ as the difference 
between legally required reserves and total reserves.
12. Industrial Bank Annual Report, 1961-64, p. 4; and 1965 P*2
13» Arthur D. Little, A Plan for Industrial Development,In Iraq,p.372
14. .al-Atrash, Monetary Policy in an Underdeveloped Economy, with 
Special Reference to the ExperiencedfEgypt, Iraq and Syria.
1951-58, P HjAccordinp- to Articles 2 and o of Law, No. 54 of 1930 
for the control of banking, commercial banks were not required 
to keep reserves with the Central Bank against Government 
deposits.
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During the first period 1950-5& they were highly liquid
15and the liquidity ratio - defined as the ratio of total 
liquid assets (including cash in hand, deposits, at Central 
Bank, Treasury Bills, gold and short-term foreign assets and 
commercial bills rediscountable at the Central Bank) against 
Liabilities, varied between 70% at the end of 1952 and 46% 
at the end of 195&* After 195& the ratio fell from 53% to 
56% at the end of 19&5 * Yet commercial banks still remained 
highly liquid and maintained large amounts of excess reserves.
Thus the lack of liquidity cannot explain the failure of 
commercial banks to supply industry with sufficient amounts of 
short-term credit.
Table V.3 shows that in early 1950 there was a marked 
preference for foreign assets, tnus the ratio of foreign assets 
to total deposits maintained by commercial banks was as high 
as 50% at the end of 1952, but fell thereafter to reach 10*7% 
at the end of 19&5* Itemll of the table shows the opposite trend 
for local assets to liability ratio which increased from the 
low level of 36% at the end of 1950 to 88% at the end of 19&5*
Thus one cannot explain the smallness of credit extended to 
industry by arguing that bankers preferred foreign assets. The 
fact is that bankers preferred other local assets to local 
industrial assts.
15* As defined by the Central Bank, Bulletin, New Series, 
No .1., 1965, p. 25.
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Although there was a considerable increase in the 
claims of the commercial banks on the private sector (item k), 
they, nevertheless, followed a conservative policy especially 
toward the industrial sector. Commercial banks of Iraq were 
liquid enough to have supplied industry with a considerable 
amount of short term credit had they been willing to do so.
• - 'S.
A central bank could have encouraged commercial banks
to provide industry with more credit. In fact a central bank
was established by the Government in 19^7 and made responsible
for monetary and credit policy and among its explicitly stated
functions was the facilitation of the provision of credit for
trade industry and agriculture."^ In 1950 the bank was given
the traditional powers of central banks to control commercial
banks by operating on the bank rate, changing the legal
reserve requirements of commercial banks, controlling the
ratio of commercial banks total deposits that could be invested
abroad and undertaking open market operations in unspecified 
17
assets. But under Law No. 72 of 195° open market operations 
were confined to Government securities and paper eligible for 
rediscount. The latter was limited to Treasury Bills and inland 
bills of exchange or promissory notes arising out of commercial 
transactions maturing within three months.
16. Law No. 3k, 19^7.
17* Law No. 3k of 1950 for the Control of Banking.
156
Yet the Bank has played a very small; role, it had no 
control over specialized banks - such as the Industrial Bank, 
and its control over the commercial banks was formalistic and 
very weak at its best. "The Bank was no more than an agency
l8
engaged in transferring foreign exchange into Iraqi currency"/
Its loans to commercial banks were negligible thus its total
loans and advances to these banks at the end of 19&5 was
19only I.D. 2 .1  million compared with commercial banks total 
local assets of more than I.D. 80 million^' at the same time.
The reason was that commercial banks did not require credit 
because they were already highly liquid. Nevertheless, the 
Central Bank might well have encouraged commercial banks to 
provide industry with more working capital. It might have 
induced them to ease their lending policy through the provision 
of generous discount facilities either in the form of lower 
interest rates or longer terra loans on paper arising out of 
loans to the industrial sector. The Bank could have adopted 
even more specific measures so that credit extended to certain 
sectors should not exceed a fixed amount, or a given proportion 
of the total credit supply. While it is not certain that a 
more active policy by the Bank would have met with much success 
it did not even try.
l8. Qaisi, Iraq’s Banking System after Nationalization, p. 9 
19* Central Bank, Bulletin, New Serie~s^ N o . 19 6 7, p. 11
20. See Table V.3
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Iraq's commercial banks could have expanded their short
term loans to industry. An interesting question is whether
they could have financed fixed capital. Table V.4, shows that
private deposits on demand with commercial banks amounted to
I.D. 13.4 million while time and saving deposits amounted to
I.D. 2*3 million, at the end of 1952 but by the end of 19&3
the latter amounted* to I.D. 30 million while demand ^deposits
increased to I.D. 29*5 million. By the end of 19&5 time and
saving deposits had risen to I.D. 36 million - six millions
more than demand deposits. Column six of the table shows
that velocity of time and saving deposits was not only low
but declined in recent years. Commercial banks mignt be
venturesome if demand deposits also displayed a very low
rate of turnovers but this was not the case in Iraq. In
fact the velocity of circulation of private demand deposits
with commercial banks was high in 1952 and has been increasing
since then. Thus during recent years these deposits were
used almost twice per month compared with once every two months
21and a half in Lebanon during 1964. Nevertheless, due to
the large and increasing jercentage of time and saving deposits
in total deposits and because of the regularity in the velocity
one can say that deposits in Iraq were not volatile and could
have been used for not only short term lending but for some
longer term loans as well. But traditionally commercial banks 
have displayed a strong bias against long term loans. Bankers
21. Asseily, A Central Bank for Lebanon, p. 179
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Table V.k
Volume, Withdrawals and Velocity of Circulation of 
Demand, Time and Saving Deposits of the Private Sector 
with Iraqfs Commercial Banks 1952-1985
I.D.Millions
Year Demand
Deposits
Time and
Saving
Deposits
Withdrawals 
from Demand 
Deposits
Withdrawals 
from time 
Deposits
Velocity 
of Demand 
Deposits
Velocity 
of Saving 
Deposits
1 2 3 v .. ..' 3 6
1952 13.^ 2-3 .2 2 1 3 .0 1 6.if 1.3
1953 1 6 .6 3.3 257 2 .5 15. ^ 0.7
1954 19.^ ^.3 325 k.3 1 6 .7 1 .0
1955 2 1 .3 5.7 kl6 7.1 19.5 1 .2
1956 2^.5 7.8 k 6k 8 .3 1 8 .9 1 .0 6
1957 28.7 12.7 559 12.7 19 .k 1 .0
1958 3 1 .8 15.7 561 20.k 1 7 .6 1 .2
1959 30.9 17.5 516 20.5 1 6 .6 1.17
i960 3 0 .2 2 1 .2 579 18.3 19.1 0 .8 6
1961 29.5 2k.k 622 1 9 .6 2 1 .0 0 .8
1962 33.5 2 8.k 7ifif 2 2 .0 2 2 .2 0.77
1963 30.5 2 9 .0 705 27.3 23.1 0.9
1964 29.5 30.1 758 30.3 25.1 1 .0
1965 3 1 .0 3 6 .0 782 37.0 2 5 .2 1 .0
Source: Central Bank of Iraq, Bulletin, New Series, No, if, 1967
pp. 1 2, 2 0 .
159
usually argue that their liabilities are withdrawable on 
demand or at short notice their assets, thereafter, must 
be short term, because if they invest a significant part of 
their deposits in long term claims which cannot be liquified 
easily any nervousness on the part of depositors might cause 
a financial crisis.
No doubt historically there was a core of truth to this 
argument. Nevertheless both Sayers and Nevin believe that
22commercial banks should give more medium and long term credit.
A commercial banker is able to make profits because he knows
that repayment of his deposits is not required in total at any
one time, and a substantial part of deposits may not be
demanded permanently, thus opening up a source of long term
finance. Conservative banking practice would, however, reject
the possibility of using funds acquired on short term basis
to grant longer term credit, and would confine portfolios to
short term self-liquidating paper to avoid the danger of
illiquidity. But in times of crisis this danger involves
2 5not only long term assets but also short term claims if
adequate rediscounting facilities are not available. Con­
sequently if it is desirable to use any significant part of 
funds of commercial banks acquired on a short term basis, for 
the purchase of long term claims, provision of rediscounting 
facilities for claims arising from long term industrial finance
22. Sayers, Central Banking after Bagehot, p. 121 and
Nevin, Capital Funds in Underdeveloped Countries, p. *+9 
23* Merrett and Sykes, Finance and Analysis of Capital 
Projects, p. 62
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is essential.
But the Central Bank of Iraq in fact discouraged commercial 
banks from granting long term credit by confining its discount 
facilities to short term bills of exchange or promissory notes 
of-three month maturity.
The Central Bank did in fact nothing whatsoever to encourage 
commercial banks to extend all types of credit to the industrial 
sector. Presumably it left all types of industrial finance to 
the Industrial Bank to take care of. The Central Bank did not 
bother to inquire into the needs of industry for finance and it 
had no credit policy in this respect.
2. The Industrial Bank 
The Agricultural-Industrial Bank started operation in 1936
to meet the short and long term credit needs of agriculture and
25
industry. Throughout the first decade of its operation the
Bank was more interested in agriculture than in industry and
from 1936 to 19^5 the average annual loans granted to agriculture
was I.D. 75»500 compared with only I.D. 6,300 for industry. At
the end of financial year 19^5 the outstanding participation of
the Bank in the equity of industrial enterprizes amounted to
26
only I.D. 118,000, which is insignificant.
In order to devote more attention to industry and secure 
specialization in the operation of the Bank, the Government decided 
in 19^0 to separate the Bank into an Industrial Bank and an
Agricultural Bank.^ But because of the War the Agricultural- 
Industrial Bank was not separated until 19^ +6 when the Industrisl
Bank started operation.
25. Law No.35 of 1935
26. Industrial Bank, A Report,, May 1962, p.2
27. Law No.12^ of 19^0
l6l
The purpose of the Bank was to encourage the industriali­
zation of Iraq. To achieve this aim it was permitted to make 
loans to industrial enterprizes, participate in the equity 
capital of industrial companies, facilitate the import of 
machinery and raw materials for industrial purposes, establish 
and operate warehouses, engage in ordinary banking operations, 
deal with foreign exchange, issue guarantees and provide 
technical assistance and advice on administrative, engineering 
and accounting affairs as well as preparation of feasibility
2 g
studies. Thus legally the Bank was far more than a credit
institution and in this section I intend to evaluate the 
operations of the Bank over the period D!950-65 in the light of 
its established functions.
Resources of Bank:
To operate properly the Bank must have at its disposal 
sufficient financial resources. Up to 1950 it was handicapped 
by the shortage of capital at its disposal. According to the 
19^0 Law its nominal capital was set at I.D. 500,000 but with 
the sharp increase in prices during the war the purchasing power 
of Iraqi Dinar during the post-war period, was about a quarter 
of the 19^ +0 level. Moreover, as the capital of the Bank was 
provided by a Government loan Mthe Treasury decided what amounts 
to pay and when to pay them and its decisions often did not 
coincide with the Bank*s requests either for funds or for making
28. Laws, No. 35 of 1935t No. 12 of 19^0; No. 87 of 1956 and 
No. 62 of 1961.
Table V.5
Resources of the Industrial Bank 1950-65
I *,D. Thousands
Year Nominal Paid-up Accumulated Total
Capital______ Profits_______ Resources
1 2 3 4
1950 1,000 1,000 73 1,073
1951 1,000 1,000 173 1,173
1952 1,000 2,000 305 2,305
1953 1,000 2 ,7 0 0 329 3,029
1954 3,000 3,000 540 3,540
1955 3 ,0 0 0 3,000 827 3,827
1956 5 ,0 0 0 3 ,5 0 0 993 4,493
1957 8,000 3 ,7 5 0 1,265 5,015
1958 8 ,0 0 0 3 ,7 5 0 1,505 5,255
1959 8,000 4 ,7 5 0 l,64o 6,390
i960 8,000 4 ,7 5 0 1,843 6,693
1961 10,000 4,750 2,248 6,998
1962 10,000 4,750 2,383 7,133
1963 10,000 4,750 2,669 7,412
1964 10,000 4,750 2,969 7,728
1965 . 10,000 4,75© 3 ,0 6 1 7 ,8 1 1
Source: The Industrial Bank, A Report, March 1965* P-15
and Ministry of Industry, The Position of the 
Industrial Sector in Iraq, p. 28
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29forward plans". The situation changed in early 1950, and
the capital of the Bank was increased to one million dinars.
Table V.5, shows that during the period 1950-58, paid up
capital was increased from one million dinar to I.D. 3*7 million,
thus every time it employed its resources additional resources
were made available by the Government. But during 1959-65
paid up capital was increased only once in 1959 by one million
to I.D. million. Up to 1963 net profits of the Bank
made an important contribution to its total resources. But
most of these profits came from profits of companies in which
the Bank held shares. This can be seen from Table V.6 which
shows that during the period 1950-65» 6l% of its total income
came from these profits. In July 196*+ most of these companies
30were nationalized, and the Bank ceased to receive any profits 
from them and the income of the Bank declined from I.D. 599»321 
in 1963 to I.D. 280,200 in 196*f.
The moderate amount of profits in I9o4 is due to the fact 
that those companies were nationalized in July of that year and 
some of them did pay profits to the Bank before that date.^ 
During 19$5 the bank did not receive anything from these 
companies, therefore, its income further declined to I.D. 195»935« 
Thus since i960 the Government has not increased the paid up
capital of the Bank and in 196^ an important source of income
was eliminated, moreover up to the end of the period under study,
29. c*l-Dally, Problems of Industrial Enterprize in Iraq, p. kk 
and note 23, P- 19«
30. Law No. 99 of 1964.
31. The Industrial Bank, A Report, March 1 9 6 5, P* 19*
Table V.6
Sources of Income of 
The Industrial Bank 1950-65
Year
I.D. Thqusands 
Interest Miscellaneous Profit Total 3 as % of 4
1 2 5 4 5
1950 20 0 63 83 76
1951 29 0 92 121 76
1956 136 1 129 266 *+9
1957 132 1 421 55*+ 76
1958 173 1 310 48*+ 64
1959 158 1 232 391 59
i960 166 0 288 *+5*+ 63
1961 175 2 *+75 652 72
1962 137 7 182 327 56
1963 180 5 373 559 67
196^ 187 4 88 280 31
1965 185 9 1 195 0.5
19 56 -6 3 65
Source : The Industrial Bank of Iraq, Profit and Loss
Accounts, 19$0, 1951 and Annual Reports, 1956-65.
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the organization responsible for compensating the Bank for
its shares in companies that were nationalized, has not made
32any payment to the Industrial Bank. Consequently, the 
financial position of the Bank has deteriorated in rfcfent 
years and its capacity to extend loans and participate in 
industrial enterprises had been seriously restricted. In 
1965 the Bank reported that it had practically exhausted all 
its resources and that its activities during that year were 
based on loan repayments and a loan of I.D. 500,000 from the 
Central Bank at 3% interest rate per year. The Bank urged 
the Mihistry of Finance and the Planning Board to put at its
33disposal additional financial resources, but without success.
I have demonstrated in chapter three that the Government
policy after 1959 was to industrialize Iraq as rapidly as
possible and that the Planning Board devoted large sums of
3*+money to investment in the industrial sector, , but most of
these funds were never utilized and large sums of idle balances
35were accumulated, as we have shown in chapter four. Yet 
planners failed to appreciate the role of the Industrial Bank 
in the process of industrialization and did not increase 
resources available to the Bank despite its persistent demands; 
instead they formulated plans that ignored the existence of the 
Industrial Bank.
32. The Industrial Bank, Annual Report, 1965, P* 2
33* Ibid., p. 2 and The Industrial Bank, Comment on the Five
Year Plan 1965-6 9? PP* l$-l6 
34. See Table III.5
35- See Tables IV.I and IV.2
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Long and Medium Term Loans: One of the main functions of
the Bank was the extension of medium and long term credit.
Table V.7, shows the number and amount of these loans advanced 
by the Bank since 1950. During that year it granted 93 loans 
for a total sum of I.D. 131,949* The number of loans increased 
rapidly until in 1957 nearly 300 loans were granted for a 
total sum of I.D. 1.5 millions. By 19&5 although the number 
of loans increased to 460 the total sum fell to I.D. 0.7 
million. The table reveals a rapid decline in the amount of 
loans granted in recent years mainly as the result of the 
decreased financial resources of the Bank. Thus in February 
1965 the Bank reported that "if additional financial resources 
are made available, the Bank will immediately increase all 
its services to the private sector which in fact needs them.
In other words the financial resources at the disposal of the 
Bank is the limiting factor"
Table V.8, shows that although most of the Bank's loans 
were in amounts less than I.D. 1000, most of its money went 
to enterprises who borrowed I.D. 5000 and more. Thus the 
Bank's policy was apparently biased in favour of medium and 
large scale enterprises. The Bank's loans have been confined,
since 1 9 6 1, to enterprises which have been licensed by the
* . 37Ministry of Industry, and this required that at least 60% of
3 6 . The Industrial Bank, Comment on the Five Years Flan, 
1965-69, p. 14 
37* Law No. 62, of 1961
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Table V.7
Number and Amount of Long and Medium Term Loans 
Advanced by the Industrial Bank 1950-65
Year No. I.D.
1950 93 131,999
1951 87 2 8 1 ,2 2 9
1952 153 659,999
1953 181 739,190
1959 292 1 ,5 6 7 ,6 0 2
1955 957 735,690
1956 369 7 9 5 ,9 3 0
1957 7 292 1,987,592
-1958 237 569,955
1959 388 797,816
1960 389 7 5 1 ,8 8 2
1961 972 1 ,0 0 9 ,9 0 2
1962 315 895,991
1963 292 891,090
1969 bo7 909,903
1965 96? 796,323
Source: The Industrial Bank, A Report, March 1965 p. 9;
The Industrial Bank, Annual Report, 1965, p. 22
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the capital of the enterprise was owned by Iraqi*s or Arabs*
38
and that the cost of machinery was not less than I.D. 3000.
Thus the Bank excluded from its operations a large number of
small enterprises, but since the Bank was the only financial
institution granting medium and long term loans, such a policy
is hard to justify. Apparently the Bank did not meet demands
of smaller firms because administrative costs of a large
number of small loans are usually high, and the risk of default
in the smaller firms is usually greater, hence the Bank could
make more profits, or less losses, by concentrating on medium
and large scale enterprises. The original purpose of the
Bank, however, was to encourage industry; not to make profits.
The period of a loan could not exceed seven years unless
the loan was covered by a mortgage on immovable property in
39which case the maximum duration was 12 years. But the Bank*s
actual policy in this respect was far more conservative.
Thus f’until 1955» well over half of the loans matured in
less than three years and very rarely did a term exceed five 
i|_0
years'*. The annual reports of the Bank during 1958-6*+
give no information about the length of its loans. Table V.9i 
shows that during 19&5 ooly 11% of the amount lent was for 
more than five years. The Bank's loans appear to be for 
medium terms. This may be in part due to the fact that the
3 8 . Law No. 311 1981 and No. l6*+, 196*+
39- The Industrial Bank, A Report, March 1965* P* 7 
*+0. Langley, The Industrialization of Iraq, p. l*+8
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Table V.9 
Number and Value of Loans
According to Maturity, 1965
Term No. I.D. % of Total
One year 174,490 21.9
Two years 71 8 5 ,3 3 0 10.7
Three years 92 6 5 ,6 1 9 8.3
Four years 60 6 9 ,1 9 0 8 .6
Five years 154 31 2 ,6 92 39.3
More than five 
years
33 8 8 ,5 5 2 1 1 .1
Total 464 7 9 6 ,3 2 3 1 0 0 .0
Source: Industrial Bank, Annual Heport, 1965, p. 26
industrial sector in Iraq consisted mainly of light industries, 
and one expects that these industries require quick replace­
ment of capital and rapid amortization. Nevertheless, the 
short period of loans may partly explain the fact that a 
rather large proportion of loans were not repaid as they fell
due. For example, in 1965 only 30% of matured debts were
h?repaid, hence the Bank was led, in one way or another, to 
extend the terms of loans, and this could have introduced some 
confusion into the work of the Bank and used a certain amount 
of administrative input without having any clear advantage. 
Moreover such a high ratio of unrepaid loans may be regarded 
as a sign that the terms of loans were decided on in a rather 
haphazard way.
Short-Term Loans: Aside from making medium and long terra
loans the Bank also extended short term credit for the opening
of documentary letters of credit, discounted bills, and
*+3
extended credit on bonded goods in warehouses. Table V.10 
shows the number and value of short term credits extended 
by the Bank during 1950-65* These short term credits were 
used to finance imports of machinery, spare parts, as well 
as raw materials. These short term loans were stopped in 
1957 but started again in 1961. Since then the Bank has
**1. This can be appreciated from Table III.11, and the fact
that about 60% of the Bank’s credit went to textiles, 
food, drink, and similar enterprises. Industrial Bank, 
Annual Reports, 1961-196**, p. 16, 1965i P* 22 
**2. Industrial Bank, Annual Report, 1965i P- 28
**3- Industrial Bank, Annua 1 Reports, 1961-6**, p. ** and, 1965»
kk. The Industrial Bank, A RepofTj March, 19^5* P« ^
Table V.10
Number and Value of Short Term 
Credit Advanced by the Bank 1950-65
Year No. I.D.
1950 20*+ 196,388
1951 176 182,145
1952 291 284,841
1953 223 276,847
1954 205 1,126,176
1955 433 823,207
1956 2^8 323,730
1961 97 285,84?
1962 181 1,116,596
1963 251 733,403
1964 254 796,003
1965 664 2,085,219
Source: The Industrial Bank, A Report, March 19&5
p. 1*+; and Annual Report, 19&5» P* 20
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increased its operation in the field of short term credit 
normally occupied by commercial banks.
In view of the position of the Industrial Bank in the 
financial structure of Iraq as the only source of medium and 
long term industrial credit and because of its limited 
resources, it was probably unwise for the Bank to compete 
with commercial banks. Commercial banks did not, however, 
extend sufficient short term credit to industry. Under these 
circumstances it perhaps seemed logical for the Industrial 
Bank to step in. Nevertheless the Bank should have concentrated 
on the provision of medium and long term credit while the 
Central Bank should have encouraged commercial banks to 
provide industry with the short term credit it required. 
Alternatively, the Industrial Bank might have guaranteed their 
short term loans to its customers. T e point is that 
commercial banks are less likely to be persuaded to advance 
long term loans; hence the Central Bank should nave at least 
pushed them into the provisioh/short term credit so that the 
Industrial Bank could have concentrated on other forms of 
industrial credit. But neither the Central Bank nor- the 
Industrial Bank seemed to have paid any attention to this 
problem. The latter has recently increased the amount of its 
short term lending and decreased long term loans, as it is 
clear from Tables V.7 and V.10. This was in part probably
174
;the result of lacKi of direction from the top.
Although the Board of Directors of tne Bank made policy 
within the framework of the law, the responsibility of the 
Minister of Industry was not limited to the appointment of 
members of the Board cf Directors and the prescribing of the 
basic status under which the Bank operated. Legally the 
Minister of Industry could have required the Board to reconsider
45any decision taken by it.  ^ In practice the role of the 
Minister was reduced to the appointment of members of the 
Board and a purely routine approval of each single loan
46extended by the Bank, provided that it was more than I.D.1000.
This was the result partly of the lack of a research unit
inside the Ministry which could follow such developments, and
partly of frequent cabinet changes which hardly left time for
a Minister to comprehend the complex situation, formulate
policy and then supervise its implementation. Thus during
1959-^5 there were 8 Ministers of Industry, while during 19 63 -65  
47there were 5«
Thus the Bank was left a free hand in allocating its 
loans between long term and short term credit. As noted above, 
the planners and Ministers did not increase the paid up capital 
of the Bank after i9 6 0, and the Bank came to depend more
45. Law No. 62 of 1961
46. The Industrial Bank, A Report, March, 19&5,P*7 
4y. Information provided by Miss M. al-Hashimi of the
Economic Department in the Ministry of Industry.
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on interest as a source of income after the nationalization
kS
of companies in which it was a shareholder. Hence in
order to make more profits the Bank tended to increase its
i+9
short term credit on which it charged 6% per year, and to
50reduce long term loans,for which it charged interest.
Unless these rates are changed or the Ministry of Industry 
stpps the Bank from reallocating its assets toward short 
term securities the Bank might even concentrate its activities 
on the provision of short term credit to finance import- 
export and other short term needs of industry. This tendency 
has already become apparent during the last few years. But 
in view of the position of the Bank in the financial structure 
of the economy as the only source of long term loans, this is 
a very unsatisfactory tendency.
Participation: The Bank's other major function was to help
in the promotion of industrial enterprises. Iraqi's were,
51understandably, reluctant to invest in industry and the Bank 
had to convince potential investors that funds could be safely 
placed in industry. Before 1961 the Bank could build 
industrial enterprises directly on its own account,^2 but it 
preferred to participate with the private sector. The idea 
was }: resumably to secure the maximum amount of investment in 
industry from a given amount of public funds, to safeguard
**8. See Table V .6
^9* The Industrial Bank Annual Report, 1965i P» 2 
50. These rates are given by The Industrial Bank, A Report, 
March, 19^5» p« 7«
51* I.B.R.D. Economic Development of Iraq, p. 33 
52. Laws No. 12 of 19^+0 and No. 87 of 1956.
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against probable dangers of lack of self interest in indus­
trial firms, and to attract private entrepreneurial talent
53into industry. Under the present law the Bank is not
allowed to establish industrial enterprises on its own account,
but it is allowed to participate with the private sector in
54
the establishment of manufacturing industries.
Up to the end of 1965* the Bank participated in 21 
55enterprises . Table V.ll, shows the participation by the 
Bank in various companies during 1950-65* The number of 
enterprises and the amount paid by the Bank increased rapidly 
before 1958. After that, the process became slower. Moreover, 
with the exception of the Light Industries Company, all enter­
prises in which the bank participated after 1958 were small. 
These are the first 6 enterprises in table V.13 which shows 
that beside the Light Industries Co., only one enterprise 
had a paid-up capital of slightly over I.D. 200,000. On 
the other hand most of the enterprises in which the Bank 
participated before 1958 were large enterprises; some of them 
had a paid-up capital of more than I.D. 2 millions. Tnese 
are the!13 enterprises in Table V.12.
The failure of the Bank to persuade the private sector to
Ccv^v \>e.
set up large scale companies'fpartlyf explained by the hesitation 
of the private sector to invest in industry on a large scale
53* al-Jalili, Lectures on Economics of Iraq, p.220 
5^* Law No. 62, of 19bl 
35* See Table V.ll.
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Table V.ll
Number of Companies in which the 
Bank participated and Value of its Shares
1930-1963
Year No. I.D.
1950 6 629,272
1951 7 911,482
1952 10 993,281
1953 11 1,139,031
195^ 13 1,631,481
1953 14 1,674,736
1956 14 1 ,89 6 ,4 5 8
1937 14 1,917,467
1938 14 1,923,270
1959 14 1,423,275
i960 15 1 ,5 8 9 ,8 7 2
1961 16 1,980,520
1962 16 1,995,221
1965 16 2 ,1 8 8 ,1 0 1
1964 4 146,868
1965 7 265,433
Source: The Industrial Bank, Annual Reports, 1961-64, p. 12
and 1965, p. 11.
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after the Revolution of 1958 and its fear of nationalization. 
Furthermore, after the "Socialist Laws of 198^4M contrary to 
the previous policy whereby the Bank refrained from holding
56
majority of shares of industrial enterprises, the Bank started
to hold the majority shareholding. Thus it decided to
increase its participation in the Light Industries Co., Min order
to increase public control over the activities of that enter- 
57prise" and it increased its share in the paid up capital
58
of that company from 12% in 196^ to 25*9% in 1985* The
Bank also promulgated the Iraq Bicycle Co., and retained
59more than 50% of the shares. When the public was invited
to subscribe, the response was disappointing. At that time 
I was Acting Director of the Economic Department in the Ministry 
of Industry and in direct contact with many private industrialists. 
Many of them did not participate in that company because they 
lacked confidence in an industrial enterprise controlled by the 
Government. Their fears were soon justified when it was 
decided, for political reasons, that the plant should be 
established in a town which lacks almost all basic elements of 
social overhead capital. But if the Bank wants to attract 
the private sector into the mixed public and private industrial 
sector, it is more likely to succeed by going back to the old 
policy of refraining from holding the majority of shares of
such companies, especially in view of its limited financial
resources. _______________________________________________
5 6 . See Table V42
57* Industrial Bank, Annual Report, 19&5, P* 9 
58. Tables V.12 and V.13
59- Industrial Bank, Annual Report, 19^5» P» 7
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Table V.12
Companies in which the Bank was a shareholder in July 1964
I.D.
Name of Company Nominal Paid-up Paid by the % of Bank
Capital Capital______ Bank_______ Participation
1 2 3 4
Iraq Cement Co. 2 ,62 5 ,0 0 0 2 ,62 5 ,0 00 569,3^0 19.4
Vegetable Oil Extrac­
tion Co.
2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 M o ,  715 20.5
National Leather 
Industries
5 0 0 ,0 0 0 50 0 ,0 0 0 1 7 9 ,1 6 8 42.5
Iraq Spinning & Weaving 1 ,2 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 ,20 0 ,0 0 0 425,110 35.**
Iraq Grain Milling Co. 25 0 ,0 0 0 252,310 6 0 ,0 0 0 26.4
Iraq Jute Industries 85 0 ,0 0 0 760,109 127,500 15.0
The Estate Industries 5 0 0 ,0 0 0 448,589 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 0 .0
National Insurance Co. 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 5 5 0 ,0 0 0 45,000 1 5 .0
Iraq Marble Co. 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 5 0 ,0 0 0 1 0 ,0 0 0 2 0 .0
River Dredging and 
Land Reclamation
2 5 0 ,0 0 0 60 ,00 0 1 5 ,6 2 5 6.2
Iraq Gypsum 150,000 147,291 5 0 ,0 0 0 20.0
Baghdad Bakery Co. 150,000 129,524 3 2 ,5 0 0 2 5 .0
Iraq Date Industries 100,000 60 ,00 0 10,000 20.0
Re-insurance Co. 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1,250,000 100,000 8 .0
Eight Industries Co. 1,000,000 445,118 62 ,5 3 5 1 2 .5
Imara Industries 100,000 69,414 **5,845 4 9 .0
National Chemical 
Industries Co.
1 5 0 ,0 0 0 75,000 17 ,1 7 5 2 2 .9
Total 10,584,595 2,240,511
Sources Industrial Bank, Annual Report, 1961-64, p. 12
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Table,V.13
The Industrial
Name of Company-
I.D.
Nominal
Capital
Paid-up
Capital
Paid by 
the J3ank
% of Bank’s 
Participation 
3 - 2
1 2 3 4
Light Industries Cm. 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 527,057 136,410 25.9
Imara Industries Co. 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 81 ,91 2 48,091 5 8 .6
National Chemical 
Industries
1 5 0 ,0 0 0 7 5 ,0 0 0 30,057 40.0
Iraq Bicycle Co. 250,000 5 0 ,0 0 0 31,000 6 3 ,7
Northern Wood Co. 150,000 1 5 0 ,0 00 50,000 3 3 .3
Al-Hilal Industries Co. 210,000 2 1 0 ,0 0 0 54,000 2 5 .7
Date Industries Co. 100,000 6 0 ,9 1 0 1 5 ,0 0 0 2b. 6
Total 1 ,9 6 0 ,0 0 0 1,15 2 ,879 365,433 31.6
Source: Industrial Bank, Annual Report, 1965, P* 11
l8l
Some observers have argued that the Bank has unduly- 
emphasized profitability- when it participated in industrial 
enterprises. Most of the projects in which it held shares 
were very profitable. The main objective of the Bank, they 
argue, was to create and assist industries and in certain cases 
"this may well mean industries which are unable to make any 
significant profits but which instead give a general assistance 
to the whole economy of Iraq.”^0 The World Bank Mission advised 
the Industrial Bank that ’’while it should presumably show a 
small profit to inspire confidence, in its operations, it should 
not retain its participation in profit making enterprises for 
the sake of maximisihg its profits, particularly when this 
limits its ability to assist other enterprises” .  ^ Had the 
Bank followed this advice it could have turned over its capital 
far more quickly and increased its activities. More important 
such a policy could have contributed to the extension of Iraq’s 
primitive capital market by making Iraqis accustomed to hold shares 
and other securities. The Bank, however, preferred the far 
less sensible policy $6 making profits and only in two occasions 
it sold some of its shares in one enterprise.
Technical Assistance: The final and important function of the
Bank was to provide technical assistance on economic engineering 
administrative and accounting problems and to prepare feasibility
60. Iversen, Monetary Policy in Iraq, p. 33
61. I.B.R.D. Economic Development of Irqq, p. 40.
62. The Industrial Bank, A Report, March, 19&5, P* **
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studies for industrial firms. Even in highly industrialized 
countries it is necessary to supply such assistance to new and
expanding enterprises. Unfortunately, the Bank had only a
small economic and technical staff which cannot provide
professional advice on these matters. Thus in 1959 the Bank
63reported that it could not provide such services, but it hoped
64to extend technical assistance in the future. By 196b, however,
the Technical Department of the Bank consisted of statistical, 
engineering and economic sections. The engineering section 
included two civil engineers - one worked full time on a 
housing scheme for the banks staff and the other on the evaluation 
of property submitted by the Bank's clients as collateral. The 
statistical section included four graduates, all fully engaged 
in the preparation of the Bank's annual and monthly reports 
containing the statistics pertaining to the operations of the 
Bank. The economic section included beside myself three 
graduates from the Baghdad College of Commerce. The section 
was engaged in preparing preliminary reports on loan applications. 
In early 1965 the Bank was asked by the Ministry of Industry 
to prepare a pre-feasibility study about a car assembly project 
based on reports presented by a number of motor car manufacturers.
By mid- 1966 nothing fof practical value had been achieved and 
at that time a United Nations expert prepared, in less than a 
month, a report which exhausted all available information and 
which contained definite recommendations. Furthermore, the
• ----  . _ - ^  - *7
b3. Industrial Bank, Annua± 2xeport, 1956-39, p.3 .
64. Government of Iraq, The Revolution, in its First Year, p. 37
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Bank has spent only very small amounts of money on technical 
research. For example, the amount of expenditure for this 
purpose was nil for the year 1962, 1963 and 1965? but I.D.
1820 was spent in 1961 and only I.D* 124 was spent in 1964 
compared with a total adminstrative expenditure of more than
65
I.D. 100,000 per year.
In most developing countries there is usually an obvious
shortage of well prepared projects which reflects a shortage
66of entrepreneurial skills. Iraq was no exception in this 
respect. The Bank, up to the end of 1963i carried out 
preliminary work on about 30 projects but it should nave 
taken far more initiative in the exploration of industrial 
possibilities particularly ih the field of small and medium 
industries because there was no other Government agency who 
did this kind of work and the Ministry of Industry concentrated 
on the large industrial projects of the public sector for 
which it hired foreign consultants to prepare the required 
studies.
6 5 . Industrial Bank, Annual Reports, 1961-64, p. 11 and 
1963 p. 36.
6 6. U.N. Process and Problems of Industrialization in 
Underdeveloped Countries, pp. 5£$57
67* The Industrial Bank, A Report, March 1965* P«3
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Chapter VI
OTHER POLICY INSTRUMENTS:
PROTECTION, TAX EXEMPTION AND 
CONTROL OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT
The Government seeks to promote the growth of private 
industry in three ways:• (1) through protection from foreign 
competion by tariffs and quotas, (2) through tax exemption of 
all kinds designed to encourage private investment in 
industry and (3) through controls over the allocation of private 
investment in industry. This chapter will outline, analyse, 
and appraise each of these policies.
1• Protection
In Iraq two arguments have been stressed for protection,
these were the saving in foreign exchange and the infant industry
arguments.^- I propose to discuss these arguments in turn.
The balance of trade argument has been used as a major
justification for protection. The argument focuses upon
the deficit in the trade balance excluding oil and concludes
that this must be stopped because ,!the development of any
country on sound basis makes necessary to change the trade
balance in its favour by increasing exports and decreasing 
2
imports". But the country*s balance of payment without oil 
is of no relevance. Oil revenues provided Iraq with foreign
1. See notes ^7 and 55 in this chapter.
2. Federation of Industry, Annual Book 1957-5$* P* 221 and 
Government of Iraq, Iraqi Revolution, One Year of Progress, 
p. 59-
185
exchange equivalent to about 20% of her national income during
the period ±950-65 on average^ and they represented 83% of
Iraq’s foreign exchange earnings during the same period. The
 ^ . 5
country did not experience balance of payment difficulties 
and protection can hardly be justified on the ground that it 
preserved scarce foreign exchange.
The infant industry argument was accepted in Iraq almost 
as a matter of faith. "Protection of infant industries is 
necessary" stated the Ministry of Industry "because of the 
dumping policies practiced by advanced countries and designed 
to destroy infant industries in countries like Iraq, and because 
local industries cannot compete with foreign large scale enter­
prises which have long industrial e x p e r i e n c e " . ^ The modern 
version of the infant industry argument run in terms of prices 
which do not reflect long run social costs or benefits. While 
it is true that when a country specializes according to its 
comparative davantage and trades at international exchange ratio 
its gain is similar to a shift in its production possibility 
curve, the core of the infant industry argument is that a
different pattern of resource allocation will bring about a
greater and irreversible shift of the curve itself. This is
due to the possibility that when an industry is protected, skill®
will be acquired and the industry will be able to produce at
■ — ■     ■ - - -   _ . . — ' ' " ""
3* Tables 1.6 and IV.8 
Table 1.6, column 7 
5« Central Bank, Bulletin, New Series, No.^,1967» PP* 17» ^ 2,*+3» 6 0, 6l. 
6 . Ministry of Industry, Annual Report, 196li P* 50
186
lower costs as a result of full exploitation of the economies 
of scale.^ Yet to evaluate infant industries is extremely 
difficult. Moreover if an infant industry is to mature it 
must not only become efficient but also realize a sufficient
g
saving in costs to compensate for the higher costs of infancy.
Taking into consideration the cost of protection is an 
important practical question because the ease with which policy 
makers in Iraq have resorted to trade controls suggests that 
they regarded trade restrictions as almost costless. But these 
testrictions - tariffs, for example, tend to increase home 
production, decrease imports and reduce consumption. Their 
costs to the economy can be divided into two elements - the 
consumption cost equal to the loss of consumer surplus which 
arises from distortions to the pattern of trade and higher 
prices, and secondly production costs equal to the extra cost 
of producing additional amounts of the protected good
Q
domestically. Both consumption and production costs tend
to be relatively high in small poor countries due to their
relatively inflexible economic structure, low elasticities of
substitution among consumer goods and high dependence on trade.^
The practical argument for protecting an infant industry
depends on whether the cost of adopting the policy is greater
or less than the benefits claimed for that policy. But if. 
future savings compensate for initial losses then there is no
need for protection because the industry will be profitable
over its whole life span. Nevertheless, investors may not have 
7» Haberler, Some Problems in the Pure Theory of International Trade, 
8. Kempt, The Mill-Bastable Infant Industry D o g m a pp. 65 -67 P*239
9» Corden, The Calculation of the Cost of Protection,pp.3 6 -3 8
10.Johnson, The Costs of Protection and Self-sufficiency.p.371
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foresight to realize this point, or the long run may be too
long hence the need for public intervention. The justification
for protection is stronger if the industry creates external
economies. Here we have a divergence between private and
social costs and protection is justified to correct the market
mechanism.^ Some economists believe that these economies
are more important in the industrial sector than in other
sectors; hence their omission is likely to bias resource
12allocation against industry. Others scress the difficulties 
of measuring these economies and maintain that they "might be 
substantial in the expert sector, domestic industry or in public 
overhead capital". ^ Despite these limitations and qualifications 
most people accept the general case for protection on the 
basis of the infant industry argument.
Given a case for intervention in international trade 
a variety of controls can be used. Controls on imports can 
operate through multiple exchange rates (which makes some uses 
of money more expensive than others), through import quotas, 
prohibition, tariffs and subsidies. The Government of Iraq 
has used tariffs, quotas and import prohibition to make pro­
tection effective and I will confine my discussion to these 
techniques.
The Tariff System: The basis of Iraq’s tariff system established
during the Mandate (1921-32) can be found in Tariff Proclamation
11. Meier, International Trade and Development, p. 126
12. Chenery, Comparative Advantage and Development Policy, pp.20-25
13• Meier, International Trade and Development, p. 132
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No. 19, 1919 which levied an advalorem rate of 11$ on all 
imports, with the exception of tobacco* alcoholic liquors 
and perfumes which were subject to specific rates of duty
iZf
equivalent to 50% of their value. Subsequent amendments
raised advalorem rates and made most of Iraq*s imports subject 
to specific rates of tax. While the typical advalorem rate 
was 15$ specific rates varied from 25$ on metals up to 100% 
or more on tea, matches, sugar, cigarettes and alcohol.^
Up to 1927 tariffs were designed to collect revenues but 
Law No. 20 of that year exempted from customs duty most 
machinery and raw materials required for industry agriculture 
and construction.^ Immediately after independence the 
Government promulgated Law No. 11 of 1933. This law included 
all the exemptions cited above and imposed specific duties on 
the most important imports. Rates of duty rose with the 
degree of processing involved in imported commodities. Necessities 
were taxed at lower rates and higher rates were imposed^on 
imports which competed with domestic industry.^
Tariff Law No. 77 of 1935 replaced the 1933 law but went 
further in the application of the principles of the 1933 law.
It coyers nearly 1500 items against klk in the previous law. It 
exempted from duty 177 commodities compared to 137 in 1933* These
Ik. Jamil, Commercial Folicy ojf 1 Iraq, P .
1 5 . Hassan , Economic Development of Iraq, pp. 3^ +5» 3^9
1 6 .
1 7 .
Jamil, Commercial Policy of Iraq, pp. 51-5i*.
19^.Jamil, Commercial loiicy of Iraq, pp. 5^, m ,
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commodities included raw materials and machinery. The
average rate on imported unprocessed goods was reduced from
22% to 15%. The new law also reduced duties on some consumer
goods such as tea and sugar by 10%, and it increased protective
duties on goods produced locally like cement, soap, shoes,
vegetable oils, dairy products, cotton and woollen piece goods.
l8But in general the level of duty was reduced.
Up to the end of financial year 19&5 this law had been
amended several times for reasons which are not related to
my study, but Law No. 30 of 19&2 widened the number of commodities
totally exempted from customs duty such as raw materials and
machinery, increased duty on luxury goods especially consumer
durables and duties on commodities which cometed with domestic
industry. The aim of the tariff system was still to collect
19revenue and protect local industries.
Revenue Aspects of the Tariff: Since the establishment of Iraq
Government in 1921, import duties have been an important source 
of tax revenue. The share of import duties in total Government 
revenues increased from 31% in 1921 to 40% in 1930. Then it 
declined to 28% in 1939 &nd 26% in 19^9*^ During the period 
1950-65 the ratio of import duties to total Government revenues 
declined from 27% in 1950 to 12% in 1 9 6 5. ^  The main reason for 
the decline in the importance of import duties was the rapid rise
18. Central Bank of Iraq, Annual Report, 1956, p. 22 and Hassan, 
Economic Development of Iraa, p p . 3 5 5 .  360.
19. Law No. 31 of 1962.---------
20. Jamil, Commercial Policy of Iraq, pp. 68, 72, 221,402 and 
National Bank of Iraq, Annual Report, 1950, p. 54.
21* TableVI.l, colum*»9 # # '
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in oil revenues. Since 1950 Iraq*s Development Budget has
22
been financed almost entirely from oil revenues. If, however, 
we consider the Ordinary Budget alone (without oil revenues), tne 
share of import duties increased from 33% in 1950 to 49% in 
1995, then the ratio declined to 27% in 1965*^ The share of 
import duties in the Ordinary Budget including oil revenues rose 
from 27% in 1950 to 34% in 1957* When the percentage of oil 
revenues allocated to the Ordinary Budget rose from 30% to
30% after 195$, the relative importance of import duties declined
- -24to 16% in 1965 hut these duties were still important, and
their contribution to total tax income of the Government was 30%
in the same yer r, and they were the most important single source
25of tax revenue after taxes on oil.
This high emphasis on import duties as a source of tax 
revenue has been noticed in other poor countries, mainly because 
it is administratively easier to tax commodities than income, 
and goods which flow through a few points of entry or exit to 
a country can be more readily taxed than commodities produced
26and distributed internally. In Iraq, however, oil revenues
have diminished the importance of import duties as a source of
public fin nee but they remain fairly significant. This is 
presumably why the actual administration of the tariff as well 
tariff policy was still in 19&5i the responsibility of the
Ministry of Finance.
22. Table VI.1, Columns 3 and 7
23• Table VI.1, Columns 11
24. Table VI.1, Column 10
25. Central Bank of Iraq, Bulletin, New Series, No.4,19$71P *25
26. Kindleberger, International Economics, p. 224
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Protective Aspects of the Tariff: A tariff designed only
to raise revenue must be levied on goods not produced 
domestically or on goods on which an equal tax is imposed on 
domestic production to eliminate the protective aspect. Less 
rigid definitions might include as revenue duties all levies 
which are too low to protect a local product, and those which 
are exceptionally high such as those applying to alooholic 
liquors and matches while the excise duties on domestically
produced products are far too small to balance the import
27 28duty. In between there are rates obviously protective.
The 1933 law encouraged industry mi inly by levying low
duties on inputs but it protected local industry by levying
high duties on a few commodities. This was "inevitable
because there were only a few worthwhile industrial projects
29to be protected". The 1955 tariff law and its amendments
in 1962 increased the extent of protection considerably. Can 
this be quantified?
Several authorities have related the amount of revenue 
collected to the total value of imports and found that the 
average tariff rose from 10% in 1921 to 3^% in 1 9 3 3* remained 
stable till 1 9 3 9» declined sharply during the war and increased 
to the pre-war level by 1950. Since tnen the ratio declined 
to 16% in 1 9 6 5* ^  But these figures are misleading because
27• These rates of course protect local industries but they are 
obviously higher than rates required for protection alone.
28. Corden, The Tariff, pp. 189-191
2 9 . Jamil, Commercial Policy of Iraq, p. ^24
30. Jamil, op.citr , p p • 62,208; Hassan, Economic Development 
of Iraq, p. 353 and Table €VL2
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they relate tariff revenues to total imports including those
commodities which pay no duty. Although the Government reduced
some duties like those levied on sugar and tea by 10%, this
does not explain the whole decline in the average tariff ratio
since 1950. There are other reasons for the fall. One is
the fact that most of the important imports were taxed on a
specific basis which means that increased import prices produced
a fall in the advalorem rate of duty.^ Another reason is the
shift in the pattern of Iraq's imports from consumer's goods
toward capital goods; that is a shift toward commodities which
pay little or no duty. From 1950 to 19&5 the percentage of
32capital goods in total imports rose from 17% to 50%. At the 
same time imports by industrial enterprises exempted from import
duties increased both in absolute terms and as a percentage of
33total capital goods imports. If we exclude imports of
3 1*
industrial enterprises, the average tariff rises to 19% in 
1963, compared with 16% on the simple average.^ The remainder 
of capital goods paid duty up to 10% advalorem. Assuming 
that on the average this rate amounted to 5% we can take out 
capital goods from the total imports and take out duties paid 
on capital goods. We are then left with a value of imports
•zg
other than capital goods and the relevant amount of duty. On
31. al-Nasrawi, Financing Economic Development in Iraq, p. 138
32. Table V I . c o l u m n  87
33* Table VI.2, columns 1 and 3*
3^* Table VI.2, column 3
35* Table VI.2, columns 10 and 7
3 6 . Table VI.2, column 11.
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this basis the average tariffs will rise to 26% in 19&5 
This ratio still includes pure revenue tariffs and it takes 
no account of goods not imported because of duties. But 
my figures seem a more satisfactory measure than the crude 
average. One could estimate the potential rate of protection 
at between 23-30%.
The compilation of a more refined ratio which takes into 
account the sums collected on low revenue duties, exceptionally 
high revenue duties, goods not produced in Iraq, etc., would 
be labourous. Furthermore, if one is interested in the actual 
rate of protection extended by the Government an aggregate 
approach is unsatisfactory. One should concentrate on industry 
alone. But to prepare an index containing all import competing 
items, would be impracticable and one is faced immediately with 
the sampling problem. Moreover most competing industrial 
goods are not included separately in Iraq's statistics of 
foreign trade. Finally even if these difficulties could be 
overcome the average tariff inaix on competing industrial goods 
would not measure the extent of protection, because tariffs 
were supplemented by quotas and prohibition. As an approxima­
tion I have calculated the extent of tariff protection on more 
than 30 imported industrial products with domestically produced 
substitutes I excluded commodities such as non-alcoholic 
beverages, bricks, tiles, perishable products protected by 
transport costs, and high revenue items such as sugar, alcoholic
37- Table VI.2, column 12
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liquers, cigarettes, matches, etc. Then Table VI.3 
constructed which shows that the simple average rate was 
33# in 1956 but increased to 31# in 1962. This is not a 
satisfactory average. Ideally the restrictive effect of the 
tariff should be weighted by flthe difference between hypo-
38
thetical imports in the absence of tariff and actual imports” .
But it is hardly possible to get such an index and one might
think that a satisfactory index may be obtained when each
tariff is weighted by the value of actual imports. This is
again not a satisfactory index because when tariffs are
increased and imports fall more than proportionately, the
weighted mean of the tariff falls and this, needless to say,
misrepresents the comparative restrictiveness of the tariff
39before and after the change in the rates. In the absence
of ”a more appropriate system of weighting.... the use of the 
unweighted mean tariff as a measure of the degree of restrictiveness 
of a given national tariff structure seems more justified, and
kohas been generally adopted by the E.E.C. authorities1.' I did
not find it necessary to calculate a weighted average for my
purpose. It is enough to notice that the rate varied from 17#
to more than 100%. Thus the actual tariff protection was,at
least in same cases, substantially higher than indicated by the
previous index (25-30%) derived from an aggregate approach. It
3 8. Walter, The European Common Market, p. 52 
39* Carmody, The Level of Australian Tariff, p. 57 
^0. Watter, The European Common Market, p. 5^
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Tariff
Table VI.3
Tariff Rates on Selected 
Import Competing Commodities
1956
Commodity Specific Advalorem
Rate Rate
1962
Specific Advalorem 
Rate Rate
25.23.a Cement 2, F.k. 10 3, F.k. 18
73-36.a Oil heaters 15 20
73-31-b Nails exceeding 2 Centimetres 8 , F.k. 12 15, F.k. 24
1*8.14 Paper bags 2 0 ,F.k. 8 25
68.1 2 .a Asbestos pipes, ecc. 4, F.k. 20 25 *
84.12 .b Air coolers 20 25
84.1?.b Water heaters 15 25
82 .11 Razor blades 20 25
48.18 Stationary,paper and books 15 25
73-13-a Nails not exceeding 2
Centimetres 1 6,F.k. 8 27
41. 2 .b Leather other than sole leather 3 5 0,F.k. 20 30
44.23 Builders carpentery 30, F.k. 9 30
44.24 Household utensils of wood 30, F.k. 8 30
62.2 . c Cotton bed linen 25 30
73-35 Iron and steel springs 15 30
48.15.b Toilet papers 15 30
53.11 Woollen textiles 27 35
6 1 .1 Outer garments 30 35
5 8 .1 Wool carpets 25 40
61.3.4 Undergarments knitted 32 41
6 0 .3 Stockings *+0 45
41.2.a Sole leather 1 8 0,F.k. 40 50
34.2 Detergents 20 50
6 2 .01 Woollen Blankets 3 0 0,F.k. 30 60
1 8 .6 Chocolate 50 2 2 5,F.k. 70
34.1 . c . 1 Toilet Soap 6 0, F.k. 30 1 5 0,F.k. 80
3 3-b .c. 2 Cosmetics 50 100
94.1 Furniture 32 100
1 5.1 3.a Vegetable oils 1 0 0,F.k. 83 1 0 0,F.k. 110
20.3 .6 .2 Jams, Jellies et£. 60, F.k. 90 1 0 0,F.k. 114
17.4 Sugar Confectionary 1 5 0,F.k. 100 2 2 5,F.k. 120
76.15 Household utensils of aluminium 90, F.k. 170 90, F.k. 176
Average 33 51
Notesi (l) F.k. means Fils per kilogramme.
(2) I have first chosen these products with the help of Mr.M.M.al-Baya, 
head of Marketing Section in the Centre for Development of 
Industrial Management of the Ministry of Industry. Then I found the 
relevant tariff rates from Tariff Law of 1955 and its amendment in 
1962. I then transformed the specific rates into advalorem 
rates on the basis of the values of actual imports according to 
statistics of foreign trade in relenant years as published by 
the Ministry of Planning, Central Bureau of Statistics. In terms 
of value of output these industries represented 23* of the whole 
industrial sector in 1962*Central Bureau of Statistics,
Industrial Census, 19b3L» PP* 14-17*
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seems that teriff policy makers were prepared to increase
the rate when an industry was established or expanded but
tariffs were rarely raised to prohibitive levels. As the
1962 amendment mentions, tariff rates were kept down in
order to permit a limited amount of imports to compete with
4+1
domestic products and to provide revenue for the Treasury.
Are these rates excessive? There is no satisfactory 
answer to such a question but it is interesting to notide 
that Freidrich List regarded a manufacturing industry that 
could not survive on 20-30% tariff as unsuitable for the
country but such rates, according to Professor Haberler
*  4+p
have lfto be regarded as very moderate nowadays". Most
of rates in Iraq stood at 30% or less (18 out of 33 items in
1962 and 22 from 33 in 195&)* It seems that Iraq*s tariff
rates can be described as relatively "moderate".
One important qualification concerns the duties levied
on raw materials, machinery and other imports. Most of these
enter Iraq duty free ar at lower rates than those levied on
finished goods. Under these circumstances "Effective Protection"
must be higher than the apparent rate. The concept of effective
protection relates the amount of auty on the imported product
to the value added in the import competing industry. For
example, if the tariff on nylon stocking is 35% and on nylon
kl. Law No. 30, 1962.
k 2» Haberler, Some Problems in the Pure Theory of International 
Trade, p. 2 3 8.
199
thread 20%, and if, in the absence of tariff, thread con­
stitutes 50% of the value of stocking, the effective rate,
2+ x
according to Cordon's method will be:(0.55 - 0.20)(0*50)r&-0.50)
90%. This follows because we relate the duty on the nylon
stocking to the value added in the domestic industry which
imports nylon thread.
To calculate effective protection one has to know import
content per unit of production, the duty on imported inputs
and then relate this to duty on the finished imports. For
Iraq such data are scarce and the problem is further complicated
by the Laws for Industrial Encouragement. Under these laws
industrial enterprises were entitled to import some or all of
their machinery, spare parts, raw materials, etc., duty free
but the required information is not published. In general,
however, the higher the cost of imports per unit of output
the greater the effective rate will be for any nominal tariff
rate. All industries listed in Table VI.5 import machinery
and spare parts, and most of them import considerable amount
of their raw materials. In most cases the value added in
Iraq is small compared to the cost of imports, because the
2+2+
domestic processing is of the "finishing touch" type, accordingly 
one can assume that the effective rates are substantially higher 
than the apparent rates of tariff protection.
^3. Cordon, The Tariff, pp. 195-197
During the years 1959-61, 65-6 6, while working in the 
Ministry of Industry I have visited most of the firms 
producing commodities listed in table VI.3 .
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Quota Restriction: The second amendment to the 1933 tariff
law and article seven of the 1953 law authorised the Government
to regulate the imports of any commodity in respect either of
quantity or value. During the war imports of all goods
became subject to licenses but after the war these quantitative
restrictions were gradually relaxed. By 1948 as a result of
Iraq's widening deficit on the balance of payment, imports of
all goods were again made subject to licenses. The Government
drew up an import programme which gave priority to essential
capital and consumer goods. From 1952-58, with increased
supplies of foreign exchange these regulations lapsed. Import
licenses were issued liberally while raw materials and machinery
2+6
were exempted from quota licensing entirely. After the
Revolution of 1958, in accordance with the "principle of
regulating the use of foreign exchange according to national 
2+7
interests", imports of all goods became again subject to
licence. The objectives of the Iraqi quota system can be
divided into measures to control overall imports in order to
reduce the deficit in the trade balance, and measures to effect
the composition of imports designed either to protect selected
industries or to encourage the import of capital goods at the
2+8
expense of consumer's goods.
4 5 • Jamil, Commercial Policy of Iraq, p. 4§6
46. al-Jalili, Lectures on Economics of Iraq, p. 68
47 • Central Bank of Iraq, Annual Report, 19t>l, p. 43
48. Government of Iraq, The Iraqi Revolution, One Year of
Progress, p. 59, and The Iraqi Revolution in its Second 
Year, p. 144.
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The balance of trade argument has been used as a major
justification for import control. But the country experienced
49
no balance of payment difficulties during the period 1950-65*
Although policy makers justified quotas on the grounds
that they preserved scarce foreign exchange. Table VI.4
reveals the weakness of this argument. From 1952-58 the value
of licenses issued to import fell below actual imports, because
. . 50
licenses were not required to import a wide range of commodities, 
and when licenses were required the issue was liberal. In 
fact the value of licenses issued for most licensed goods was 
greater than actual imports.^
From 1959 all imports were licensed but the value of
52license issued exceeded the value of imports and in 1965 when
"the quota was set at a low level.... in view of exhaustion of
appropriations for certain items... an amount of I.D. 13 million
53was added". The data available shows that the quota system,
misleadingly called import programmes, was not effectively used 
to control overall imports.
The quota system sought to encourage the import of capital 
goods.. Table VI.5 shows that during 1952-58 when investment 
goods were not subject to quotas, imports increased from 
^9* Note 5 , p. 185
50. National Bank of Iraq, Annual Report, 1953* P« 17 and
Federation of Industry, Annual Book, 1957-58, p. 22^.
51. Hassan, Economic Development of Iraq, pp. 370-371* Federation 
of Industry Annual Book, 1957-58, pp. 221-30.
52. Only in 1965 was the value of licenses issued less than the 
value of imports but in that year the value of licenses did 
not include imports of the public sector. Central Bureau 
of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1 9 6 5* P* 236
53* Central Bank of Iraq, Annual Report, 1965* P* 125
202
Table VI.4
i
Value of Import Licenses 
Issued and Value of Actual Imports
I.D. Millions
Year Imports other 
than Imports 
by Oil 
Companies
Import
Licenses
2 - 1
1950 2 9 .2 53.5 + 13.0
1951 42.2 62.7 + 19.5
1952 47.4 48.8 + 0 .1
1953 55.5 14.7 - 41.3
1954 6 8 .3 19.4 - 47.4
1955 90.9 23.1 - 67.9
1956 1 0 7 .2 2 2 .6 - 30.9
1957 1 1 2 .0 2 6 .2 - 13.0
1958 99.8 77.5 - 2 2 .8
1959 99-4 1 6 7 .7 + 6 8 .1
I960 124.3 1 5 4 .5 + 2 0 .6
1961 133.5 148.3 + 14.5
1962 1 2 7 .7 1 6 0 .6 + 33.7
1963 112.5 1 2 6 .6 + 14.1
1964 146.7 n.a. n.a
1965 159.9 133.5 - 24.4
Source: Imports - From Central Bank, Bulletih, New Series,
1 9 6 5, No.l, p. 48; Import Licenses - From Ministry 
of Planning, Central Bureau of Statistics,
Statistical Abstracts and Central Banks, Quarterly 
Bulletins, for the years 1950-65*
Notes: The decline in value of licenses from 1952 was due to
abolition of license requirements on a number of 
Imported goods. National Bank of Iraq (called 
Central Bank from 195&), Quarterly Bulletin, No.8 , 
1953, p. 17.
In case of discrepency between figures, the latest figure 
was taken.
n.a, = not available.
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I.D. 5 million or 16.7% of total imports in 1950 to I1D. 43 
million or 45% of total imports in 1958. Then imports 
became subject to license from 1959 and the value of capital 
goods imports fell to I.D. 37 million in that year (37% of 
total imports); not until 1965 did the absolute amount of 
capital goods attain the peak total of 1956. Thus despite 
the quota system*s bias in favour of capital goods the import 
of these goods declined because the import of capital goods 
depends on too many factors beside quota restrictions. When 
foreign exchange is scarce, quotas can be used to facilitate 
the import of capital goods in preference to other commodities, 
but in Iraq there was no shortage of foreign exchange hence 
quotas were neither necessary nor did they increase the import 
of capital goods.
The final and perhaps most significant justification for 
the quota system was that it was necessary to protect local 
industry. Prior to 1959 import policy provided for only 
mild physical restriction on competitive imports. With few 
exceptions the restrictions were in values - not in physical 
terms}, and values were determined haphazardly on the basis of 
previous imports. This gave rise to complaints by industrialists 
and some economists who claimed that restriction by value
9
cannot exclude foreign industrial products because the local 
importers agreed with foreign suppliers to declare ficticious 
prices. Foreign producers could also cut prices to enter the
protected market on a larger scale. ^ __________________________
54. Iraqi Federation of Industry, Annual Book, 1957-58, pp.224-5 
and Hassan, Economic Development of Iraq, p. 370
TableVI .5
I.D.Millions
Year
1
Total 
Imports 
Other 
than Oil 
Companies
Capital
goods
imports
Central
Banks
Estimate
Capital 
Imports, 
C.B.I.,
Estimate
Adjusted
Consumer
goods
imports
C.B.I.
Estimate
Consumer 
+ Capital 
goods 
imports
Capital
goods
imports
Dr.
Atraqchi
Estimate
3 as 
of 1
3 as % 
of 5
65a
of
1 2 3 4 3 6 7 8 9
1950 2 9 .2 5.0 3.0 23.3 2 8 .4 5-9 16.7 17.2 2 0 .
1951 42.2 11.4 11.4 24.2 3 5 .6 9.0 27.0 32.0 2 1 .
1952 47.4 15.7 13.7 22.6 3 8 .3 1 3 .6 33.1 40.9 2 8 .
1953 53-3 2 3 .0 2 3 .0 22.3 4 5 .3 20.3 41.4 50.7 36.
1954 68.3 30.4 30.4 27.4 5 7 .8 24.3 44.5 53.1 35.
1955 90.9 45.1 45.1 30.7 7 5 .8 3 5 .4 49.6 39.4 38.
1956 1 0 7 .2 59.2 55.2 30.5 8 5 .7 4 3 .3 51.5 64.4 40.
1957 112.0 45.7 45.7 36.4 8 2 .1 40.3 40.8 55.6 35.
1958 9918 43.1 43.1 36.2 7 9 .3 39-0 45.1 34.3 39.
1959 9 9 .4 37.0 37.0 43.5 8 3 .5 32.7 37-2 4^.3 32.
i960 1 2 4 .3 4*+ .0 44.0 6 0 .8 104.8 40.1 35.3 41.9 32.
1961 1 3 3 .5 48.6 48.6 6 5 .2 1 1 3 .8 43.9 36.4 42.7 32.
1962 1 2 7 .7 53.5 53.3 54.3 107-8 48.8 41.8 49.6 38.
1963 1 1 2 .5 32.3 46.3 47.8 52.8 41.1 30.0
1964 1 4 6 .7 6 5 .0 5 6 .8 6 6 .3 1 2 3 .1 40.7 46.2
1965 1 5 9 .9 74.5 69.4 6 9 .6 139.9 43.4 49.9
Source: Table VI. 4; Central Bank, Annual Reports, 1934 -6 5  and
Quarterly Bulletin, No.l., p 
Merchandize Foreign Trade in
. 19; al-Atraqchi, 
Iraq, 1948-62, p.
Pattern
1 6 5.
of
Note: Column 3 is the same as in Column 2, except for the years
1963-6 5* During these years certain items were included 
by the Central Bank but I have excluded them to make the 
figures comparable.
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Import policy from 1959-65 banned imports of goods where
productive capacity of domestic industry was sufficient for
local needs; where local needs were estimated to be more than
the productive capacity of local industry the quota was set
at a level to bridge the gap. Protection through quotas was
necessary, according to the Iraqi Ministry of Industry, to
55
prevent damping and to protect infant industries. The
question is how far can this argument support a case for quanti­
tative restrictions as compared to the use of tariffs?
If the demand and supply curves for a particular commodity 
are not perfectly inelastic there is little difference whether 
tariffs or quotas are used to protect an industry provided that 
the quota is set at the volume of imports which would result 
from a given tariff. But if there is an inelastic supply of 
that commodity from outside or if foreign producers dump 
exports at prices lower than those in the home markets, then 
a tariff may not increase the price or reduce the volume of 
imports to the required extent. Under these circumstances a 
quota should be imposed to restrict imports. The quota ban 
them be justified on the ground that domestic resources are 
engaged in the production of the commodity which cannot be 
shifted out of the industry concerned temporarily and be 
shifted back later e a s i l y . 56
55» Ministry of Industry, Annual Reports, I960, p. 51 a&d 1961,p . 63 
5 6 . Kindleberger, International Economics, pp. 251-53
20 6
It is one thing, however, to point out on theoretical
basis that quotas are useful because of dumping, but it is an
entirely different matter to demonstrate that dumping exists
and occurs on a large scale. The Iraqi officials used the
dumping argument to support the imposition of quotas but they
did not cite any evidence to support the existence cf dumping.
Tariffs are not costless, but quotas are even more
expensive for consumers. They are more restrictive and tend
to reduce competition and establish monopolies to a larger
extent than tariffs. They raise the price of imports and in
the absence of the auctioning of import licenses, importers
may secure for themselves this increase in value due to created
scarcity, hence import licenses become valuable and this may
57lead to corruption or if corruption already existed this adds 
yet another form. Even without corruption there are other 
difficulties when decisions are taken about quantities of 
different imports, from where to import and by whom, In taking 
these decisions administrators are frequently affected by
58considerations of fairness and other arbitrary personal prejudices.
Our problem is how to evaluate the case for quantitative 
restriction in Iraq. Unfortunately, only meagre information is 
available. Until 19&1 protection was granted by the Higher Supply
57* Maldistribution of import licenses in Iraq has been referred
to by al-Habeeb, Notes on Commercial .Policy of Iraq, p. 17
and Explanatory Note to Law No. 30, 19^2, p.29«
5 8 . Kindleberger, International Economics, p. 251
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y ,
Committee - a ministerial committee under the chairmanship
of the Prime Minister - on the strength of recommendations of
ad hoc committees. Thereafter the Permanent Committee for
Protection was established under the Ministry of Trade with
a membership drawn from the Ministries of Trade, Industry and
Finance, the Federation of Industry and Baghdad Chamber of 
59Commerce. The first wave of quota protection after the 
Revolution of 195& came in 1959 when tfimports of some foreign 
goods were banned.... while imports of other commodities not 
manufactured locally in sufficient quantities were limited11. ^  
From 1 9 6 0 -65 a further 63 products received protection, 29 were 
protected by import quotas and 34 items completely protected 
by import prohibition as can be seen from table IV.6, which also 
shows that the range of quota protection was becoming wider.
Table VI.6
No. of Industrial Products 
Completely or Partly Protected by Quotas
1960-1965
Year Partly Protected Completely Protected Total
1960 2 6 8
1961 6 4 10
1962 4 4 8
1963 4 5 - 9
1964 6 5 9
1965 7 12 19
Total 29 54 63
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract,1965
p. 237.
59* Ministry of Industry, The Position of the Industrial Sector
of Iraq, p. 42
60. Government of Iraq, Iraqi Revolution, One Year of Progress,
PP- 55, 56.
208
No information is published by the Permanent Committee 
for Protection but according to one member^ the Committee
scrutinized applications for protection by industrialists,
62collected data from the Ministries of Economy and Industry, 
the Federation of Industry and Chamber of Commerce. The 
Committee visited the factories concerned and eventually 
prepared a small report including recommendations for the 
Minister of Economy. Usually the Minister accepted the recom­
mendations of the Committee. Protection was granted initially 
for one year, at the end of which the case was restudied and 
if the Committee was satisfied protection became permanent. 
Fortunately I have obtained (15) of the reports of the
O ^
Committee,^ and have also read supporting statements prepared
64for it by the Federation of Industry. In every case decisions 
were taken on the basis of "local needs" compared to "productive 
capacity of domestic industry". Local needs were defined as 
equal to average annual imports plus domestic production sold 
over the past two or three years. The Committee rarely made 
projections of future demand or supply. Productive capacity 
was defined as almost equal to maximum output on the basis of 
more than one shift of work per day under ideal conditions.
Prices used for comparison were wholesale prices in Baghdad 
of domestic and imported goods. Other Departments were
61.MrAl-Shamma, Assistant Director General in the Ministry of 
of Industry and its representative in the Committee.
6 2. The name of the Ministry 0f Trade was changed to Ministry 
of Economy, in 19&3*
6 3. Sent to me by Mr. al-Shamma and Mr. M. Said, Director 
G e n e r a i n  the Ministry of Economy.
64. I have read (14) of these reports published in Federation 
of Industry, Quarterly Magazine,for the period 1962-65-
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consulted sometimes on questions of quality but in most cases 
the Committee's decision was based on its own evaluation of 
whether the available domestic product reached some minimum 
required standard. If the Committee found that domestic 
capacity could meet the local needs, that the price of local
product was below or a little higher than the price of the
imported substitute and the quality was satisfactory, it recom­
mended permanent import prohibition even if only one local 
producer operated.
The Committee's method of investigation does not involve 
any consideration of long run efficiency. It made no attempt 
to compare domestic costs of production of a commodity with its 
real cost for the economy. For imported goods Baghdad whole­
sale price would be higher than the cost o.i.f., because Baghdad 
prices include customs duties and reflect the operation of the
quota system. The Committee made no attempt to study whether
any protected industry had possibilities to become efficient.
It attached little value to competition, displayed no awareness 
of the disadvantages of monopoly. The following quotations 
makes official attitudes towards foreign competition all to clear!
The National Bank of Iraq claimed that "the most important 
means which must be taken to achieve domestic production and 
just distribution is the adoption of the principle of quantitative 
limitation or total prohibition of the import of foreign commo-
65
dities the competition of which cannot be destroyed in any other way"
65. National Bank of Iraq, Annual Report, 195^» P* 30
210
"This Ministry", stated the Ministry of Industry "takes care
to protect domestic products according to the principle of
66
the domestic market for national products", while the Ministry
of Trade stated that "the basic aims of commercial policy are
protection for national industries against foreign competition
by prohibiting the import of commodities produced locally and
limiting the import of goods not produced in sufficient amounts
67
to meet market requirements". As Adams noticed and reports
of the Federation of Industry substantiate "the philosophy of 
eliminating competition rather than working for efficient 
production and improved quality is contagious, and is evident 
in the private sector of the economy also. Private producers 
come to expect the Government to protect their market by means 
ranging from high duties to outright prohibition on import 
competing products".^
It is interesting to see, however, that the Ministry of 
Finance declared that "wherever possible it is better to protect 
by tariffs rather than by quantitative restrictions of imports. 
Because the tariff rate, if chosen, carefully, can ensure 
protection of domestic industry as well as other aims which 
cannot be achieved by uuantitative import restrictions or import 
prohibitions, because imports prevent monopoly, stimulate 
improvement in quality of domestic products, satisfy consumer
6 6 . Ministry of Industry, Annual Report, 19&1, P«7»
6 7 . Government of Iraq, The Iraqi Revolution in jts^^60011  ^year* 
the Report of the Ministry of Trade, p"! TPTi
6 8. Adams, Iraq’s People and Resources, p. 126 and Langley,
The Industrialization of Iraq, p. 253*
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demands in a better way, collect revenues for the Treasury and
69combat inflation.” Why then did the Permanent Committee for
Protection resort to quantitative restrictions as the main 
instrument of protection?
The Ministry of Trade was lesponsible for import policy 
and has attached to it the Committee for Protection, but this 
Ministry had little to do with the formulation and execution of 
tariff policy - presumably because the tariff was mainly 
regarded as an instrument for collection of revenues. Quanti­
tative restrictions came under the direct control of the 
Ministry of Trade (Department of Exports and Imports), this 
Ministry could only recommend changes in tariffs to the Ministry 
of Finance. The latter anyway remained reluctant to alter
tariffs because "rapid changes in the rates introduce confusion
70into the tariff law”. Hence it was easier for the Ministry
of Trade to protect industry by quantitative restrictions. </
Next the Protection Committee always recommended quantitative
restrictions. -This occurred in part because the Committee
found it easier to estimate consumption and output in physical
terms, on the basis of actual consumption during the past few
years and the capacity of local industry. The Committee would
then recommend restrictions on imports to make them just bridge
the gap between domestic output and local needs. This the
Committee probably found a far easier task than the alternative
69- Government of Iraq, Law No. 30, 19&2, The 9th amendment of 
Tariff Law No. 77, 1955* The Explanatory Note, p. 28.
70. Ibid., p. 29
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exercise aimed at finding the correct levels of protective 
tariffs for particular products. The latter exercise involves 
a comparison between local and foreign costs of production 
instead of their prices in Baghdad market.
Finally the Committee probably shared the official antipathy 
to the market mechanism and a faith in direct controls. The 
quotations cited above all neglect relative prices. Domestic 
demand was measured in physical units and they conceive of 
demand as price inelastic. On the other hand the foreign 
supply of goods to compete with local products was thought be be 
unlimited at prices specially designed by foreigners to destroy 
Iraq's industry.
But these assumptions are unlikely to be correct and it
is unwise to base policy upon them without a proper investigation
of each case. While markets in poor countries are far from
being perfect Government intervention often makes things worse. •
In Iraq it was not only the market which was imperfect but the
Government administracion as well. Supporters of direct
control claimed that when Government granted import quotas,
expressed in value terms, the volume of imports could not be
controlled because Iraqi marchants agreed with foreign suppliers
71to declare false prices on invoices. In other words, the 
Government administrators were not competent enough to check 
invoiced prices with rices in countries of origin. Nevertheless,
71* See note No. P* 203
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supporters of direct controls expected the same administra­
tors to control domestic prices, protect the interests of
industrialists, labourers and consumers by further extension
72of public control. Early in i960 the Protection Committee
recommended complete protection of a commodity, produced by
two firms, for one year with the proviso that their activities
were watched carefully by Ministries of Industry and Economy.
At the end of a year the Committee reported that it was
impossible to show how far the pricing and other policies of
this industry were satisfactory because the firms did not
supply information and did not send samples of their products
73to be tested by the Ministry of Industry. This shows how
weak was the administration, to say nothing about the undesira­
bility of leaving the choice of samples to the firms themselves 
instead of the administration.
The consequences of Iraq*s policy of protection which in 
effect protected any industrial enterprise that existed to 
whatever extent necessary, are predictable I high costs, high 
prices and low quality. In 1961? the Central Bank observed 
that the MIraqi consumer has not benefited from the industrial
development of the country because Iraq's industrial products
74are costly and of low quality”. Presumably the argument is
that Iraqis will benefit in the long run. The question ishow
long is the long run? Most of the industries listed in table
72. Hassan, Economic Development of Iraq, p. 3&9 
73* Ministry of Economy, Permanent Committee for Protection, 
Report No. 77 of 1967, p.2.
74. Central Bank of Iraq, Annual Report, 1961, P* 44
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75VI.5 were established before 1953 and some of them even 
76
before the War but by 1962 they were not only protected by high 
tariffs but by quantitative restriction as well. The protec­
tion policy did not seem to have paid any attention to 
efficiency and a recent thesis on industrial productivity in 
Iraq concluded that Hin the firms studied it was observed that..
77
little attention was given to long run policies and cost savings11.
2f Tax Exemptions
Tax exemption is a device which can be used in a variety
of forms to encourage private investment in industry, because
it leads to a direct increase in the return which a potential
investor expects at any assumed level of pre-tax profits. This
makes projects profitable for.private investors which might
otherwise not be undertaken.
Tax exemptions vary in character with the type of taxes.
They can be granted for different periods of time and can
cover all or only part of the normal tax liability. There
are limits in granting tax exemptions either because the
Government may find it difficult to favour industry over other
sectors of the economy or because it needs revenue. But if
exemptions are too small, for too short a period and are
administratively complicated, they accord little financial
78advantage to the potential investor.
75* Ministry of Economy, Industrial Census, 1954, pp. 10-11 
76. Langley, The Industrialization of Iraq, pp. 58-59 
77- Suleiman, Industrial Productivity in Iraq with Special 
Reference to Selected firms, 1953-63, P • 297•
7 8 . Bryce, Industrial Development, pp. 77-78
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The policy of tax exemption in Iraq began with Law No.l4 
of 1927 for Encouragement of Industrial enterprises* This 
law and its amendments included all basic tax exemptions 
included in subsequent laws promulgated in 1950, 1955, 19&1 
and 1964.^ The taxes involved included income tax, stamp 
duties, tax on property and import duties.
The 1929 law exempted all profits from tax for six 
years. This was not, however, an important incentive to 
investment in industry because ’’the income tax in itself 
was very low and tax evasion was the rule before 1939, then 
tax rates were increased, the method of collection improved 
and industrial enterprises were made subject to income tax11. ^  
The exemption from income tax was introduced again in 1950 
and it continued in subsequent laws. The 19&4 law exempted 
profits not exceeding 10% of the paid up capital of the enter­
prise for five years (dated from the First year of positive 
profits), and profits not exceeding 5% of paid up capital a 
further five years. The 19&4 act is less generous than tne 
1929 law and more complicated due to the vagueness of the 
terms like ’’paid up capital” . But it did exempt undistributed 
profits needed for improvements for expansion of the enterprise
79. Laws No. *+3, 1950; No.72 of 1955, No. 31 of 1961 and
No. 164 of 1964.
80. Jamil, The Commercial Policy of Iraq, p. 288
provided the sum involved did not exceed 25% of the total
81profits over a five year period. This clause assumes
that expansion of existing enterprises is more desirable
than new investment. The assumption is probably correct
since established enterprises usually acquire a level of
experience and knowledge of the market which reduces risks
of investment within the enterprise and this, presumably,
is important in a poor country with a short industrial tradition.
Industrial enterprises were also exempted from stamp
duties. Such duties are paid when applications are made
to various Government departments or when contracts and other
transactions require Government consent. But the rates
are extremely low, hence exempting Industrial enterprises
82from these duties was not a significant exemption.
81. Short periods of tax exemption will have meagre results if 
the income tax is too high to ensure adequate returns for 
risk and rranagement after the conclusion of tax holidays. 
This could occur if investors have to pay high personal 
income taxes on distributed dividends as well as taxes on 
company profits. In this respect Iraq’s Income Tax
Law No. 178 of 1959 and amendments imposed heavy taxes.
Thus the tax imposed on residents commences at a low 
rate of 3% on income up to I.D. 500 and then increases up 
to 90/b on incomes above I.D. 20,000 per year. The rates 
levied on industrial enterprises starts from 10% on profits 
up to I.D. 1000 and increases to 45% on income above 
I.D. 13000. But when tax rates are so high few projects 
will offer a high enough profit before taxation to give 
an attractive return after tax unless they are able to 
charge the public high monopolistic prices.
82. Jamil, The Commercial Policy of Iraq, p. 185
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Laws for the Encouragement of Industrial Enterprises 
exempted these projects from real estate tax for a period of 
ten years. This exemption involves land, plant buildings and 
stores but not administrative buildings. The real estate tax
83
rate was equal to 10% of the annual rental value of the property. 
Moreover the 1964 act included the provision of state owned 
land at appropriate rentals for a period of 10 years and gave 
the further privilege of purchasing the land so acquired at 
prices equal to their market value.
Since 1927, the tariff laws exempted a large variety of 
machinery and equipment from import duties, the remainder were 
subject to rates up to 10%, or even more in certain cases. 
Industrial enterprises covered by the Industrial Encouragement 
Laws were, however, exempted from these duties.
The profitability of an industrial project can also be 
improved by exempting imported raw materials from custom duties. 
Iraq’s tariff laws exempted some raw materials from duty and 
levied moderate or even high duties on others. It has been 
estimated that the 1955£tariff law has reduced the average
84duty on these goods from 22% to 15%« From 1930 one of the 
most important incentives provided for in the industrial 
encouragement acts was the exemption of raw materials from
customs duty. This exemption has been applied within a limited
85scope in order to avoid misuse by industrial enterprises and to
8 3 . Laws. No. 162 of 1959, No. 35, 1927 and No. 17 of 1940.
84. Hassan, Economic Development of Iraq, p. 361
8 5 . Jamil, The Commercial Policy of Iraq, p. 579
218
collect revenue for the Treasury. Laws for the encouragement
of industry were automatic in operation as far as income tax,
real estate tax, stamp duties and import duties on machinery
were concerned. Exemptions were granted to firms for
defined periods of time provided that they fell within the
86conditions of the law. But the exemption of raw materials
involved Government departments in screening of applications
from firms each year.
Whenever a given industrial enterprise requested
exemption of raw materials from import duties, officials from
the Department for Promotion of Private Industry visited the
plant and presented a report to the Industrial Development 
87Committee. In general these reports attempted to measure the 
firm*s imports over the past year and to predict its future 
consumption. According to the law the amount of raw materials 
exempted from import duties for the firm is decided in relation 
to its need for help in the light of current socio-economic
8 6. According to 19&^ law, enterprises eligible for these
privileges must carry out their main process on machinery 
whose total value must be at least I.D. 3000, supplemented 
by at least 60% Iraqi capital and employ no more than 10% 
of non Iraqi unskilled labour.
8?« This Committee is attached to the Ministry of Industry,
its members represent the Ministries of Industry, Finance, 
Planning and Economy, Federation of Industry and an 
expert. Article 2 Law No. iGk af 196 +^.
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88situation of the country. Neither this vague criterion
nor the reports are of any help to the Committee. But in
the absence of more relevant information and properly defined
criteria exemptions from custom duties were recommended
arbitrarily by the Committee and the amount exempted varied
from zero to the total of raw material inputs of the firm.
This policy of haphazard exemption gave rise to complaints
from both the Federation of Industry which claimed that the
89amount of raw materials exempted was meagre, and the Ministry
of Finance who maintained that it had adversely effected the 
90revenues. The recommendations of the Committee were subject 
to the approval of the Ministers of Industry and Finance. They 
usually approved the Committee's recomruendaLions, but the 
Ministry of Finance exercised a double check on this type of 
exemption because it had a representative in the Committee - 
usually the Director General of the Department of Customs 
and Excise^-and because the Minister of Finance could veto the 
recommendations of the Committee.
Thus Iraq's laws for the encouragement of industry was a 
screening type of law as far as raw materials were concerned. 
Theoretically this is superior to the automatic type of law,
88. Law No. l6k of 198^ article 10.
89* Iraqi Federation of Industry, Quarterly Magazine, March 19&5i 
pp. 23-25 and Speech by the Chairman of the Federation in 
the same issue p. 12.
90. Ministry of Finance, Note on the 19&2 Budget, p. 6.
because it allows the Government to provide exemptions from 
duties in different degrees to various enterprises according 
to their desirability. But this type of legislation requires 
high technical and administrative ability. Appraisal of 
applications should be efficient honest and rapid in order to 
encourage investment.
In the absence of suitably qualified personnel in 
countries like Iraq tax exemptions should be placed on an 
automatic rather than a selective basis. One possible tech­
nique is to revise the tariff more frequently in order to 
reduce or eliminate duty on imported raw materials used in 
large quantities by industrial enterprises. No doubt this 
would reduce revenue from import duties. But from tne point 
of view of the economy this is almost costless; remission of 
import duty is not an expense to the Government or a subsidy 
by the Society and if industrialization succeeds it will over 
the longer run result in a higher level of tax revenue. Yet 
there is presumably some problem of finding alternative sources 
of revenue in the short run. Unfortunately not enough 
relevant information is available to appraise this problem but 
it is interesting.to notice that in 1961 the Ministry of Finance
estimated that all tax exemptions extended to the industrial
21sector amounted to I.D. 2.5 million compared to I.D. 2h million 
of revenues from import duties while total Government revenue 
amounted to I.D. 187 million during the same y e a r , hence even
91. Ministry of Finance, Department of Budget, Note on the 1962 
Budget, p. 6. *-----------------
92. Table VI.1, columns 1 and
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an increase of 100% in tax exemptions on raw materials would 
have had a marginal effect on Government revenues.
3. The Licensing of Industrial Enterprises
Law No. 18 of 1957 made it illegal to establish industrial
enterprises with a capital of more than I.D. 20,000 without
Government consent. The law stated that licenses would not
be granted unless investors satisfied the Government that there
was sufficient demand for new production. In 19&1 the Government
extended the system of licensing to include the establishment
of any industrial enterprise provided that the cost of machinery
and equipment was no less than I.D. 3000 and the licensing
system was extended to include change of location and expansion
93of industrial enterprises.
The reason for this extension, according to the Ministry 
of Industry, was that ,!one of the principle failures of the 
previous regime was to leane the establishment of industrial 
projects to the wishes private industrialists, this is a 
dangerous policy because it may lead to the establishment of 
excess capacity, in relation to domestic market, in some lines 
while other branches of industry remained unexplohted. This 
means higher average costs and hence higher prices. It follows 
that Government control is necessary and no license will be 
granted prior to an extensive study to make sure that domestic 
market needs the extra output.H . 9^+ j_s interesting to notice
93. Law No. 31 of 1961.
91* • Ministry of Industry, Annual Report, 19o0, p. 5 8 .
222
that the only industry of some importance which was claimed to 
have grown in a capitalistic manner and hence developed waste­
ful excees capacity was the cement industry which was working 
at 80% of its capacity during 1958-59* By 19^, however, 
plans were prepared and it was decided to increase the capacity
of this industry significantly for domestic as well as foreign 
95markets.
Applications for licenses were made to the Ministry of 
Industry (Department for the Promotion of Private Industry) 
accompanied by the necessary technical and economic data. That 
department then consulted the Planning Department in the Ministry, 
Federation of Industry, the Industrial Bank and other depart­
ments. Reports of these departments were then submitted to 
the Industrial Development Committee and licenses were issued 
by the Minister of Industry oh the strength of its recommenda­
tions. The criteria used by the Committee in its decisions 
were:
(1) Did the applicant>~have sufficient financial resources 
and contacts with foreign suppliers of industrial machinery?
(2) The importance of the project in relation to demands, 
the capacity of existing plants and the possible emergence of 
monopolistic practices.^
95* Hassan, Studies in Economics of Iraq, p. 129 and
Ministry of Industry, The Position of the Industrial Sector 
pp. 51-52.
96. Ministry of Industry, Laws and Regulations, pp. 1 6 3, 172-173.
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I have examined all applications for licenses submitted
97during 19&5 a*id the first half of 1966. In most cases the
Committee granted a license because it believed (on the basis 
of reports from .relevant departments) that the domestic 
market could absorb the additional output. Market demand 
was estimated from incomplete information on past production 
and imports, sometimes projected into the immediate future.
In no case did officials conduct a proper analysis of costs 
and prices. Their reports asserted that given projects would 
provide employment and foreign exchange and never attempted 
to quantify these claims. Yet once a license was granted 
the .projec-t became eligible for tax exemptions and other 
benefits. Moreover the same projects were usually granted 
whatever degree of protection they required, in order to 
continue their operations, including a total ban on imports.
This system is bound to foster inefficiency since it 
tends to encourage the production of any industrial commodity 
even if it has no long run possibility of competing on 
international markets. Forthermore, the licensing system with 
its attempt to avoid excess capacity restricted internal com­
petition. On the other hand the system was too restrictive 
and cumbersome. I have already described the procedure in 
general terms but to appreciate its complexity let me bring the 
whole system together at the risk of some repetition. For
97* I was responsible for preparing a summary of the reports 
of various departments and for presenting it with the
Committee's recommendations to the Minister.
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example, if a textile plant wished to change one of its 
weaving machines but the productive capacity of the new 
machine was higher than the old one, the firm had to apply 
to the Department of Promotion of Private Industry. The 
application then passed to the Planning Department of the 
Ministry of Industry, the Industrial Bank and the Federation
of Industry were also involved. The reports of these depart­
ments were then submitted to the Industrial Development 
Committee. In cases of conflict a joint committee would 
have been set up to study the problem. Then the Industrial
Development Committee may have recommended to the Minister of
Industry to grant the license.
At the second stage the firm applied to the Ministry of 
Economy (Department of Imports and Exports) which usually 
granted the import license provided that the quota for textile 
machinery was not exhausted. Even with an import license the 
firm still needed authority from the Foreign Exchange Department 
of the Central Bank.
Even with an efficient administration such complicated 
and time consuming regulations may well make the firm's relations 
with the Government the most frustrating barrier it faces. My 
description.of Iraq's administration in chapter two suggests that 
the Government administration was far from being efficient.
During 19 6 5 -6 6 when I was an administrator in the Ministry of 
Industry I was told by numerous industrialists who eventually
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received licenses, that had they been aware of the bureaucratic 
compilations they would never have committed themselves to the 
investment. One wonders how much investment never begins 
because of maladministration?
226
Chapter VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
From 1921 the Iraqi Government played an active role in 
the economic development of the couhtry. Up to 1950 it devoted 
an average of 12% of its annual resources to capital formation 
and its share in gross capital formation was approximately 3^%*
The Government invested mainly in social overhead capital but 
its financial resources were not enough to promote rapid expan­
sion and by the early fifties Iraq’s infra-structure remained 
underdeveloped. Given the obvious need for social overhead 
investment and the small budget surplus available to it the 
Government could not feasibly implement a policy of industriali­
zation based on direct public investment. But in early 1950s 
when oil revenues increased enormously it became possible for it 
to increase investment in all sectors of the economy.
Nevertheless, a subsidiary cause of the relatively slow 
rate of public capital formation before 1950 can be found in 
the lack of continuity in the formulation and implementation of 
development programmes engendered by political instability.
Between 1921-50 the Cabinet changed about every 8 months and 
each new Government attempted to revise the economic policy of 
its predecessor. Since political instability continued to afflict 
Iraqi politics into the fifties the Government in power in early 
1950 saw that it was essential to devise an institutional frame­
work which could protect the State’s effort to promote economic 
development from the consequences of frequent Cabhinet changes.
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Thus in 1950 the Government established an autonomous 
agency called the Development Board to formulate and imple­
ment investment programmes. The majority of the Board came 
from outside the Government and were appointed for five years. 
The Board received a substantial part of the oil revenues 
paid to the Iraqi Government. It employed its own personnel 
and set up an organisation free irom the rigidities of normal 
civil service regulation. But its autonomy was shortlived and 
in 1953 the administrative machinery of the Board was trans­
ferred to a new Ministry for Development. The Board remained 
in operation with the Minister of Development as a member and 
the majority of its members were not politicians. Although 
the dangers of political instability came back in 1953 the Board 
managed to maintain a substantial degree of autononcr and this 
brought a large element of continuity into development policy.
After the Revolution of 1953 the Development Board was 
abolished and a new Planning Board created which consisted 
entirely of Ministers. In 136k full time executive members 
were added to the Planning Board but the majority of its 
members continued to be departmental Ministers. Under the 
new organization, the implementation of plans became the 
responsibility of Government departments but the departments 
could not expand their personnel and raise their capacity to 
implement plans without approval from the Ministry of Finance. 
This situation created serious bottlenecks due mainly to lack 
of co-ordination between the Ministries.
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In the post 1958 period the formulation and implementa­
tion of the Government’s industrial programmes was the res­
ponsibility of the Ministry of Industry. This Ministry 
included administrative units responsible for almost all 
aspects of industrialization such as planning, design, con­
struction, technical and economic research, manpower and 
market surveys. In practice the design of projects, feasi­
bility studies, the training of labour and the construction 
of industrial projects was carried on by private agencies and 
the functions of the administration was confined to the same 
supervisory tasks previously undertaken by the far simpler 
technical section of the Development Board’s organization 
for industry.
One weakness of the Development Board’s organisation
lay in its excessive centralization - i.e. its failure to
delegate detailed planning and administration to subordinate
agencies and other Government departments. After the
Revolution of 1958 the Government attempted to decentralize
and it made the Planning Board responsible for general
planning and entrusted other departments with the task of
detailed planning and implementation. In practice the Planning
Board became pre-occupied with detailed planning and problems
of implementation and it never gave enough attention to basic
policy issues such as the assessment of total resources, the
selection of alternative patterns of investment, etc. Nor did
it give serious consideration to the improvement of the adminis-
station which remained the most important obstacles to Iraq’s 
economic development.
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Between 1951-58 the Development Board formulated three 
investment programmes and from 1959-65 ^he Board
formulated another three. The Development Board simply 
sought to invest 70% of Iraq’s oil revenues in various 
sectors of the economy. It did not set out to achieve 
target growth rates of production and income for different 
sectors of the economy. The Planning Board’s approach was 
to set target rates of growth for economic sectors which in 
turn determined the required rates of investment and saving. 
After the Revolution of 1958 the Government reduced the share 
of oil revenues devoted to capital formation from 70% to 50%, 
while the programmes of the Planning Board required resources 
equivalent to almost all available oil revenues.
With given financial resources, the Development Board 
decided on the scale and timing of investment in each sector 
of the economy on the basis of reports prepared for it by 
professional economists and other advisors but it used simple 
common sense rather than mathematical models, to avoid incon­
sistencies in its plans. The Planning Board tried to prepare 
more sophisticated investmeht programmes but its plans turned 
out to be similar, at least in form, to those formulated by 
the Development Board. Both Boards decided on the basic issues 
of resource allocation on the basis of a general attitude 
towards the economic development of Iraq and reports of private 
consultants about different sectors.
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Nevertheless, the Development Board emphasized agricul­
ture while the Flanning Board gave priority to industry. Any 
general discussion of priorities is bound to be inconclusive 
but it does seem that the Development Board’s bias toward 
agriculture reflected the essential, priority for economic 
development of Iraq between 1950-65* The majority of the 
population remained in the countryside and continued to 
depend on agriculture for their livelihood. There were, 
moreover, excellent opportunities for the development of 
agriculture while the country lacked the variety of raw
materials skills and markets essential for the rapid develop- ' ' 
ment of a viable industrial sector.
The funds available for investment always exceeded the 
amounts required for the execution of feasible and well prepared 
projects. If there had been more of these projects a proper 
assessment of their costs and benefits could have offered a 
more satisfactory solution to the problem of resource allocation. 
Moreover the scarcity of well designed projects was again 
due mainly to the weakness of the administration particularly 
the shortage of qualified specialists capable of designing and 
appraising projects.
While the formulation of consistent plans is important, 
their actual implementation determines the growth of production 
*and income. Implementation can be measured by comparing plan 
targets with actual achievements. Apart from the sixth plan 
(1965-6 9), the Iraqi plans do not contain proper overall or
23a
sectoral targets for production, income, employment or 
savings of foreign exchange. I can only measure plan 
implementation in terms of investment targets. Throughout 
1951-65 expenditure on capital formation was substantially 
less than planned investment. But while the gap between 
planned and actual investment narrowed under the management 
of the Development Board (1951-56), it widened under the 
Flanning Board (1959-65)• Throughout the period the achieve­
ment of investment targets was lower for industry than any 
other sector and the gap between actual and planned industrial 
investment increased during 1959-65*
During 1951-65 there was a marked deviation of tne actual 
pattern of investment from the planned pattern. The extent 
of deviation again increased under the management of the 
Planning Board. Thus the implementation process upset the 
priorities of the Flanning Board to a greater extent than 
those of the Development Board.
The country's inability to invest available funds in 
sound projects, the large and increasing gap between targets 
and achievements and the distortion of established priorities 
during the implementation of plans resulted from a complex 
combination of administrative inefficiency, ambitious plans 
and political factors.
Thus for five of the six plans covering the period 1951-65? 
planners exaggerated the amount of funds that the government 
was prepared to devote to capital formation. Thus even if
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all the funds made available by the state had been invested, 
actual capital expenditure would have amounted to only 6 3 % 
of planned investment. The Planning Board assumed that it 
would receive 50% of oil revenues and the remainder of finance 
required would come from other government sources. This 
procedure not only obscured the failure of the government to 
allocate more than 50% of oil revenues for development but it 
also helped to distort priorities of the plans for the alloca­
tion of investible funds.
Plan implementation depended on the efficiency of Iraq's 
public administration which suffered from excessive centalisa- 
tioh, low morale, lack of co-ordination and a poor sense of 
urgency. Promotion was based on seniority, officials were 
frequently shifted from one position to another regardless of 
experience and quality. Few remained in one department long 
enough to become really expert. There was also serious 
defects in administrative procedures. After the Revolution 
of 1938 Government current expenditure increased rapidly but 
most of it went to departments like defence which had little 
direct connection with the capacity of the administration to 
implement plans, and the result was a regr.etahle decline in 
the ratio of capital expenditure to total Government expenditure 
between 31958 and 19&5 *
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The ratio of actual to planned expenditure was lowest 
for the industrial sector and this reflected the relative 
weakness of the Ministry of Industry. This was partly due 
to the re-organisation of 1959 which placed the machinery 
for implementation under the control of the Ministry of 
Finance. Although the Planning Board gave high priority 
to industry in the allocation of investable funds, the 
Ministry of Finance did not allow a parellel increment in 
the size of the administration dealing with industry. There 
is no doubt that other factors beside expenditure affect the 
capacity of an administration to implement pians (the internal 
organisation of each ministry, quality of its staff, the 
relative complexity of the field of work,etc.). But it was 
probably necessary to increase the personnel of the Ministry 
of Industry considerably in order to render it capable of 
investing all the funds allocated to capital formation in 
the industrial sector. In other words the Planning Board 
formulated investment programmes without proper consideration 
of the capacity of the Ministry of Industry to implement them. 
Would it not have been more sensible for the Planning Board 
to gear its industrial plan to the administrative capacity of 
the Ministry of Industry and to demonstrate administrative 
bottlenecks? At least this might have persuaded the Ministry 
of Finance to do something about it.
Political instability also hampered the rate of public 
investment particularly after 1958. Successive purges 
weakened the already weak administration and repeated changes 
in the orientation of the Govennment1s economic policy encoura­
ged conservativeness and the avoidance of responsibility by 
many officials. Political instability lowered morale and 
badly affected initiative at all levels o ^ administration.
In order to encourage private investment in industry 
the Government established the Industrial Bank in 19^6. The 
following year it also established the Central Bank while in 
19^2 it established a commercial bank.
Industrial enterprises need short term loans to finance 
their need for working capital, and longer terra loans to 
finance fixed capital formation. The requirements for 
capital differ from enterprise to enterprise but in a large 
number of firms the demand for working capital was larger than 
for fixed capital. Industrial enterprises used suppliers 
credit on a far larger scale than bank loans but this was a 
more expensive form of borrowing than credit from commercial 
banks. Furthermore, the failure of commercial banks to 
supply industry with sufficient short term credit was not 
due to their lack of liquidity. On the contrary these banks 
maintained substantial excess reserves. Nor could this 
failure be blamed on a preference for foreign assets because 
the banks simply preferred other local securities to industrial 
assets.
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The Central Bank of Iraq was established to facilitate 
the supply of credit to all sectors of the economy but it 
failed to appreciate the needs of industry, and never 
encouraged commercial banks to extend short term loans to 
manufacturers. Furthermore, by confining its discount 
facilities to short term bills of exchange and promissory 
notes of three month maturity it positively discouraged them 
from supplying long term credit to industry.
The Industrial Bank sought to encourage industriali­
zation through the provision of long and short term credit 
by way of participation in the equity capital of industrial 
companies, through the provision of technical assistance and 
by preparing feasibility studies of industrial projects.
Although the Bank accomplished useful work in most of these 
fields, up to 1950 it was handicapped by the shortage of 
funds but then its acapital was increased. Recently the 
financial resources of the Bank have declined because the 
Government failed to increase its paid up capital and because 
a large part of its funds were locked up in industrial enter­
prises which were nationalized. Although the Planning Board 
never utilized all the invests^ble funds made available to it 
the Board failed to appreciate the role of the Industrial 
Bank and refused to increase the Banks capital despite continuous 
requests to do so.
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Because commercial banks failed to meet industrial 
demands for short term credit, the Industrial Bank has 
devoted some of its resources to short term loans. Moreover, 
recently the Bank has started to reallocate its assets 
toward short term securities. It would, however, have been 
better for the Bank to concentrate on the provision of long 
term loans and for the Central Bank to have encouraged 
commercial Banks to meet industry*s need for short term 
credit; because the Industrial Bank was the only financial 
institution which provided long term industrial credit*, 
because commercial banks were less likely to be persuaded 
to advance long term loans; and because all resources of the 
Industrial Bank could have been utilized for the provision 
of longer term loans.
Up to 1965 the Bank participated in the equity capital 
of 21 enterprises but until 1964 it refrained from holding 
a majority of share holding. Recently it has changed its 
policy in order to exercise control over companies in the 
mixed (private and public) sector of industry. But since 
investors lack confidence in enterprises controlled by 
public organisations and if the Bank really wants to attract 
private capital and initiative into the mixed sector, it seems 
more sensible for the Bank to go back to the old policy.
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The Bank also provided technical assistance and pre­
pared feasibility studies for medium and small scale 
industrial projects. But its activity in this field has 
not been satisfactory basically because of a shortage of 
qualified personnel capable of undertaking technical and 
economic studies.
The government also promoted the growth of Iraqi 
industry by protecting it from foreign competition. 6riginaiiy 
the tariff was designed to obtain revenue but gradually 
the government used tfc to encourage domestic industry by 
levying low duties on imported inputs and high rates on 
Commodities which competed with domestic industry. Never­
theless, up to 1963 the tariff remained the single most
important source of revenue if we exclude oil revenues. In
general duties were kept at moderate levels in order to permit
a limited volume of imports to compete with domestic industry
and to provide revenue for the Treasury. The government 
fixed these rates haphazardly, a point which can be validated 
by the extremely wide variation in Iraqi custom duties levied 
for protective purposes anly. Thus in 19o2 duties varied 
from 17% to 170%, a range which could not b@ expected 
to reflect differences in efficiency of industries considered 
’’infants” .
Tariffs were supplemented by quotas and import prohibitions. 
Whenever the productive capacity of a domestic industry was 
thought to be sufficient for local needs the Government banned 
imports entirely. When local demand was estimated to be
23®
greater than available capacity the Government established 
a quota to bridge the gap. But the official investigation 
into these questions did not take into account any considera­
tion of long run efficiency. The Government made no attempt 
to compare domestic costs of production of an industry with 
real costs for the economy, or to ascertain whether the 
protected industry had any possibility of becoming efficient.
It attached little value to competition and saw no dis­
advantages in local monopolies.
The Government also utilized tax exemptions to encourage 
private investment in industry. The exemptions involved 
income taxes, stamp duties, real estate taxes and import 
duties. Apart from the latter all tax exemptions were 
a'tuomatic in operation. For example, profits not exceeding 
10% of paid up capital were exempted from income tax for five 
years and this exemption was granted to all industrial firms 
which fell within the scope of the law. But the exemption 
of raw materials from import duties involved Government depart­
ments in screening applications from every industrial firm 
each year. Theoretically this might be thought superior 
to automatic forms of tax ecemption because it enables the 
Government to operate a selective policy. But the adminis­
tration was simply not competent enough to appraise these 
applications efficiently and made arbitrary decisions. * The 
result was a continuous complaint of partiality by industrialists.
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It would have been preferable to set up this exemption on 
an automatic basis. Alternatively tariff rates could have 
been revised more frequently to reduce duties or eliminate 
them on raw materials consumed in large quantities by 
industrial enterprises.
The Government attempted to control the allocation of 
private investment in order to avoid an excess capacity.
Licenses were granted for the establishment of new enterprises 
and the expansion of old ones whenever the Government 
thought that domestic market could absorb additional output.
Market demand was estimated on the basis of incomplete 
information about consumption and no proper analysis of 
costs and prices was conducted before licenses were granted.
In fact, the system encouraged the production of any industrial 
commodity regardless of long run efficiency, Furthermore, 
the administration of the system was restrictive and cumbersome 
It involved several departments; none of which was capable of 
cohdueting cost benefit analysis efficiently and rapidly. Once 
again the policy makers overestimated the capacity of the 
administration and imposed on it duties far beyond its 
capacity•
Different public agencies were concerned with the industriali­
zation of Iraq. Thus tariff policy, investment programmes, 
quantitative impofct restrictions, monetary policy and tax 
exemptions were each dealt with by a separate body and the 
Government failed to co-ordinate their albeit limited efforts 
into a comprehensive policy.
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